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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the gap between what our science says and how many theorists and 
everyday people have characterised how we conceive of mental states. I argue that looking at our 
folk psychology (FP) in light of an understanding of real-world, current science yields beneficial 
philosophical results. FP, in the iteration that I shall be concerned with here, refers to every person’s 
ability to apply reason explanations to conspecifics’ behaviour. I focus predominantly on the 
underlying processes that we allegedly pick out in our folk psychologising, those of beliefs and 
desires (the propositional attitudes). The reason for this focus lies in the gap between our intuitive 
beliefs and understanding of our mental processes and the picture painted by the empirical sciences. 
I first explore some issues concerning traditional theorising on the topic, before discussing  current 
scientific research into pur cognitive processes in the form of predictive processing (PP) as 
advocated by Friston (2003, 2008, 2010), Hohwy (2013), and Clark (2016). PP depicts our brains 
not as passive, stimulus-driven organs, but as active constructors of our environment. An 
implication of this approach is that the way in which we represent the environment within our mind 
is different to how it is typically conceived within traditional FP. I also explore Hutto’s (2008a; 
Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017) claim that our minds are wired to be attuned to the environment in 
terms of minimal content, which allows me to develop a minimal conception of representation in 
terms of content, one in which direct correspondence between mental states and the supposed 
representation of the environment need not obtain for the mental to do causally efficacious work. I 
conclude that the beliefs and desires utilised in FP are socio-cultural impositions upon the neural 
substrate with no counterpart in reality. This has clear implications for our understanding of how 
we think about mental states within the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind, if what we are 
aiming toward is a clarification of just what the mental is. Additionally, these new insights may 
ensure that the cognitive sciences are better informed about what it is that is being explained and 
where to focus further research concerning the mental. 
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OPSOMMING 
In hierdie tesis word ondersoek ingestel na die gaping tussen huidige wetenskaplike modelle van 
kognisie en die alledaagse verstaan van hierdie prosesse wat deur beide leke en sommige teoretici 
aangehang word. Ek voer aan dat dit ons veral sal baat om ons volksielkundigevermoëns in die lig 
van toepaslike, onlangse wetenskaplike teorieë in heroënskou te neem. In hierdie skrywe maak ek 
gebruik ŉ verstaan van “volksielkunde” (VS) wat verwys na ons almal se vermoë om rede-
verklarings vir ons eweknieë se optrede te bied. Ek fokus hoofsaaklik op die onderliggende 
kognitiewe prosesse waarna ons volksielkundige uitlatings oënskynlik verwys, te wete, 
onderliggende oortuigings en begeertes (proposisionele houdings). Die rede vir hierdie benadering 
is die gaping wat tans bestaan tussen ons intuïtiewe verstaan van hoe ons kognisie werk en die 
beeld wat die empiriese wetenskappe daarstel. Die doel is dus om om vas te stel hoe ons ons 
volkverstaan en –diskoers rondom ons verstandelike prosesse moet bejeën in die lig van hierdie 
nuwe wetenskaplike modelle. Eerstens word tradisionele volksielkundige teorieë bespreek en van 
die problematiek wat hiermee gepaardgaan uitgewys. Dan word die kontemporêre kognitiewe-
wetenskaplike teorie van voorspellende verwerkings bespreek, soos voorgestel deur Friston (2003, 
2008, 2010), Hohwy (2013) en Clark (2016). Die voorspellendeverwerkingsteorie beeld ons breine 
uit as aktiewe samestellers van ons omgewingsverstaan, eerder as die passiewe, stimulus-gedrewe 
organe van die tradisionele verstaan. Gevolglik blyk dit dat die wyse waarop ons kognitiewe 
prosesse in der werklikheid ons omgewings uitbeeld drasties verskil van die alledaagse beeld wat 
ons van hierdie fenomeen het. Hierdie insig ondermyn daardie kognisieteorieë wat op ons 
volksielkunde gebaseer is. Verder  word die werk van Hutto (2008a; Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017) 
gebruik om te toon hoe ons kognitiewe verwerkingsprosesse waarskynlik ingestel is op ons 
omgewing by wyse van minimale kognitiewe “inhoud”.. Gevolglik voer ek aan dat daar nie ŉ 
direkte ooreenkoms tussen ons verstandelike afbeeldings en die omgewing hoef te wees vir ons om 
effektief met die wêreld om te gaan nie. Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die “oortuigings” en 
“begeertes” van tradisionele volksielkundige teorieë niks anders is as ŉ sosiaal-kulturele konstruk 
nie wat nie met die neurale werklikheid ooreenstem nie. Dus, indien ons ŉ akkurate beeld van ons 
kognitiewe funksionering wil vestig behoort ons die gebruik van hierdie konstruksies in ons 
kognitiewe en filosofiese teorieë te heroorweeg. Verder kan hierdie insig ook leiding bied ten 
opsigte van wat presies die fokus van die kognitiewe wetenskappe behoort te wees indien ons ons 
werklike, onderliggende verstandelike werking wil verstaan. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1. Beginnings 
The science and understanding concerning the mind, consciousness, and their relation to the 
body, has progressed in leaps and bounds over the past century. This, however, does not take 
away from the fact that there is a difference between what our science says and what many 
have taken it to mean when applying it to phenomena in the world. In other words, individuals 
do not always have an accurate understanding of what the science is even saying, including 
philosophers.  By way of example, one could ask a scientist whether Cartesian dualism1 is dead, 
and she would more than likely answer in the affirmative. But, as Dennett (1991a) has so 
forcefully argued, we are fooling ourselves if we believe this to be the case. Even advocates of 
materialism struggle to emancipate themselves from speaking in terms that belie dualistic 
thinking2. The philosophy of mind literature has not in all instances managed to rid itself of its 
dualistic inclinations, a problem compounded if the relevant science is not taken into account 
when discussing the mental. This, in turn, has also potentially affected the layperson’s ability 
to apply the science to ourselves and incorporate it into our general discourse. These 
considerations have led me to delve further into the literature surrounding a multitude of 
discourses on the philosophy of mind, which has arguably exerted an influence on our 
conceptualisations of the mind. How is our language and truncated understanding preventing a 
comprehensive image of the sciences relating to the mind/brain? How has this fostered 
outmoded ways of thinking? How has this thinking influenced us, even in our day-to-day 
interactions with others? Taking a cue from Dennett’s logical behaviourism3 (1991a; 2005), I 
argue that looking at our folk psychology (FP) in light of an understanding of real-world, 
current science would yield beneficial results for philosophers and laypeople alike. 
                                                 
1 Cartesian dualism finds its origins in the writings of Descartes (2008), and maintains a view of the universe 
which has a dual substrate, that of the mental and the physical. It has been the main source of argumentation with 
regards to the mind-body problem through the years. 
2 Hence Dennett’s formulation of what he calls Cartesian materialism (1991a: 107), a seemingly paradoxical 
concept which is nevertheless extant in the world. It is what we are left with once one throws away Cartesian 
dualism, but keeps the notion of a centrally-located, but still importantly material, area within the brain where 
consciousness is localised. 
3 More specifically, Dennett endorses the primacy of verbal reports in the introspection of mental states. It is all 
we currently have to be able to tease out the enigmas of the mind from a personal level. 
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FP, in the iterations that I shall be concerned with here, refers to every person’s ability to apply 
reason explanations4 to others’ behaviour, and also to how we tend to conceive of the intrinsic 
processes in the brain which constitute the mental states that we tend to pick out in others. 
These two levels must not be conflated, and I shall focus predominantly on the underlying 
processes that we allegedly pick out in our folk psychologising, which can confuse and blur 
conceptual lines. The reasons for this focus lies in the gap between our intuitive beliefs and 
understanding of our mental processes and the picture painted by the empirical sciences. Much 
like dualism still often has a stranglehold on our everyday intuitions, I argue that the way in 
which we view and utilise our FP is lacking in theoretical accuracy. Therefore, my project will 
be to incorporate the sciences and scientifically-inclined philosophy into further elucidations 
on how our minds potentially work. But my efforts will not be as general as that, as my project 
will be aimed at exploring how the folk conception of our minds and the social discourse 
surrounding it should be understood in light of these highly important fields of research. The 
purpose of this will be to tie the empirical, the philosophical, and the everyday conceptions of 
ourselves closer together. The benefits of this would be a clearer scientific understanding of 
the mental states we ascribe to each other, what they pick out in the world in juxtaposition to 
what we think we are doing. 
I contend that philosophy is in the process of clarifying, refining, and elucidating the conceptual 
hurdles which we come across within our exploration of our world5, and nothing more. To 
clarify, the philosophical discipline should reach toward descriptive claims in assisting the 
empirical sciences, and normative claims within the political, legal, and moral realms. To my 
mind, the good work that philosophy does can be subsumed into variations of the above 
categories. Incorporating this study into the preceding, reconceptualising the descriptive claims 
of what we are claiming mental states to be is a worthy extension of this broad approach to 
philosophy. Furthermore, and central to the aims of this thesis, I shall endorse a naturalistic 
worldview, which, in its broadest and most general sense, advocates theories which fit our best 
natural sciences. 
More specifically, I will endorse a form of pragmatic physicalism, which limits what we take 
the universe to be made of, but provides a far more practical platform for conceptualising our 
                                                 
4 Reason explanations refer to the narrative reasons we all utilise for the explanation of the behaviour of 
conspecifics. 
5 By “world” I mean more than the terrestrial, but instead refer to the broader implications of our lived experience 
in relation to the universe. 
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reality6. Physicalism, in its most broad iteration, refers to the idea that nature consists of only 
one kind of thing, i.e. the physical. Pragmatism, on the other hand, points to the philosophical 
position of treating the majority of fields and issues within philosophy in such a way as to focus 
on their practical benefits. There is an emphasis on applicability toward human experience, and 
thought directed toward this end need not necessarily represent reality as such. 
This means that there is space for indeterminate positions in our epistemology and ontology, 
which need not affect the task of the pragmatic philosopher unnecessarily. An indeterminate 
position is that which holds a fundamentally undecidable element within its makeup, where the 
borders are not easily drawn. To be pragmatic is to bracket issues of contention if they hamper 
effective conceptualisations. Pragmatic physicalism has become more prevalent within the 
philosophical literature. The “pragmatic turn” (Engel et al. 2013: 202) in philosophy of mind 
has shown a profusion of philosophers taking up the mantle of pragmatism and applying it to 
their theories (Ullman 1991; Varela et al. 1991; Churchland & Ramachandran 1994). This 
change in theoretical perspective has been due to the advantages provided by the practicality 
of shedding the straight-jacketing effect of sticking to conceptualisations overly reliant on 
mental “representation”. While not every philosopher has shifted toward this perspective, it is 
certainly true that many have thrown out or amended more traditional approaches to the mental 
with regards to concepts such as content, representation, and the like. Such traditional 
approaches often tend to focus on the content-rich nature of how the environment is represented 
within the mind. Content, in this technical sense, refers to the accuracy conditions of our 
representations. It is therefore taken to be a marker of how accurate our sensory impingements 
are in depicting the world. This thesis will advocate a minimal conception of representation, 
one in which direct correspondence between mental states and the representation of the 
environment need not obtain for the mental to do causally efficacious work7. I will claim that 
content-rich representations of mental states is a conceptualisation that has grown vastly out of 
hand over the decades, and at the very least needs to be reined in. Pragmatic philosophers have 
less need for content-rich representations, and may relax the pursuit thereof to explicate mental 
states (or the content inherent within them). This thesis shall go some way to elucidate the why 
                                                 
6 My position is reductive or deflationary with regards to specific phenomena such as the special properties of the 
mental and propositional thinking (as explained below). I therefore endorse a view which does not elevate the 
importance of these phenomena. 
7 As will be explained further on and throughout this thesis, this deflates the notion of a content-rich 
representational theory of mind to something more akin to selective bodily engagement with the environment. 
This is all without a corresponding internal “code” standing in for what the mental state is meant to be 
representing. 
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and the how. As we shall see, mental representation does not seem to do as much work within 
our cognitive processing as has been traditionally conceived. Hence, pragmatic approaches to 
the mental can potentially assist us in elucidating a more nuanced understanding of the 
continual interaction between mind, body, and world than most approaches that have come 
before.  
Not all theories within the philosophy of mind are the antithesis to what I propose, with some 
softer approaches ideal for integration, but some ideas must be done away with. For the 
purposes of my thesis, chief among these is the ascription of propositional attitudes (see below), 
as well as the conceptual content that such attitudes are purported to contain, at least when it 
comes to most modes of cognition. In other words, there is a possibility that there is not as much 
content in our apparent propositional thinking as has been proposed, and even the existence of 
the majority of propositional attitudes themselves are up for debate. Propositional attitudes, in 
their full-blooded guise, are closely aligned with content-rich representational theories of mind. 
If content-rich representational theories of mind are in themselves problematic, a deflationary 
approach to propositional attitudes is warranted. To tackle propositional attitudes is to tackle 
any representational theories of mind which are aligned to an internalised “language of 
thought”, trading in content that closely corresponds with that which it represents. I shall 
propose, after engaging with the literature on fine-grained mental processing and bodily 
engagement with the environment, that “propositional attitudes” are a gloss on what is actually 
instantiated at the neuronal level. It will be shown that propositional attitudes are more post-
hoc rationalisations of fine-grained mental processes that deal with consistent uncertainty. This 
will not result in an eliminativism with regards to propositional attitudes in terms of how we 
use them in day-to-day discourse, but it will reconceptualise what we are actually speaking 
about when we ascribe propositional attitudes to others. This has clear implications for our 
understanding of how we think about mental states within the cognitive sciences and 
philosophy of mind, especially if what we are aiming toward is a clarification of just what the 
mental is.  In addition to this, these new insights may ensure that the cognitive sciences are 
better informed about what it is that is being explained and where to focus further research 
concerning the mental. 
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2. FP as Propositional Attitude Ascription 
The importance of FP for the philosophy of mind has arisen as an expression of the issue of 
how it is that we can reliably know other peoples’ mental states (in other words, how we can 
read their minds) (Stich & Nichols 2003: 1). This issue relates to the complications surrounding 
other peoples’ minds and, more specifically, being able to extrapolate their mental states 
through their behaviour. In the philosophical field, FP is said to consist in our everyday ability 
to ascribe mental states to others in terms of their “beliefs”, “desires”, and so on. More 
specifically, a particularly influential view of FP has been that of conceiving of this ability in 
terms of propositional attitude ascription (Hutto 2008a: ix). A propositional attitude, first and 
foremost, is understood as an intentional state. Intentionality, within philosophy, refers to the 
directed nature of mental states, or the attitudes thereof: what they are “about” or “directed 
toward” (Hutto 2008a: 1). Propositional attitudes are typically in the form of a platitude such 
as “S believes that p”, where the agent in question is “S”, and “p” is a particular proposition, 
such as “this is long-winded” (Hutto 2008a: 1). Propositions are believed to be content-rich in 
their relation to the world, in that they closely correspond that which they pick out in the world. 
This is in contrast to the issues alluded to above by the more pragmatic school of thought, 
which advocates relaxing the need for mental states that correspond accurately to that which 
they refer. The problem of propositional attitude ascription will be analysed in detail in Chapter 
Two, but for now it is sufficient to know that this is the paradigmatic understanding that has 
informed much of the debate over FP. In other words, traditional FP presupposes accurate, 
inherent content that corresponds to propositional attitude ascription. In light of this, I shall 
proceed by setting up my argument for a view of FP which may rely on propositional attitudes 
as central to its operation, but does not claim to pick out what actually occurs in reality. As 
described earlier, content-rich propositional attitudes are looking increasingly hollow in their 
scientific accuracy. 
To develop my argument, a suitably comprehensive overview of FP and of the related cognitive 
processes and their interactions is needed. I shall be drawing from three broad philosophical 
and scientific fields in order to develop such an overview, namely: 
(1) The philosophical literature that has built up surrounding FP or, more accurately, what 
has been surmised it is we do when we folk psychologise. My discussion will serve as 
the grounds from which these views shall be problematised. Furthermore, I shall 
incorporate a potentially more accurate depiction of just what enables our FP abilities 
in the first place. 
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(2) The latest paradigm in neuroscientific theory as put forward by proponents of 
predictive processing (Clark 2013a, 2016; Hohwy 2013), which will be shown to 
amend the theories mentioned in (1) above by undermining the view of FP as 
propositional attitude ascriptions as accurately reflecting reality. Predictive processing 
appears to provide a scientifically more valid depiction of our fine-grained mental 
states, in opposition to propositional-style depictions of the very same. 
(3) An enactivist account of cognition, primarily form the writings of Hutto and Myin 
(Hutto 2008a; Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017; Hutto & Satne 2015). Enactivism, to be 
explained in Chapter Four, is an umbrella term which groups all theories that endorse 
a view that depicts cognition as a dynamic interaction between body and environment. 
This specific enactivist account argues against the plausibility of content-rich 
propositional thinking by advocating a minimalist view of the content of mental states. 
This theory is a compelling and plausible alternative to traditional thinking on the 
nature of the intentionality of the mental. This section shall be further subdivided into: 
a. A brief sketch of the problem of content ascription in the majority of our folk 
psychological reason explanations. 
b. An outline of the development of enactive theories of content. This shall then 
segue into a thorough unpacking of teleosemiotics (to be explained further 
below) as the most suitable theory of content for most forms of cognition, 
including supposed propositional thinking as depicted in FP. 
 
I shall end by introducing the potential determinants of how we pick out our apparent folk 
psychological propositional attitudes. But, for now, in terms of the problems surrounding FP 
as a theory of our mental states, there is a great worry that if the problems highlighted here hold 
weight, there is a high possibility that FP could be false. If the platitudinous ascriptions it 
envisions are false, as eliminativists about propositional thinking would have us believe (such 
as Churchland (1981)), we may have reason to do away with FP in terms of propositional 
attitudinal thinking. Perhaps the fixed content of the propositions which are said to pick out our 
mental states are not well designated by our folk psychologising, as propositional attitudes are 
potentially of an etirely different nature8. If this is true, if we cannot achieve empirical validity 
for our claims, how can it be said that we “correctly” folk psychologise? In other words, if the 
                                                 
8 I remain neutral for now as to whether this is a knock-down argument for our use of propositional attitudes 
within our day-to-day discourse. 
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propositional attitudes that we ascribe do not pick out reality, then we are clearly 
misunderstanding what is going on in people’s “minds”. Does this mean that our everyday folk 
psychologising is wrong? With this understanding of the resultant debates surrounding FP, 
philosophers are in need of formulating a more precise account of the nature of FP and what it 
picks out.  
With this in mind, Chapter One will first situate FP historically, highlighting the specific ways 
in which the concept “folk psychology” has been utilised in the literature. The focus will 
primarily be on FP as propositional attitude ascription—what it is and what a couple of theorists 
on FP have specifically proposed in this regard. A critique of FP understood as propositional 
attitude ascription will follow in Chapter Two. Thereafter, in the same chapter, I shall describe 
how narratives during our ontogenetic development, those laden with folk psychological 
terminology and concepts, appear to be the basis from which we develop our habit of folk 
psychologising. This implies that what occurs during our folk psychologising has more to do 
with what is forced upon us in our youth rather than with accurate hypothesising as to 
someone’s actual mental states. Social norms are communicated and internalised through these 
narratives, and inform our propositional thinking. This theory is articulated by Hutto (2007a; 
2007b; 2008a; 2008b) as the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH), and it opens the door for 
my own views on the social realm and how our FP is propped up primarily through a form of 
social scaffolding or the norms through which social communication holds. Further 
implications of this will be explored in Chapter Four when I tie the chapters together with 
regards to the interrelations between the themes of this thesis. 
 
3. Predictive Processing 
In Chapter Three, I shall investigate the ever-growing empirical work on the predictive 
capacities of the mind. I shall focus on the latest research in the neuro- and cognitive sciences 
relating to predictive processing. As the central focus of predictive processing is about the 
sufficiently accurate prediction of the organism’s environment, it overlaps with what we do 
from the macro-perspective of social mindreading. I introduce this body of work to show that 
our base mental states are not as semantically-loaded as previously thought. In addition to this, 
it is a prevalent discipline in the sciences which has been picking up steam over the past number 
of years, with an empirically strong foundation (Clark 2013a; Hohwy 2013; Seth 2015). 
Fundamentally, it is an empirical view of the underlying processes of the mind, which depicts 
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the brain as a predictive machine first and foremost. Granted, the explanandum here is more 
fine-grained than our ability to predict the behaviour of conspecifics, but there is a case to be 
made that these underlying processes influence the nature of our macro-predictions. It has 
fundamental implications for our understanding of the role of propositional attitudes within our 
reason explanations, depicting propositional attitudes as coarse-grained impositions upon the 
more probabilistic nature of our cognitive structures. “Probabilistic”, here, denotes that our 
mental states and processes are more concerned with finding likely environmental causes with 
a given range of inputs. 
As I work through what predictive processing entails, it shall become clear that I endorse a 
particular formulation of it, as proposed by Clark (2013a, 2016). The central idea of this model 
of the mind is the unification of cognition, perception, and action, as well as their interrelations. 
This is achieved through the application of a broad, computational paradigmatic principle, 
providing a conceptually coherent narrative in terms of which cognition can be elucidated. The 
important repercussions of this for FP relates to the effect that this theory would have on the 
extant view of our FP as accurately designating propositional attitudes on the cognitive level. 
If we are seeking to elucidate and explain reason explanations, and the existence thereof, in our 
folk psychologising, the predictive processing framework (if accurate) should inform any 
suppositions that we make in this regard. As we shall see, general propositional attitudes such 
as “beliefs” and “desires” do not easily fit into the predictive processing picture on the fine-
grained cognitive level. This leads some proponents of predictive processing (Clark 2016; 
Dewhurst 2017) to endorse a view of cognitive processing that depicts the effect of 
probabilistic models of the environment instantiated in the brain as what is actually being 
picked out by our folk psychologising. As I shall argue, while this need not significantly alter 
our everyday habit of folk psychologising as such, it significantly undermines the philosophical 
plausibility of much formal theorising on the topic. General FP may be a coherent heuristic in 
our social lives, but it should not be taken as empirically well-founded. In addition, the 
predictive processing framework could eventually seep into public discourse, altering the way 
that we describe our reason explanations. This, however, is not something that can be predicted 
with any certainty as of yet. 
Generally, the predictive processing view of cognition does not describe neurophysiological 
phenomena as such, but rather describes the computational capacities of the brain, the 
understanding of which can then be used to describe scaled-up behaviours of both brain and 
body (Clark 2013a: 187). This means that, on the predictive processing view, the possibility 
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remains that the sub-personal could potentially alter phenomena on the agentive level in ways 
that we have not yet grasped. As already mentioned, the predictive processing picture 
undermines the status of our folk psychological concepts as concepts that accurately pick out 
something in the world. In addition, predictive processing could potentially span the conceptual 
gap between science and folk understanding, and also do positive work on the (perpetually 
rickety) bridge between the hard and soft sciences. This conceptual gap concerns the mismatch 
between understanding how things actually work in the world (determined through the 
empirical sciences), as opposed to the everyday conception of how things tend to work 
(determined through heuristic social learning). I contend that aligning folk conceptions of the 
world more closely with the empirical would help at insulating ourselves from the harmful 
effects of misattributed causal reasoning9. This type of empirical conceptual clarification 
should be cause for celebration, and much hope has been placed on it by its more philosophical 
adherents (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016). 
As we shall see, predictive processing is at 180 degrees to the more conventional idea of the 
brain as a passive sensory machine, driven purely by stimulus. Predictive processing endorses 
a view of the brain as constructively perceiving its environment in an active and continually 
selective way. This involves top-down processing when assimilating environmental 
stimulations, as opposed to the classical view of stimulus-driven, bottom-up processing. This 
process gets cashed out in the form of continually formulated predictions of imminent 
environmental sensory experiences (Clark 2013a: 181-182). Any errors in prediction provide 
updates of existing representations for incorporation into future predictions, which is known as 
prediction error minimisation (ibid.: 186). This occurs, for the most part, below the level of 
phenomenal experience. Simply put, these predictions stand in the place of representations of 
the environment and are utilised by the brain for predicting future real-world sensory 
impingements, as well as their potential sources. Any mismatch between the prediction and the 
actual sensory input lead to prediction errors, which then need to be rectified. These predictive 
models replace the content-rich representations of the environment of classical theories. In 
Chapter Three, I will argue for minimally contentful basic predictive processing. This will 
serve to call into question the existence of the majority of propositional mental states. 
                                                 
9 One need look no further than how the elucidation of the complex interactions of neuronal wirings has affected 
our understanding of personality type and the effects thereof. For a typical example, elucidating processes at the 
neuronal level has helped explain the reasoning ability of autistic and similar individuals on the spectrum. 
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Moreover, predictive processing is also understood to emphasise action over perception, 
leading many to describe predictive processing as action-oriented, with perception mainly 
serving as the means by which knowledge is acquired from the environment in order to enable 
contextually-efficient action for organismic survival10 (ibid.: 185-186). I shall be going into 
further detail on this highly important point in Chapter Three. Briefly, an important idea that 
underlies all of the above, and which helps explain the evolution of the brain toward predictive 
processing, is that of the free energy thesis as developed by Friston and colleagues (Friston 
2003, 2009, 2010; Friston & Stephan 2007). The minimisation of free energy lies at the heart 
of the minimisation of prediction error within the neuronal dynamics of the predictive 
processing systems of our brain. This minimisation of free energy is thought to be the “path of 
least resistance” in the gradual evolutionary development of the mind/brain. It is free energy 
minimisation which is thought to drive much of the processing of the mind, whether at a fine-
grained level or at a more macro-perspective. A take-home point from Friston’s thesis is the 
frugal nature of the brain that we are left with (Friston 2010: 131-132; Clark 2015c: 14-18). If 
it is true that free energy is kept to a minimum, a view of the brain which utilises content-rich 
representation of the environment, in the form of propositional thinking, is further undermined. 
My discussion of predictive processing in Chapter Three will serve as necessary background 
for my critique of FP as traditionally conceived. I will provide a brief overview of some of the 
literature on predictive processing (PP) as a foil to my view of FP, which is somewhat at odds 
with tradition in that I will be downplaying the existence of propositional attitudes as actual 
cognitive mental states. I shall go into detail concerning the characteristics of this view of FP 
to provide a suitable platform for an understanding of FP as conventionally understood. The 
background concerning predictive processing shall serve to elucidate a view of brain 
processing that I do endorse due to its empirically-grounded approach. Once these fields of 
research have been adequately unpacked, the possible effect that predictive processing could 
have on our understanding of FP shall be expanded upon. Specifically, I will focus on the ways 
in which predictive processing would broadly affect our view of the scientific plausibility of 
propositional attitude psychology. To take our folk understandings of belief and desire as prime 
examples, their clearly delineated and determinate nature when utilised within folk 
psychological discourse would not readily fit into the more fine-grained, probabilistic 
framework endorsed by predictive processing, but this shall become clearer in Chapter Three. 
 
                                                 
10 This also fits neatly into how many enactivist theorists view the role of cognition to be. 
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4. Teleosemiotics 
In Chapter Four, a further view of the mind as endorsed by Hutto (primarily in Hutto 2008a; 
Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017, Hutto & Satne 2015) will be explicated. Primarily, this is an 
enactivist view of basic11 cognition and its relation to the apparent content of such cognition. 
The need for introducing this field of research lies in how it explains what is represented within 
our mental states, and in particular how it affects our understanding of propositional attitudes. 
Predictive processing goes a long way in subverting our understanding of how our mental 
world is constructed, but an enactivist-style teleosemiotic approach adds to the debate by 
depicting our base mental states as only minimally contentful (Hutto 2008a; Hutto & Myin 
2013a, 2017). Minimum content refers to the arguable fact that we need only have few accuracy 
conditions within our mental states which delineate how a mental state can misrepresent 
something in the world. If this view is correct, this has negative ramifications for propositional 
attitude psychology. If there is minimal content on not only the sub-personal level, but also the 
personal, agentive level, this inevitably affects traditional FP theories. As already mentioned, 
propositional attitude psychology predominantly entails a view of cognition that is constituted 
by suitably rich content of the environment and, as such, cannot operate with minimal content. 
Recall that “content” refers to the accuracy conditions of propositions, and the accuracy 
conditions of  propositions require rich content to be able to say anything about the world, in 
the sense of whether they accurately represent what is in the world or not. Minimal content 
theories have clear ramifications for our understanding of the cognitive paradigm, and – along 
with the problematisation that predictive processing also places on the propositional attitudes 
– alters our understanding of our cognitive selves.  
To explicate this view of minimal content in our cognition, Chapter Four will proceed in a 
series of steps. Firstly, the problem of content-ascription for the majority of our cognitive 
processes will be introduced and expanded upon. Thereafter, a step-by-step guide through the 
literature concerning the emergence of alternative enactivist theories of cognition will be 
unpacked in order to provide a suitable grounding for a more minimal construal of cognitive 
content in the brain. Then the problem concerning one of the most prominent theories of mental 
content, namely teleosemantic theory (primarily from Dretske 1988; Millikan 1984; Papineau 
1987), will be unpacked, and I will try to address this problem by means of my own amendment 
to the theory. The reason for introducing teleosemantic theories of mental content lies in the 
                                                 
11 As will be reiterated in Chapter Four, “basic” here refers to the foundational processing of our minds, and not 
to a “simplistic” mind. 
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fact that they are the most accepted naturalised theories of content, while still not going quite 
far enough in their purported project of naturalising content. The “-semantic” suffix refers to 
the inherent content of our mental states. Teleosemantic theories focus on the “normative” 
aspects of this content within our intentional states, therefore relating them to function first and 
foremost, in that our intentional states are directed toward distal stimuli for a particular reason 
(Hutto & Myin 2013a: 74). In teleosemantic theories a particular intentional attitude serves a 
“normative” function through appeal to the “correct” teleological reason for its existence. The 
evolutionary history of the intentional state, for example, embeds its function into the cognitive 
makeup of the organism (ibid.: 76). Teleosemantic theories can be understood as general 
approaches as opposed to specific theoretical explanations of how minds obtain content in the 
first place. This content serves the function of representing the world in an accurate fashion, 
which makes representation a key element within theorising of this ilk, with propositional 
thinking often being central (ibid.: 75). The semantics of our internal mental states are seen as 
derivative of these originary functions. 
Taking this understanding, I shall introduce and argue for an amendment to these teleosemantic 
theories. This shall take the form of a teleosemiotic account of content, as endorsed by Hutto 
(2008a; Hutto & Myin 2013a; 2017). Teleosemiotics, on Hutto’s construal, performs a similar 
role to teleosemantic theories in terms of intentionality, but he emphasises a lack of semantic 
content within the intentional attitude of the organism. According to the teleosemiotic approach 
to mental content, when an organism tracks features of the environment, semantic content need 
not exist. This view of the brain as lacking in semantic content sits well with the predictive 
processing view as minimal content speaks to the need for minimal processing power. 
Therefore, once the suitable groundwork has been laid, I will expand on theories of brain 
processing which may appear to be counterintuitive at first glance, but which will be shown to 
potentially have more scientific validity than theories that make use of tacit, semantic, 
representational, propositional attitude ascriptions. Here, I will specifically explore the 
plausibility of the claim that extensive content is actually instantiated within our mental states. 
This is why I will first present an argument for minimal-to-no- semantic content for the 
majority of our cognitive functions by backing this with an amendment to teleosemantic 
theories of content which, while admirable in their naturalism12, have a supposition at their 
core that renders them problematic in their veracity. This will serve as a further basis for my 
                                                 
12 By admirable I mean their predilection for empirically-valid scientific theories of the human mind. 
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thesis, which endorses a view of content in day-to-day cognition that is minimal and 
fundamentally of a more covariant nature. Covariance speaks to a relational function between 
stimuli and mental states, rather than informationally-accurate content. How this relates to FP 
is in the way that minimal content acquisition affects the alleged content of the propositional 
attitudes. Here, I will draw primarily from the work of Hutto and Myin (Hutto 2008a; Hutto & 
Myin 2013a, 2017; Hutto & Satne 2015), as their minimal theory of content appears to cohere 
well with the predictive processing account of the brain with its emphasis on the minimisation 
of free energy. Hutto, specifically, views content as minimal, as he is, by his own admission, a 
radical enactivist, endorsing a view of cognition as constituted through highly dynamic 
interaction between the body and environment with minimal content acquisition in the majority 
of our intentional states. This pushes him to endorse a highly pragmatic, naturalised theory of 
cognition, whereby the mind/brain utilises resources in a frugal manner to incorporate features 
of the environment, be it the physical or social environment. On top of this, action and 
behaviour come about in service of the survival of the organism, wherein accuracy conditions 
do not allow for the necessary frugal processing, linking it with the literature on PP. 
Onn Hutto’s view, talk of content representation is highly problematic as it appears to be adding 
phenomena to the brain which need not exist (Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017). Throughout the 
literature there is an understanding (indeed a fundamental assumption) that mental content is 
sourced from the environment through the senses, taken into the brain, and then represented in 
some fashion for further discrimination, either immediately or in the form of episodic memory 
and the like. It is a view, whether tacitly or overtly accepted, that envisages the brain as 
typically operating in more-or-less input-output terms. This is the cognitivists’ line of thinking, 
which treats the brain as a closed circuit of mental processing that has as its primary function 
the processing of a continual stream of sensory information (Branquinho 2001: xv). Hutto 
rejects this wholeheartedly, with very few reservations. In Chapter Four it will become clearer 
why he does so, and I shall be using this core divergence from the conventional cognitivist 
view of cognition as the primary hook from which to hang the rest of this thesis. The 
conventional cognitivist who thinks that we continually take in sensory information (which 
informs our propositional attitudes) is diametrically opposed to Hutto’s view, as well as to the 
predictive processing account of cognition. Hutto (Hutto & Myin 2017; Chapter Five) argues 
that the core approach of the teleosemantic view of mental content certainly does do good work, 
but that we need to go a little further and ditch talk of “representation” altogether. 
Teleosemantic theories are useful for explaining the base tracking of environmental stimuli, 
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but there is no need to posit additional semantic properties over and above this to elucidate 
what we are trying to explain. Instead, according to him, we should appeal to a form of ur-
intentionality (Hutto & Myin 2017, Chapter Five; originally introduced in Hutto & Satne 2015), 
which strips intentionality down to its core instrumental functionality of being focused on distal 
and internal stimuli, but without richly contentful representation thereof. He proposes that our 
mental states do not represent content in as detailed a fashion as is generally assumed. If our 
mental states are not saturated with detailed content and operate on a more streamlined and 
visceral level of interaction with the environment, then it is difficult to support a view that 
insists on their accurate representation of the environment. For our purposes, this is of interest, 
as this would apply to the content of supposed propositional attitudes as well. On the predictive 
processing construal, with its streamlined approach to sensory intake, it seems plausible that at 
most an attenuated form of representation is taking place. 
 
5. The Social Mind 
The view on representation discussed above will inform my view on FP, predictive processing, 
and my views on how our cognition is shaped in general, which is what I will address towards 
the end of this thesis. As mentioned above, utilising Hutto’s views, in Chapter Four, I shall use 
a predictive processing lens along with teleosemiotics to propose a scientifically-plausible view 
of our mental states that has no need of full-blown representation and hence of propositional 
attitudes. This is all in order to overturn the philosophical biases that have crept into our 
common discourse and to offer an alternative view of our minds which is more scientifically 
grounded than has traditionally been the case in philosophy of mind. If we accept a model of 
our cognitive processes where these primarily involve predictive processing and minimal 
content, we shall need to revise our understanding of propositional attitude ascriptions and what 
role they play in our folk psychologising. However, I shall argue that this does mean that we 
need to do away with our practice of folk psychologising as such, partly because propositional 
attitude ascription is but one stone in the greater edifice that is our folk psychologising. 
Furthermore, everyday folk psychologising works, in the sense that it allows us to get by in our 
social environment. However, we need to be very careful not to conclude that this success is 
due to us accurately picking out beliefs and desires in others. 
To end this thesis, in Chapter Five, the importance of assimilated cognitive norms and concepts 
such as social scaffolding and narratives, as briefly mentioned above, will be shown to 
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harmonise with the predictive processing framework as well, even with a view of cognition that 
has minimal content-ascription. Our social and ontogenetic development will be shown to be 
the basis for much of what is assumed by the propositional attitude view of our folk 
psychologising. It shall be proposed that enculturation and the narratives within social 
discourse shape how we come to understand and develop our folk discourse. It will be argued 
that reason explanation in the folk psychological paradigm need not assume the actual existence 
of content-laden propositional attitudes in the majority of cases of social cognition, and can 
instead be viewed as a cultural affectation that is only afforded to us as a gloss on our 
fundamental mental processes. It will be shown that reason explanation is more than likely 
retrospective instrumental13 thinking that affords us a grip on an otherwise cognitively fuzzy 
environment, providing platitudes that guide us along pathways that work in the macro-
perspective of general social interaction. I shall argue for a deeper, embodied view of our minds 
that does not work on much more than assimilated social norms incorporated into the predictive 
processing framework, delineating a sub-version of FP which I shall call Dispositional Folk 
Psychology (DFP). 
The conclusions to be derived from the preceding bodies of work will describe a view of the 
mind as a frugal, or productively lazy (Clark 2015c: 9-12, 14-18), machine in a loose sense. 
Evolutionary affordances (Gibson 1979) over centuries of human development, so it shall be 
argued, have provided us with a brain/body system which seeks to maximise available 
resources toward the survival of the organism, by minimising free energy. The canonical 
definition of an affordance treats it as something within the environment of the organism which 
matters to it, for better or worse (ibid.: 127). The minimising of free energy lies at the base of 
the predictive processing account of the brain, as stated above, which means that an organism’s 
affordances are constrained by the underlying principle of frugality. Accessing such 
affordances would require as direct a line to the body’s environment as possible, something an 
a priori prediction machine utilising non-semantic covariant information could do far better 
than a constructivist machine relying on incoming sensory content. What appears to count here 
is the minimisation of free energy for maximum gain, with organismic survival being 
paramount. The evolutionary tricks to minimise this free energy have accumulated over 
millennia to arrive at complicated, complex processes14, which have aggregated to provide a 
                                                 
13 Instrumental thinking is that which incorporates appropriate cognitive means to a particular mental task. It is 
therefore crucial for intentionality, and by extension desire, traditionally conceived. 
14 As most in the biological fields stress, this in no way amounts to a guaranteed teleological outcome of perfection, 
and it certainly does not mean that humanity sits on top of the pile, superior in all the ways that count. We don’t, 
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motley arrangement of functionalities. Not all of these are positive, as the body can only work 
with what has been given, which means that often the body’s adaptions are jury-rigged over 
time for alternative purposes than originally intended. These shifts in functionalities are visible 
in the way that the brain has adapted over time, utilising less-than-optimal material to weave a 
tapestry that works well enough. There is a continually-expanding body of research which 
highlights how previous adaptations have been co-opted for new purposes, and occasionally 
into multiple functionalities. Exaptation is the technical term used to describe phenomena such 
as these. They can range from the innocuousness of a particular inert gene suddenly binding to 
a novel hormone, to the complexity of our neuronal wiring being utilised for functions other 
than those which it evolved for (Sapolsky 2017: 381). 
It is from this work that a growing understanding of the brain as a flawed yet impressive 
machine has emerged. From here, it is not so far a leap to my view of the mind as a flawed 
prediction machine, co-opting previously evolved processes of environmental navigation 
toward this end. Everything that follows, be it language, norms, culture in general, are 
secondary to base survival, utilising environmental tracking mechanisms which have been 
further co-opted for these more nuanced features of our environment. Staying with the notion 
of survival, no longer is it dependent solely upon prudent reaction to physical environmental 
phenomena, but also upon prudent reaction to social environmental phenomena, in the form of 
cultural affordances (Ramstead et al. 2016). This is where my formulation of DFP plays a role 
as the assimilated social variant of the evolutionary game. Our social environment, as 
intangible as it may appear to be, has potentially facilitated a late-developing capacity in our 
brains to predict social affordances in just the way that other, more tangible, affordances have 
facilitated prediction capacities earlier in our developmental history. Again, it is plausible that 
these social predictive capacities have co-opted the already extant general predictive capacities 
of the brain toward this end, more than likely in a less-than-optimal way, and this has served 
us well enough in our evolutionary history. The end of Chapter Four will primarily be 
concerned with this view of our mind/brain. 
By the end of this thesis, a more nuanced understanding of these brain processes, as well as 
their possible effects on social cognition, will have been developed. The counter-intuitive 
nature of much of what will be proposed might be taken to count against my argument, but our 
intuitions should not affect our acceptance of the science, and this includes current theories on 
                                                 
and we aren’t. Having said that, advanced brain processing just so happens to be among the most complex 
phenomena known to man. 
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the ways in which predictive processing and teleosemiotics inform our understanding of our 
everyday cognition. The minimisation of free energy thesis within the predictive processing 
framework can complement a frugal teleosemiotic account of cognition, whereby minimal 
content exists in the brain for the majority of cognitive processes that utilise such content. This 
translates into a view of cognition that does not trade in content-rich propositional attitudes of 
many traditional folk psychological theories, which is the major point of interest and 
contribution of this thesis. While some traditional FP deals in content-rich propositional 
attitudes, I will conclude that it is an abstraction of our neural reality, regardless of its efficacy 
within social discourse. The implications of this are that it gives us a greater understanding of 
what we are actually doing when we ascribe beliefs and desires to others. Furthermore, it 
follows where the science is taking us, as opposed to hanging on to philosophical baggage. 
Regardless of the eventual validity of these claims, scientific work only progresses with a 
concerted effort toward adopting, absorbing, or eliminating theories. It is this drive for 
soundness in hypothesising that shall encapsulate much of what my project will entail. 
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Chapter Two: Folk Psychology as Propositional 
Attitude Ascription 
 
“Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher. 
I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything.” 
- Anthony Chemero (2009: ix) 
 
1. Introduction 
To begin a reworked assessment of what people actually pick out in the world when predicting 
other peoples’ behaviour, we need to look at what has been said regarding folk psychology 
(FP). An attempt to ground our capacities to predict others’ behaviour through empirical 
research and scientific methodologies was made, marking the pertinent distinction between our 
common-sense understanding utilised in our everyday explanations, and the how of the very 
same15. In other words, they began to separate the way in which people understood and 
explained each other’s behaviour and the neurological processes which underlie these abilities. 
As shall become clearer later on in this thesis, not only are the methods by means of which we 
arrive at reason explanations16 difficult to determine, but the very common-sense 
“understanding” of behaviour that people have is conceptually muddled at the very least. 
Compare the following: a highly contextually-bound conversation incorporating complex 
instrumental thinking17 with someone’s interaction within a crowd of people (be it with brief 
smiles or finer expressions of bodily intent), instantiating a minimal construal of instrumental 
thinking. What will become clearer in later chapters is that most of our cognition follows 
thinking, in its attenuated sense, of the second sort. This type of thinking does not involve 
representational, content-rich propositions of the sort often associated with instrumental 
cognition. This type of thinking will be shown to fold into a processing system within the brain, 
as discussed in Chapter Three, which generally enables successful navigation of the most 
pertinent environments for everyday human functioning (which includes the social 
                                                 
15 The debate on how we folk psychologise is a diverse topic, with many adherents falling predominantly in either 
of the Theory-Theory, Simulation Theory, or the Hybrid Theory construals of FP (Stich & Nichols 2003: 238-
251). The details of these need not concern us for this thesis, as these point more toward the methodologies we 
allegedly employ in our folk ascriptions, rather than the issues surrounding what these ascriptions entail. 
16 “Reason explanation” here refers to the elucidation of the behaviour of conspecifics within particular contexts. 
17 In this paper, instrumental thinking is construed as the explicit “rational” thinking that people are familiar with 
as they overtly and purposefully think about specific things. 
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environment). But for now, I shall simply preface what is to follow with the caveat that when 
thinking of our brains as generally interpreting information in this second sense, it is very 
difficult to accept the sketches of how the mind predicts behaviour as often put forward by 
cognitive theorists. Nevertheless, reviewing some prominent traditional views of Folk 
Psychology will inform our subsequent theorising on the topic and will aid us in reformulating 
a Theory of Mind (ToM) that draws on contemporary science. A ToM, here, refers to the ability 
in all of us to ascribe mental states (such as our beliefs and desires) to ourselves as well as 
others (Scholl & Leslie 1999). Furthermore, it is the understanding that others have differing 
mental states to our own. 
There is a very influential view of ToMs within the fields of the cognitive sciences, philosophy 
of mind, and others. Whether explicit or not, it endorses a particular viewpoint on what occurs 
during interpersonal folk understanding18 when we enact our ToMs. As Mölder (2016: 6-7) 
describes it, this is borne out by what he calls the Folk-Mentalist Thesis, an implicit view in 
these fields which describes the mind as exclusively comprised “of mental states as 
individuated through folk psychology” (ibid.: 7)19. Mölder (ibid.: 7) stresses that this is an 
implicit assumption that is widespread within the literature. The term “folk understanding” can 
also be substituted for “common-sense understanding”, as these denote the same phenomenon 
(Ratcliffe 2007b: 56). They speak to a view of human interpersonal understanding as an 
everyday ability whereby people can derive an understanding of the behaviour of others 
through the attribution of beliefs and desires (amongst others) to their conspecifics. An example 
would be the attribution of a belief to someone of the effect “DSbelieves that p”, but this will 
be expanded upon below. These, assuming a baseline cognitive ability in those involved, we 
tend to attribute to anyone. Churchland (1998a: 3) elucidates this quite clearly when he states 
that FP is 
 
…the prescientific, commonsense conceptual framework that all normally socialized 
human beings deploy in order to comprehend, predict, explain, and manipulate the 
behaviour of humans and the higher animals. 
                                                 
18 It will become clear that the “interpersonal” is the baseline from which many studies of FP work, but concepts 
within FP are often utilised in a broader sense than simply interpersonal belief/desire attribution, which will be 
discussed. 
19 This Folk-Mentalist Thesis is derived from two implicit theses, the one being what Mölder calls The Folk 
Assumption, that “mental states are individuated through folk psychology” (2016: 6), the other being The 
Mentalist Assumption, that “the mind is solely composed of mental states” (ibid: 7). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 20 
This ability appears to manifest itself, whether through genetically-endowed innate processes 
or in ontogenetic development20, independently of what we may eventually learn from 
scientific studies concerning the mind and its functioning. In other words, people acquire or 
learn the folk psychological framework, despite not actually understanding the base 
neurological processes that it is assumed to describe. Despite folk psychological practice 
centring on this acquired understanding of the interpersonal domain, prevalent folk 
psychological theories are aimed at describing the mental states on which the practice is 
predicated. 
The point here is that there is an accepted, highly influential view of folk psychology which 
trades in belief-desire attributions (to be further explained below), and which rests on the 
assumption that these have something interesting to say about what actually occurs at a 
mental/neural level, and is referred to when we folk psychologise. It is this that will 
predominantly concern us for the rest of this chapter. 
I shall begin this chapter with an historical overview of such theories of folk psychology, 
namely, those that construe it as entailing propositional attitudes. I will describe what 
propositional attitudes are, and how they are thought to function and work within our folk 
psychologising. I will then look at a couple of the most influential theorists who have argued 
for and against propositional attitudinal thinking in their writing. This will serve to highlight 
some of the central assumptions of such folk psychological theories, which I will go on to 
critique. My main criticism will be aimed at conceiving of folk psychology primarily as 
accurately picking out propositional attitudes that somehow exist at the neuronal level. A 
prominent example here is Fodor who, despite claiming that he does not hold this view, 
seemingly ends up arguing for it nevertheless (2003: 155). This will lay the groundwork for a 
more scientifically-valid theory of what occurs in our common-sense understanding of others, 
which is a primary concern of this thesis. Hutto’s notion of the Narrative Practice Hypothesis 
(Gallagher & Hutto 2008; Hutto 2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 2008b), and the work that 
narratives perform in our cognitive development and subsequent reasoning, will be shown to 
be a cogent explanation of the temporally-extended effects that culture has on the development 
of our FP abilities. This further undermines the validity of describing the propositional attitude 
ascriptions in our folk psychologising as accurately picking something out in the world. The 
preceding will open up space for the following chapter on the predictive abilities of the brain, 
                                                 
20 Ontogeny is the development of any organism from its origin to its mature form, whatever that may consist in 
for the particular organism. 
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which needs to be understood before introducing teleosemiotics and an alternative 
interpretation of how the mind tracks environmental cues later on. For now, folk psychological 
thinking as propositional attitude ascription that accurately picks out something in the world 
will be called into question. 
 
2. Propositional Attitude Psychology 
2.1 Propositional Attitudes and Folk Psychology 
 
When people folk psychologise, they attribute mental states to others primarily on the basis of 
the observation of behavioural patterns. These mental states are taken to be the intentional 
states21 of the others under observation. The concept of an intentional state has a long history 
in the philosophical field22, but can simply be described as the “being aboutness” of a mental 
state (Hutto 2008a: 1). In other words, it is what that particular mental state is “directed 
toward”, or what it is “about”. For example, when a mental state involves a belief that there is 
an empty coffee cup on a table, we can assign the simple fact that that mental state is directed 
toward the existence of that empty coffee cup. Therefore, the mental intentional state is 
somehow directed toward the empty coffee cup. Traditionally in the folk psychological 
literature, talk about intentional states predominantly focuses on two types, those of “belief” 
and “desire”, but there are many others (such as fear, hope and so on). Fodor (1987: x, and 
Chapter One) is indicative of this tendency when he describes our common-sense psychology 
in terms of the application of a belief/desire dichotomous pairing23. To understand behaviour, 
according to Fodor, one must ascribe a belief and/or desire to the agent in question in order to 
make sense of the agent’s behaviour. He goes so far as to say that “there are no alternative 
                                                 
21 In the broad field of philosophy, intention should not be confused with intension (with an s), which refers to the 
non-extensionality of specific words or phrases. To use an example, the extension (what the concepts denote in 
the world) of the phrases “organism with a liver” and “organism with a pair of lungs” are the same in that, in 
reality, organisms that have lungs also have kidneys. In contrast, however, the intension (the semantic content) of 
the concepts “liver” and “pair of lungs” are different. “Liver” and “lungs” have different meanings. Moreover, the 
shared extension here is contingent; these phrases could have had differing extensions, had animals evolved 
differently. This is not terribly important in this treatment, but some philosophers of language would perhaps 
argue otherwise. 
22 It is a term that was revived by Franz Brentano in the nineteenth century from medieval philosophy, and taken 
up again by late twentieth century philosophers of mind (Dennett 1987: 19-20). 
23 A mental state consisting of a belief is understood to guide behaviour in some form, while a mental state 
consisting of a desire is a motivator for behaviour through the integration of end-directed aims. This pair of mental 
states, belief and desire, are what are usually used within the folk psychological literature. After my description 
of predictive processing is introduced in Chapter Three, it shall be shown how the clear distinction between these 
two is problematic. 
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theories [of behavioural explanation] available” (Fodor 1987: x). Searle (1983: 1) states this 
very same idea even earlier in his project on the intentionality of the mind. To Searle, our 
intentional states can only be those that contain beliefs and desires with inherent content. They 
must be about something, and that something informs what amounts to a propositionally-laden 
attitude. While intentional states are more than just these paradigmatic examples24, talk of FP 
trades almost exclusively in them. These paradigmatic mental states are expressed in the form 
of “propositional attitudes”, where a person “D” is being mind-read by a conspecific, and this 
mindreading takes the form (within the conspecific) “D desires c”, “D believes that p”, and so 
forth, where “c” and “p” denote propositions such as “I see a cup of strong coffee” or “strong 
coffee will fix this” (Hutto 2008: 1-2). For the concepts of “belief” and “desire” to be 
efficacious, their meaning must be analysable in terms of sentences specifying the mental states 
under which people would behave in ways appropriate to the desires or beliefs in question 
(Stich & Nichols 2003: 2). 
The ways in which these concepts are used within our folk psychologising fix their meaning 
within the broad theoretical framework of our FP (in other words: their causal role is 
important). On this view, FP (as a theoretical framework analogous to any science) explains 
our mental states by attributing beliefs and desires that are taken to accurately represent the 
mental states in question (ibid.: 4). What is certainly indisputable is the centrality of the use of 
propositional attitude ascription within FP discourse and its utilisation by people for 
behavioural understanding in interpersonal communication (Hutto 2008a: 2). What is also 
taken for granted is that those utilising FP genuinely interpret such propositional attitudes as 
causally determinant internal mental states that those under observation possess (ibid.: 5-6). 
These mental states are seen as causally determinant in that it is these propositional states that 
are taken to be the true instigators of behaviour. Dispositional states have seemingly been 
ignored in much writing on the topic for this very reason (Ratcliffe 2007b: 205-211). 
Dispositional states refer to a form of mental state which does not deal specifically with 
propositional content that is actually entertained, but that nevertheless has the potential to give 
rise to a particular belief or desire. In other words, they somehow have the capacity to become 
full-blown, intentionally-directed states if the requisite environmental prompting is present 
(ibid.: 204). It is not easy to attribute a propositional attitude to that which is not very clearly 
attributable on the dispositional construal, and hence the problem has been largely ignored. Our 
language, in the form of describing propositional attitudes, seemingly cannot capture this state 
                                                 
24 For a good discussion on this, see Grzankowski (2012). 
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of affairs except through fairly broad holistic descriptions of the mental states under question 
(most prominently in the form of the beliefs and desires that we all ascribe to people). In other 
words, our descriptions of these particular mental states cannot be delineated further than the 
usual propositional attitudinal ascriptions, despite these not necessarily accurately describing 
these mental states. As I will argue, FP is accurate only insofar as it is utilised for coarse-
grained behavioural understanding. Despite this, there is a sense of realism in talk attributing 
content to mental states for the purposes of prediction. Folk practicing FP generally manage to 
separate states involving beliefs and/or desires when appropriate and, while true in a 
holistically pragmatic sense, these are taken as accurately depicting the internal mental states 
of conspecifics (ibid.: 210-211). 
Therefore, while theorists of FP believe that the processes involved in attributing propositional 
attitudes are mostly tacit, they also assume that explicitly elucidating our propositional attitudes 
can be indicative of what occurs beneath the surface (ibid.: 8). Proponents argue that it is 
possible to gain insight into the internal mental states of individuals through more rigorous 
philosophical analyses of what is expressed. Propositional attitude ascriptions (the utterances 
referred to above), such as “S desires p”, are deemed to be a window into this murky world, 
and they are termed “platitudes”, and anyone with a suitably operating cognitive ability would 
not deny their claims25. What is important to take from this though, is that these platitudes, vast 
in number, all appear to interrelate in suitably structured ways between the mental states 
possessed by individuals and their resultant actions (Malle 2004, see Chapter Four). And due 
to the seemingly obvious relationships that the platitudes seem to indicate between mental 
states and their impact on the world, it encourages the view that the study of our FP offers a 
conceptually unified (up to a point) understanding of our inner cognitive processes. This 
understanding is made manifest, it is thought, through these aforementioned platitudes that 
operate in a law-like fashion (Ratcliffe 2007b: 6) and is achieved with minimal effort on our 
parts. We all know these generalised platitudes as objects of common knowledge26. 
In light of the above, FP consists of our ability to predict and attribute these mental states to 
others, all in the service of explaining their behaviour. This is known as the mindreading aspect 
of our FP (first alluded to, but not explicitly named, in Stich & Ravenscroft 1994). Mindreading 
refers to the ability of individuals to attribute propositional mental states to conspecifics, which 
                                                 
25 For extensive and seminal treatments of this conception of our FP, see Lewis’ (1966, 1970, 1972, 1994). 
26 These platitudes, as explained in Chapter One of this thesis, come in the form: “S believes that p”. 
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are then used to predict and explain their behaviour27. Generally, these mental states are thought 
to be information-rich (i.e content-rich in the form of propositional attitudes) and to be 
represented in some fashion within the minds of others, which explains their behaviour. Hence, 
propositional attitudes, as bearers of content-rich information, function as the reason for 
particular behaviour, which can lead to prediction by others through the mindreading aspect of 
FP (Stich & Nichols 2003: 6)28. Crucially, the platitudes (and by extension the propositional 
attitudes) mentioned above are seen as identical to the content-rich mental states that enable 
mindreading (ibid.). 
 
2.2. Fodorian Folk Psychology 
2.2.1. The Language of Thought and Fodorian Folk Psychology 
 
A prominent thinker who endorses a view which is quintessentially of the nature set out above 
is Fodor (1975, 1978, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2008b). I make particular mention of him as his 
views on theory of mind, and in particular his Language of Thought (LoT) hypothesis (Fodor 
1975, 2008b), presuppose a scientific as well as a propositional view of the mind. His thought 
on the topic trades in talk of generalisations of a law-like nature, modules29, and the predictive 
power that these all afford (as with the rest of this thesis, the importance of the power of 
prediction always bubbles to the surface). The importance of this, for our purposes, rests on the 
scientific view that Fodor holds, but which nevertheless stops short of incorporating functional 
indeterminacy within his theory of mental processes. Here, functional indeterminacy refers to 
the indeterminate nature of mental processing mechanisms or, more specifically, how these 
even came to be within environments with a plethora of distal causes. Indeterminacy of mental 
processes denotes the inability to always accurately fix the content of mental states to the 
environment. Arguably, it is difficult to entertain the view that mental states accurately 
represent particular environmental stimuli if there are potentially multiple causes of these 
representations within the environment. If there are multiple causes which set the accuracy 
conditions of a mental state, we run into problems when needing to elucidate their definitive 
causal histories. This does not bode well for rich propositional content that trades in robust 
accuracy conditions, and this shall be a prominent point within the rest of this thesis. 
                                                 
27 A clear example would be the mental states attributed to a pedestrian at a road crossing with a lot of traffic 
passing by. We attribute the mental state that she believes that she should stop and, disaster notwithstanding, we 
are often correct in our assumptions. 
28 It is for this reason that Stich & Nichols (2003: 6) point toward the “information-rich” aspect of FP. 
29 Talk of delineated modules and law-like generalisations can easily be transposed to the world of folk ascriptions. 
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Thinking, on Fodor’s view, operates in a form of mentalistic language (his LoT), instantiated 
in a complex but systematic web of representations, which “is at the heart of [the] systematicity 
of thought” (Fodor 2008b: 20). The question of neuronal correlations aside, these 
representations are combined in a syntax30, along with attendant semantic31 relations. These 
allow for the processing of these representations in a causal manner. In other words, 
representations are capable of causing other representations within the syntactic chain (ibid.: 
199). Much emphasis is put on the semantic relations that are afforded by this combinatorial 
system, and thinking is effectively deemed to be a “tokening” within the brain of the requisite 
structured representations (which include both syntactic and semantic characteristics) (ibid.: 5-
6). On top of this, Fodor argues that individuals are realist when it comes to propositional folk 
ascriptions, and uses his fully representational theory of mind to defend the validity of this 
view (Ratcliffe 2007b: 6). It is worth noting that the incredible predictive power of the brain is 
made vastly more understandable if this view of how thinking occurs within the mind is at least 
partially correct. The type of mental states that inform our FP abilities would naturally follow 
from this fully representational depiction of mental states. This is one of the reasons why it has 
been so popular since its inception. 
Fodor has always advocated a computational, strictly cognitivist, model of the mind (one can 
scan any of his works to arrive at the conclusion that he is a strict functionalist). Cognitivism 
(briefly alluded to in Chapter One) has been the dominant view detailing the mind and its 
relation to the brain within the literature since midway through the 20th century. While the 
details do not matter as much to this thesis, these days it has detractors (e.g. Clark 2013a, 2016; 
Hutto & Myin 2017) that take issue with its overly simplistic notion of passive sensory uptake 
and representation of this sensory information within the mind (a view to be problematised in 
the following chapters). Drawing from this, Fodor’s thesis maintains that every mental state is 
identical to what could be called a monadic property within the mind (Fodor 1994: 12-16). This 
property can be characterised as the connective relation to an explicit mental representation. 
As these mental states are seen to be type-identical to computational processes, the mental 
states can be interpreted as symbolic, with their representations involving the compositional 
qualities/properties of syntax and semantics (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988: 12). Within his LoT, we 
can begin to see the value this would have with regards to how the syntactic and semantic 
structure of the mind could form a system of innate “Mentalese” (Fodor 1994: 167) which 
                                                 
30 Syntax refers to the structural relations which exist between words and sentences, which provide the principles 
upon which sentences are regulated within a language.  
31 Semantic refers to the inherent meaning of words. 
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supervenes32 in some form upon the structural underpinnings of the neuronal processes (Fodor 
2008b: 15). Therefore, the propositional attitudes, in turn, are instantiated within this complex 
web of Mentalese, providing just the causal and explanatory power needed to make thinking 
intelligible to us, while also bearing a relation to the monadic state mentioned above (Fodor 
1994: 13). In other words, the propositional attitudes bear special relations to explicit mental 
representations, which have content identical to the propositional attitudes themselves. This 
provides the systematicity of thought that all (non-compromised) human beings seem to have 
(Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988: 40). The type-identity conflation of propositional attitudes and 
mental representations as somehow supervenient upon the neurological substrate of the brain 
will be critiqued (or problematised) throughout this thesis. 
 
2.2.2 The Disjunction Problem and Adaptational Denialism 
 
The problem, on my construal, is that while Fodor captures a sense of continuity between the 
properties of the environment (the “content”) and mind with his LoT, he makes use of a view 
of mental content which is too “narrow” to account for its causal and explanatory powers. 
Narrow mental content is defined as mental content which is not determined by the individual’s 
environment, but purely by the intrinsic properties of the individual. In other words, if there 
were to be a duplicate of said individual in a significantly different environment, this duplicate 
would necessarily still have the same content within her cognitive apparatus. This is in 
contradistinction to “broad” mental content, which incorporates the environment of the 
individual (including elements of the individual herself) to determine mental content. 
Accordingly, a duplicate of this individual would have differing mental content to the original. 
This is partly why Fodor struggles to conceptualise the derivation of content from the 
environment.  
Fodor’s ideas on propositional thinking are highly dependent on the “intact” cognitive 
perceiver, whose perception and cognition are functioning properly (1987: 126-127). Errors of 
misrepresentation are allegedly ruled out when the cognitive apparatus functions in a “proper” 
fashion (ibid.: 101-102). The emphasis, on my construal, on the “intact” cognitive perceiver 
seems to dismiss the accepted notion of ourselves as fundamentally flawed in our perceptual 
                                                 
32 Supervenience is a term with a lot of weight within specific philosophical spheres. For the simplest explanation, 
if something supervenes on something else, a change in the latter necessitates a change in the former. Therefore, 
if Fodorian Mentalese supervenes upon the neuronal substrate, a change in the neuronal substrate would 
necessarily lead to a change in the Mentalese instantiated by these structures. 
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and reasoning abilities at even the conscious level33. While he has dropped an overtly narrow 
view of content since his (1994), as noted within his recent work, Fodor’s views on 
evolutionary processes provide insight into his misgivings concerning how content is fixed 
within mental states. 
Fodor (Fodor 2008a; Fodor & Piatelli-Palmarini 2010b) endorses a distinctive view of 
evolutionary adaptationism which seeks to undermine standard, in his terminology, 
“Darwinism”34 (ibid.). On his view, current theories on natural selection have fundamental 
flaws which are in need of rectification. Fodor argues that these flaws apply to all phenotypic 
traits (Fodor & Piatelli-Palmarini 2010b: 154), but its import for content determination within 
our mental states are what fundamentally concern us here. His argument follows the contour 
of his renowned disjunction problem35, namely, that it is difficult to distinguish between causes 
which are content-determinant and those that are not (Fodor 1994: 40). These causes have a 
direct bearing on the content (accuracy conditions) of mental representations. On Fodor’s 
construal, a theory on representational content must make it clear how it is that a representation 
is capable of misrepresenting. In other words, what would make a particular representation a 
mistake, in terms of representing something in the world as having properties it does not have 
or being something other than it is. The disjunction problem underscores the difficulties in the 
acquisition of specific mental states through adaptation, as there could not be an easy mind-to-
world fit (as explained below). 
If one stimulus, let us call it S1, accounts for a particular mental representation M, delineating 
an adaptational attunement of the mental to that stimulus, we can say that there is no disjunction 
evident. But, if there is a second stimulus S2 that also triggers mental representation M, how 
are we to separate the adaptational attunement between mental representation M and either 
stimulus S1 or S2? By way of (an admittedly timeworn) example, if both chicken (S1) and 
duck-in-the-dark (S2) cause the representation M, this representation is instead constituted by 
the disjunctive chicken-or-duck-in-the-dark (S1 v S2). The issue, here, is that if both disjuncts 
reliably trigger the “chicken” representation, what is it about the “duck-in-the-dark” triggering 
that makes it a misrepresentation? This is the argument underlying Fodor’s issue with 
adaptational and holistic depictions of content acquisition (ibid.). But in fact, the entirety of 
                                                 
33 Kahneman (2011), Greene (2015), and Sapolsky (2017) are excellent contemporary sources detailing this very 
topic. 
34 The term itself should ring alarm bells as there are a multitude of evolutionary theories on offer which would 
fall under the bracket of Neo-Darwinism. The name alone appears to be introduced to construct a straw man 
argument for easy dispatchment, despite the ever-adaptable nature of evolutionary theory. 
35 This idea was first formulated in his (1984), and thereafter developed in subsequent works (1987, 1994). 
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Fodor’s thesis on the topic is a masterstroke in wonderfully-argued obfuscation. According to 
him, what M actually represents is not either a case of S1 or S2, but rather the actual disjunction 
(S1 v S2) (ibid.). To him, there is a gap in our understanding if we are forced to attribute the 
result of adaptational processes to a disjunction as opposed to either of the disjuncts. If both 
the disjunction and either of the disjuncts are on the table, invoking correctness conditions does 
not get us out of the problem as there is no principled way, according to Fodor, to distinguish 
between the two using an adaptational theory of content. An adaptational theory of content can 
account for a representation, but cannot account for one (eg. chicken) being the correct 
representation and the other (eg. duck-in-the-dark) being a misrepresentation.  No matter how 
fine-grained our analysis, we are still left with an indeterminacy at the core of our theory of 
content—we cannot account for mistaken representations. As a result, we need to accept that 
there is a fundamental problem at the heart of naturalising our content by means of adaptationist 
theory if we cannot undo this kind of result (ibid.: 48). Therefore, the functional indeterminacy 
engendered by the disjunctive relation is untenable on his view, which is the reason for his 
dropping of the “Darwinist” program, as selection-for (using the evolutionary term) is 
overdetermined36. 
To explain away the disjunction problem, Fodor has introduced his theory of “asymmetric 
dependency” (Fodor 1987, 1994). According to this theory, while duck-in-the-dark may cause 
a “chicken” tokening within the brain while not seeing an actual chicken, duck-in-the-dark only 
instantiates “chicken” tokens because chickens actually do. To be more precise, if chickens 
don’t instantiate “chicken” tokens, then duck-in-the-dark (or any other objects which also cause 
a misrepresentation) would not do so either. But, even if duck-in-the-dark did not cause 
“chicken” tokens, chickens would still instantiate “chicken” tokens. If one is able to sever the 
connection between the chicken and “chicken” tokening, one would sever the duck-in-the-dark 
and “chicken” tokening, but not the other way around. This is why the duck-in-the-dark to 
“chicken” tokening is asymmetrically dependent upon the chicken to “chicken” tokening 
relation. It is not clear to me how this truly gets to the heart of the issue. This seems more 
semantic handwaving than a fundamental game-changer in explicating the accuracy conditions 
of our mental states. It stipulates in purely conceptual terms the way in which we can reliably 
misrepresent an object, but it does not introduce a robust explanation of the causal history of 
the misrepresentation which the disjunction problem embodies. An alternate path we can take 
                                                 
36 In other words, there are potentially more than one possible cause of a particular representation, and we cannot 
distinguish between an accurate and an inaccurate representation of a particular phenomenon in the world. 
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is to explain the disjunction problem away with an appeal to the way in which our minds have 
evolved to pick out information in the environment.  
As Rosenberg (2013: 5-8) correctly points out, it is selection-against which evolutionary 
pressures actually dictate, without purpose or end-directed aims. In other words, while 
evolutionary processes are blind to the end result or consequences of their pressures, Darwin’s 
main theoretical accomplishment was that of 
 
…identifying the mechanism—random, i.e. blind, unforesighted variation and passive, 
environmental filtration that sculpts the appearance of purpose in nature, even though 
there is no reality of purpose operating in it (ibid.: 6). 
 
If evolutionary theory is understood as passive and as a “mechanism of filtration” (ibid.), we 
can accept the view, contra what Fodor has written on the topic, which is that seemingly 
disjunctive properties can filter through despite no clear reason for the selection for these traits. 
The passive mechanisms of filtration in nature are only in the business of preventing traits from 
persisting which are not conducive to the continued survival of the organism. If we take natural 
selection to be an imprecise and gradual change in an organism, the selection for particular 
mental states at all times seems to be an illogical extension of evolutionary theory. Evolutionary 
processes need not select for a trait at all times, it need simply select against that which is not 
pertinent to the survival of the organism, and this also means that a lot of residual evolutionary 
baggage would not simply disappear. Extending this to dispositional mental states, the 
organism does not need to evolve mechanisms that instantiate determinate mental states 
consistently as there is seemingly no sufficient evolutionary pressure to evolve many of these 
mechanisms in the first place. This does not rule out determinate mental states, but it does allow 
for less determinate mental states in our cognitive processing, contrary to what Fodor would 
want with his representational theory of mind and LoT. Beliefs and desires can exist on this 
view, but not in the rigid fashion that Fodor would insist upon. Fodor’s theories simply do not 
align with evolutionary theory, and worries about disjunctive properties are misplaced. For 
example, if we take a probabilistic and minimally contentful view of mental content37 seriously, 
we need not worry about the accuracy conditions of each mental state if dealing with 
uncertainty is inherently built into our cognitive architecture. Our mental states can 
misrepresent as long as it does not impair our more pertinent interactions with the environment. 
                                                 
37 To be properly expanded upon in Chapters Three and Four. 
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To make this clearer, Fodor argues that the concepts of propositions cannot be broken down 
further than the constituents of language, meaning that these concepts cannot be individuated 
into even simpler constituent concepts (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988: 48-50). Mental 
representations, to him, are the individuated, linguistic components of propositional thinking, 
which affords the seeming systematicity of our thought and general cognition (ibid.: 48). For 
him, the unsystematicity that would proliferate in our cognition if we were to take any other 
theory would be “preposterous” (ibid.: 49, emphasis in original). If we were to ignore the 
semantic and syntactic relations afforded by a LoT, all we are left with is a “list” of 
representations38 (ibid.). While holding the view that the conceptual meanings of propositional 
attitudes are atomistic (or, cannot be broken down into further constituent parts) (Fodor & 
Lepore 1992: 206), he has expanded this view into the aforementioned generalised viewpoint 
of how adaptational accounts do not suffice to allow for the selection of content through the 
adaptational history of the organism (Fodor & Piatelli-Palmarini 2010b). To grasp Fodor’s 
views a little more, it is worth understanding his use of the constrast between “selection-of” 
and “selection-for” (ibid.: 110; Sober 2010: 595). His example is that of a population of 
theoretical entities in which some have hearts and a significant proportion do not. The hearts 
not only pump blood, but also make sounds. Needless to say, those without hearts do not have 
either of these traits. Both of these traits are called “coextensive” as they are contained within 
the same organisms within the given population. If, after time, we find that all of the organisms 
now have hearts, the question arises as to what caused this change in circumstance. Assuming 
natural selection occurred, which Fodor certainly does despite his misgivings, we can assume 
that organisms which had hearts to pump their blood had increased capacity for survival and 
reproduction (i.e. fitness) in relation to those that did not. As the aforementioned traits were 
coextensive, it can be stated without controversy that those organisms with the heart noises 
were fitter than those without. 
This is all well and good, until Fodor (and Piatelli-Palmarini) attempt to problematise the 
distinction between selection-of and selection-for. The problem goes as follows: natural 
selection occurred, selecting for the pumping of blood, but there was no selection for the 
creation of the heart noises. Again, this is not problematic. But, while there was selection of 
                                                 
38 This paper was specifically in response to connectionist theories of mental cognition, where they instead 
advocated for a symbol-based LoT. Connectionism refers to the application of approaches in artificial intelligence 
to the understanding of the brain, whereby multiple connections between brain cells enable simultaneous 
processes to function. Furthermore, many processes are nested in parallel hierarchies that eventually form mental 
states and assorted phenomena. 
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both of these traits, there is only selection for one of the traits (the pumping of blood). This is 
where Fodor (and Piatelli-Palmarini) take issue: they state that any claims that natural selection 
selected for one trait but not the other of two coextensive traits cannot be true. To the authors, 
all that natural selection can truly achieve is selection-of two coextensive traits. If one is 
selected, then so is the other, and there is nothing else that can be said about it (ibid.: 154). This 
appears to necessitate a rejection of how the sciences manage to separate causal relations (the 
selection for the pumping of blood increased fitness) and mere correlations (the “thump-
thump” noises that merely came along for the ride) (Block & Kitcher 2010; Papineau 2010; 
Sober 2010: 596). The authors do not see it this way, and maintain that there is something about 
selection-for that is problematic (Sober 2010: 596). They would maintain that there is a “fact 
of the matter” concerning which trait caused increased fitness, but they deny that natural 
selection as currently understood could possibly distinguish between the actual cause of the 
increased fitness and the accidental, co-extensive trait (Fodor & Piatelli-Palmarini 2010a). 
Therefore, they assert that it is not simply that we are barred from truly knowing that one trait 
(the pumping of blood) was selected for, but that any such claims are simply false. There simply 
is no such fact of the matter. Taking it further, there are simply no laws about selection-for due 
to the high context-dependence of each case of adaptation. The complex nature of the 
environment makes it impossible for natural selection to provide sufficient laws which govern 
selection-for, as all instances of selection-for would need to have laws which dictate what they 
all have in common. 
The above is a form of adaptational denialism. The general framework provided by Fodor is 
too simplistic a case to make against adaptational processes, and is ultimately unhelpful. I argue 
that Fodor’s approach toward natural selection is a hangover from his view of the 
indispensability of the atomistic constituents of the propositional attitudes. Arguably, his 
argument about the disjunction problem is the proto-argument for his subsequent discussion on 
the inability of selective processes to fix adaptational traits. The above selection-for issues map 
directly onto Fodor’s worries about the disjunction problem in that they are clear cases of 
undecidability that need to be explained, at least on Fodor’s construal. Instead of accepting that 
misrepresentation need not be a fundamental issue when discussing the disjunction problem, 
or that selection for either of two traits need not be an issue when discussing adaptions, Fodor 
bites the bullet and advocates a clear grounding for each. In light of the above, I argue that 
Fodorian thinking on propositional attitudes is a deeply problematic mindset if we want to think 
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adequately about the constituents of our mental lives39, especially when it informs our 
evolutionary history. Fodor’s arguments fly in the face of the work done in naturalising 
philosophical theories within the cognitive sciences, where intentional attitudes and the content 
thereof can plausibly be shown to be either suitably grounded in plausible scientific theories, 
or explained away. Without further incorporation of scientific analyses into his theorising, it is 
also difficult to falsify neuroscientifically. For instance, as discussed in Chapter Four, it will 
be shown how we can allow for sensitivity to the environment without needing to adhere to 
strict content-determination. Arguably, suitably naturalised theories will be grounded in an 
evolutionary understanding of our brains, which can account for the adaptation of our mental 
states. Fodor would not support the proposals in this thesis due to his seeming adaptational 
denialism, but to naturalise propositional attitudes, and to solve (or more accurately explain 
away) the disjunction problem, the issue of the ostensible indeterminacy of content needs to be 
entertained. I propose that the disjunction problem falls away if we incorporate the 
teleosemiotic account of intentionality expanded upon in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the atomistic view of the propositional attitudes, as supervenient upon our 
cognitive architecture, will be undermined through a theory of the indeterministic nature of our 
fine-grained mental processes, as expanded upon in both Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. 
 
2.3. Churchland 
2.3.1. Churchland’s eliminativism 
 
Another prominent thinker on the attribution of propositional attitudes within our folk 
psychologising is Churchland, who set out to dismantle FP as we know it (primarily in (1981), 
but also see (1985), (1998a), (1998b), (1998c)). I choose to discuss his views in order to show 
the opposing poles of the FP debate, and to therefore show the scope thereof. To Churchland 
(1981: 67), if FP is to be taken as an empirical theory that reliably describes the regular 
correlation between stimuli and behaviour, it is not obvious that propositional attitudes are 
realistic depictions of individuals’ mental states. His central concern is the possibility of the 
scientific falsehood of much of our theoretical folk psychologising. To him, there remains the 
looming possibility that the disparate phenomena within our FP could fail to reduce to our 
actual mental states in a future science, which would necessitate dropping these concepts 
                                                 
39 Or, as Dennett (2013b) would say, we need to pump our intuitions in another direction. 
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altogether40. The broad terminology we use to describe the mental states of others could then 
be subsumed and replaced by this mature science’s construal of the inner workings of the mind. 
This, according to Churchland (ibid.: 70), would not bode well for the efficacy of FP as a whole, 
but especially for thinking about our beliefs and desires as taking the form of the much-vaunted 
propositional attitudes. Therefore, invoking the propositional attitude “S believes that p” could 
fail to describe any concrete mental state at all, beyond a false, pre-determined holistic 
ascription of an individual’s behaviour41. What is meant by this is that an adequate fine-grained 
depiction of what is being picked out by our folk psychologising will not necessarily equate to 
the depiction that we use in our everyday behavioural ascriptions. Therefore, the “theory” used 
to explain behaviour (the propositional attitudes) will be false, strictly speaking, and only 
depicts the holistic dispositions of the agent (ibid.). FP as a theory must therefore be eligible 
as a “candidate for elimination” (Churchland 1981: 212) as more accurate theories are 
developed. This view has led Churchland to proclaim that there are no such things as beliefs 
or desires42 (ibid.: 89). This provocative claim has often been used as a club with which to beat 
the back of Churchland’s reasoning43, as taking it at face value has led to emotive retorts 
ridiculing the very idea. But this response has generally been unfair, as the actual focus of his 
sustained attack has been the view that our beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes in the 
conventional sense. On his view, beliefs and desires (and whichever other relevant mental 
states under investigation) cannot exist in this form. He does not rule out the possibility that 
what we take to be our beliefs and desires can be reinstated in some future science, but in a 
different theoretical terminology that accurately depicts what is happening at a physical level 
in the brain (ibid.: 86). This approach could be taken to mean the death of beliefs and desires 
(in the traditional sense), and therefore the eliminativist’s creed appears to be doing away with 
something integral to our self-conception (ibid. 1998b). However, to give a fair assessment of 
his view, a more comprehensive critique should be attempted. 
 
                                                 
40 I am not personally enamoured with this all-or-nothing reductionism. I do not view it as a useful methodology 
within our epistemological concerns, including the eventual basis of what occurs in the mind with regards to our 
folk psychologising. Simply explicating our underlying architecture does not necessitate a sea-change in the way 
in which we operate at a social level. I advocate tempering our argumentation and letting the chips fall where they 
may. 
41 By “pre-determined” I refer to the socio-culturally acquired meaning of what a propositional attitude entails, 
and by “holistic” I refer to the notion that these meanings are adequate for our social interaction, but do not 
accurately pick out our mental states. 
42 This point is argued even more forcefully by Stich’s early writings (Stich 1983: 231). 
43 Any response from Fodor drips with sarcasm, see for example Fodor & Lepore’s Chapter Seven in (1992). 
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2.3.2. Churchland’s eliminativist thesis 
 
On Churchland’s (1998a: 11-12) construal, it is not evident how the vast set of general “laws” 
involved in our FP can be applied in a rolling and continual fashion through the manipulation 
of sentential propositions in the brain. The task appears to be unnecessarily complex for such 
nuanced interaction and subsequent comprehension of others’ behaviour44. Much like the 
notion of minimising free energy, which shall be expanded upon in the next chapter, these 
complex interactions seem unnecessary to provide the benefits of our folk psychologising. In 
his words, it is wholly “mysterious” how these “prodigious feats of retrieval” could function 
optimally in our “ongoing social commerce”45 (Churchland 1998a: 12). Churchland, in a move 
that ties in with the spirit of this thesis, asks us to look at the emerging account of the way in 
which brains are understood to “encode” information (ibid. 1995: 21; 1998a: 10; 1998b: 31; 
1998c). In contradistinction to Fodor’s LoT, he does not endorse a view of the brain embodying 
disparate information in sentence-like structures. Instead, he attempts to bring this view into 
the modern scientific age with his endorsement of vector coding46 within the brain, which is 
potentially a more plausible theory of how the brain “represents”47 information (ibid. 1993; 
1995: Chapters Two and Three; 1998c). 
One of his favoured analogies to illustrate the power of vector coding is that of the television 
screen in relation to our own retinas (ibid. 1995: 7-8; 1998a: 13-14). Television screens, in his 
words, depict “a sequence of representations which are non-sentential” in both their “syntax as 
well as their semantics” (ibid.: 1998a: 13). The “semantics” within this analogy refers to the 
intensity of the activation patterns of the screen pixels, designating the content, while the 
“syntax” is rules governing the arrangement of the many pixels in just such a pattern.  There is 
no logical structure beyond the activation of the many brightness intensities along the screen 
pixels. In much the same way, our photo-receptors have similar activation patterns. In this 
example, the “semantics” can be understood as pictorial, but different sensory modalities yield 
differing semantic relations. For example, taste codes activation patterns across the tongue, just 
                                                 
44 Churchland (1998a: 12) also pointed out that individuals can seldom express how it is that they attribute their 
folk abilities. Ratcliffe (2007b: 46-52) performed an informal experiment to detect just what the folk think 
understanding (on the interpersonal level) means, leading to a similar conclusion.   
45 Of course, at face value, simply because it doesn’t seem possible should never discourage a research paradigm. 
It is conceivable, for example, that various underlying processes take a lot of the burden enabling a sentential 
propositional language in the brain at some higher level. 
46 Vector coding refers to the mapping of activation patterns across the brain. 
47 The reason for the scare quotes shall be explained once I go into the issues surrounding representation further 
in this thesis, but I shall refrain from using them excessively from now on as it is Churchland’s terminology. 
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as sound codes activation patterns across the auditory canal. The semantics of the above are 
clearly very different, but the underlying processes encode a vastly powerful tool of 
representation, regardless of the form in which this representation takes. The power of this 
picture of representation as vector coding is made evident once one realises that one singular 
vector representation is only one arrangement of the myriad values available, and the potential 
values available (or things able to be represented) increase on a logarithmic scale as more 
values are incorporated (ibid. 1995: 7; 1998a: 13). Compare the hundreds of thousands of pixels 
that a television screen can display, and the millions that our photo-receptors embody. Not only 
do these millions of values activate a vector across the target population of retinal neurons, but 
these can then be transformed across multiple neuronal populations, ending in the effector 
motor neurons responsible for action in response to the original sensory input (ibid. 1998a: 14). 
Here the television analogy breaks down, as the sheer number of potential neurons, ranging 
from the millions to the billions depending on where you draw the functional line, are smaller 
and incorporated into more than simply the two dimensions of a television screen. 
On Churchland’s view, the connections along the uncountable synaptic pathways embody the 
stored knowledge and learned ability of the individual, enabling a form of learning that does 
not trade in sentential structures, but multiply combinatorial vector “prototypes” (ibid. 1995: 
27-34; 1998a: 14). These prototypes comprise the “learned perceptual and explanatory” 
capacities of the individual. Furthermore, these prototypes inform our perception over and 
above what is taken in through our sensory apparatus at any time48 (ibid.). It is these prototypes 
that enable, indeed embody, our explanatory capabilities, and inform our perception. The 
massively parallel processing49 capabilities of the brain, utilising the background perception 
that these activation vectors afford, cause behavioural responses to occur within milliseconds 
of response time. Thus, 
 
[t]o learn a theoretical framework is to configure one’s synaptic connections in such a 
fashion as to partition the space of possible neuronal patterns into a system or hierarchy 
of prototypes. And to achieve explanatory understanding of an event is to have activated 
an appropriate prototype vector from the waiting hierarchy (ibid. 1998a: 15). 
                                                 
48 Interestingly, by articulating this, Churchland had hit on something akin to what shall be introduced in the 
subsequent chapter in terms of the percepts that predictive models are thought to represent in the brain. He even 
states that these prototypes “constitute ampliative interpretations of that input, interpretations that place the input 
into an antecedently prepared context and fund expectations of features so far unperceived” (Churchland 1998a: 
14). In other words: these prototypes can be interpreted as predictive models upon which we subsequently act 
upon the world. 
49 Parallel processing is a technological term which refers to simultaneous processing within a singular computer. 
This has been extended to the operations of the brain. 
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In this way, our perception, prediction, understanding, and action, are all interlinked in a mutual 
operation centred on vector processing50. But what does this lend to Churchland’s view of the 
untenable nature of our current understanding of FP? He states that it is this very vector 
processing paradigm which informs FP, or more precisely the “family of learned vectorial 
prototypes” (ibid.) is simply what FP is constituted by. On my construal of his work, what he 
is alluding to here is that, when attributing a “belief” while folk psychologising, we are instead 
picking out the end result of the vastly complex internal dynamical relations of the brain instead 
of a canonical “belief”. The prototypes are the higher order neuronal arrangements which 
broadly correlate to these attributed beliefs, but do not represent them in their delineated form 
as understood by the folk. It cannot be assumed that “the intentional idioms of FP” (ibid. 1981: 
82) actually represent what is important within our cognitive processes, not to mention that we 
may have inherited a partly incoherent framework through our folk learning. 
Churchland also makes an interesting point regarding the normative aspect of FP: the 
regularities (or “logical relations”) that are said to hold between propositions does not say 
anything about their essential nature, it simply says what we value about the patterns we ascribe 
(ibid.: 82-83). What we value is simply what can be predicted from a macro-perspective in 
order to understand the behaviour of our conspecifics. Furthermore, looking at the evolutionary 
development of humanity and the relatively late emergence of language, it seems implausible 
to model our internal mental states as fundamentally and essentially constituted along the lines 
of language (ibid.: 83). We appear to have mistaken an intuitive learnt grasp of others as an 
insight into mental necessity51. As a result, the old view of FP as sententially-mediated in the 
form of propositional attitudes does not have a space in a future ontology. It is this which 
underlies his eliminative materialist project, arguing for the possible reducibility of our current 
understanding of our FP. Folk psychologising can instead be reconstrued as describing “a 
kinematics of activation patterns and a dynamics of vector-to-vector transformations driven by 
learned configurations of synaptic connections” (ibid.). Vectors could arguably be used to 
account for the compositionality and systematicity of thought, as opposed to the propositional 
thinking that Fodor endorses. To me, however, Churchland does not make it clear enough just 
how he demonstrates that propositional attitudes are effectively eliminated on this view. Vector 
coding is an admirable theory and explanation of how our brains may represent the 
                                                 
50 This unitary conception of cognition shall be a theme which recurs in Chapter Three’s account of the predictive 
nature of the brain. 
51 To paraphrase an excellent line from Dennett (1991a: 401). 
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environment, but it serves more of a descriptive function than an eliminativist one. To describe 
mental states in terms of vector coding, we are not doing sufficient work toward eliminating 
propositional attitudes. I am not sure that he would deny the existence of FP as a practice, and 
talk of “elimination” seems to jump the gun somewhat. Elucidating the internal dynamics of 
the brain would not necessarily necessitate a complete overhaul of our folk practices, but he 
appears to endorse this rather vehemently52. 
I am, however, partial to Churchland’s problematisation of the propositional attitudes due to 
my interest in the internal workings of our cognitive systems, and the rest of this thesis will be 
in line with Churchland’s original project. I shall show in Chapter Three how a different view 
of the underlying mental processes could perhaps be the language that Churchland was alluding 
to when he proposed that an entirely different one replace our talk of beliefs and desires in the 
literature. I am, however, unsure as to whether this language will suffice as a suitable 
replacement for propositional attitude ascription. Whatever theoretical terms Churchland 
argues we will/should inherit from an accurate scientific theory will only be useful insofar as 
they filter into public discourse. I argue we need not necessarily overhaul our folk terminology, 
but that these issues will iron themselves out in time.  
Ultimately, Fodorian thinking appears to take folk psychological propositional attitudes as the 
primary mode of cognitive explanation and functioning, whereby they are the atomistic 
constituents of our cognition, which need to be explained and elucidated. As we have seen, if 
Churchland is even half right, Fodorian FP is far too basic and literalist for an accurate portrayal 
of our mental states (Dewhurst 2017: 6-8). On the other hand, Churchland and others who 
follow the eliminative materialist paradigm seem committed to the idea that if FP fails to 
sufficiently reduce to an accurate structural portrayal of cognition, then there is no recourse but 
to eliminate it from our ontology. I view neither extreme on this position wholly useful, as 
amendment of our understanding of FP can take over from Churchlandian eliminativism just 
as easily to account for Fodor’s failings in the realm of FP. As will be seen later in this thesis, 
we can “save” propositional attitudes, but not in a way that is commonly thought. The 
eliminativist is close to a more coherent picture of the inner workings of the brain, but more 
nuance needs to be incorporated into the framework. 
 
                                                 
52 There is also still a sense that his “vector-to-vector transformations” are broadly similar to a LoT, even if the 
mode of explanation shifts from sentential structures to the interrelations of vectors. 
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3. Decentralising the Propositional Attitudes 
3.1 Problematising the Assumption 
There have been other proposals focusing on the propositional attitudes of our FP throughout 
the past few decades, but it is not worth going through them all here. The above two views 
served as the prime examples of the debate on our folk psychologising. Despite Churchland’s 
misgivings, the axiomatic nature and predictive capabilities of Fodorian propositions make his 
an attractive theory, which goes some way to reaching what Botterill (1996: 106) deems is 
necessary for something to fall into the sphere of valid theoryhood. Botterill makes a cogent 
point in stressing the need for a theory that is more general in its framework than that which it 
purports to describe, all while incorporating its disparate elements into a cohesive unit. Arguing 
for a theory more akin to the laws of Newtonian physics, he rather humorously pointed out a 
need for more than simply “gardening lore” (ibid. 1996: 109-110) when attempting as 
comprehensive a theory as possible. As he goes on to explain, Botterill (1996: 106) lists a 
number of criteria that would be essential for this undertaking, among others, the need to 
reference “unobservable” phenomena, being able to incorporate counterfactuals, conceptual 
integration, and the ability to predict phenomena. Ratcliffe (2007b: 9) points out that this all 
sounds rather similar to folk psychology in its present guise53. I argue that the best way of 
achieving a sound theory would be to start from the bottom up, describing the disparate 
phenomena in fine-grained terms before moving upward to explicate the multitude of these 
phenomena successfully under a common banner. This is precisely what I begin to do in 
Chapters Three and Four. We should perhaps let the chips fall where they may, and reconstruct 
a coherent theory to replace canonical FP by suspending as many preconceptions as we can, 
rather than shoehorning them into existing theories, weighted by their bias. 
Despite the obvious differences in opinion concerning our folk psychological ascriptions, what 
appears to be ever-present is the view of propositional attitude ascriptions as central and 
primary to FP. Looking at Fodorian theories, we see a pattern of suppositions whereby 
propositional attitudes are elevated in importance and are central to our folk psychological 
abilities. Bartsch and Wellman (1995), by way of example, construct a behavioural view of 
how adults mediate an understanding of each other through unobserved and internalised 
propositional attitudes, but without an argument for why this should be so. Therefore, the 
                                                 
53 By way of example, the behaviours of conspecifics are incorporated into the folk psychological system in order 
to predict and/or explain their behaviour, and folk psychological talk also trades in conceptual placeholders such 
as the typical “belief” and “desire” we are always faced with. On top of this, mental states are also unobservable 
and often elicit talk of a counterfactual nature (Ratcliffe 2007b: 9). 
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received FP view is taken as as a given for their subsequent analysis of how people use the 
prototypical FP concepts of belief and desire, with no exploration of whether they do (ibid.: 
11). As Ratcliffe (2007b: 52) rightly states, there is no actual scientific discovery of the 
constructs of FP within experiments of this ilk, as FP is already inscribed as a constraining 
factor within the experiment which confirms the bias toward an elucidation of the data in terms 
of these constructs. Data selection is always already skewed from the start. 
To reiterate the central issue at play, there is insufficient questioning of the assumption of the 
existence of propositional attitudes themselves within our mental lives. Instead of looking 
closely at how warranted we are at placing propositional attitudes in this primary role, many 
theorists have begun with the (tacit) assumption that propositional attitudes are central to our 
cognition, and then have focused instead on whether these attitudes are an innate ability or 
acquired. Ratcliffe (2007b: 45) maintains that it is at least “arguable” that assent to the existence 
of internalised propositional attitudes are instead products of philosophical theorising, as 
opposed to their alleged “commonsense” nature. Arguably, propositional attitudes are not very 
good at picking out the types of thinking that individuals “actually” do. For one thing, on 
Goldman’s (1989: 167) view, there is the worry that the philosophical investigation into 
propositional thinking does not pick out actual representations within folk thinking. Rather, the 
literal construction of new propositional platitudes to “accommodate philosophical 
preconceptions” are further utilised to theorise about these alleged theoretical concepts, despite 
these being theoretical impositions in the first place (ibid.). At base, philosophers who assume 
propositional attitudes are central and expand their theorising from there, as opposed to the 
incorporation or amendment thereof from the outset, are playing language games. Worse, this 
does not fall within the remit of philosophical circles alone, but expands toward real-world 
application within cognitive and psychological experimentation and theorising, as with the 
Bartsch and Wellman (1995) example above. 
 
3.2 The False Belief Task as Emblematic of the Problem 
More than any others, much alleged empirical verification of propositional attitudes has been 
drawn from the false belief task experiment, first proposed and conducted by Wimmer and 
Perner (1983). They first conceived the experiment to ascertain the age at which children are 
alleged to ascribe a mistaken belief to other people. The subsequent experiments were careful 
to pick out when children were ascribing false beliefs, rather than simply acting on a lack of 
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requisite information to describe the state of affairs. Wimmer and Perner (ibid.: 103) state that 
a suitable conception of someone’s false belief arises when there is an “explicit representation 
of the wrongness of this person’s belief in relation to one’s own knowledge”, and “the ability 
to represent the relationship between two or more persons’ epistemic states emerges” (ibid.: 
126) at this point. 
The first set of experiments involved children, along with a puppet called Maxi, who were 
faced with a pile of cookies. Both the children and Maxi observe the cookies being placed in a 
cupboard, before Maxi exits the stage. Those controlling the experiment then move the cookies 
to a second cupboard, before asking the children their opinion on Maxi’s perception of where 
the cookies will be once he enters the stage again. Concepts such as “belief” were not 
introduced to the children during the task, and instead of verbally responding the children were 
asked to point. This was in order to distinguish between an actual ability to detect a false belief 
and merely an ability to describe themselves as detecting one. The results have become 
academically well known, as only children of a specific age54, with sufficient cognitive 
capacities, are capable of shifting their perspective to that of Maxi’s (ibid.: 122-123). The 
children who failed the test were deemed unable to grasp the notion that the puppet has his own 
“perspective”, with requisite beliefs, and therefore could not ascribe a false belief to Maxi 
(ibid.: 123-126). The children who failed the experiment were unable to accomplish the 
requisite perspectival shift, as they did not have the cognitive resources to be able to adopt the 
multi-perspectival stance that this required. From this, it was surmised that the children did not 
possess an adequate conception of “belief”55. As Frith and Happé (1999: 3) put it, the false 
belief task is defined as the “litmus test” for any folk psychological ability. Fodor (1995) 
himself has used it to defend his representational theory of mind by arguing that it shows a 
form of innateness with regards to propositional modules in the brain. In other words, on this 
construal children appear to already have the cognitive tools to be able to “understand” belief 
in a holistic sense, and simply need further brain development to be able to ascribe context-
sensitive beliefs56. 
As alluded to above in the applied approach by Bartsch and Wellman (1995), the false belief 
task becomes a paramount case whereby interpersonal understanding is imposed upon the 
                                                 
54 Originally from between the ages of four and six, but this has been shown in subsequent experiments to be even 
lower on occasion (Dunn 1991; Surian & Leslie 1999). 
55 There have been a proliferation of the methods and types of experiments which purport to show similar 
conclusions to the original false belief task, one prominent example being Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) application 
thereof to autistic children. 
56 Scholl & Leslie (1999: 147) as well as Nichols & Stich (2003: 91) have similarly endorsed this view. 
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structure of the experimentation itself by the experimenters. The experimenters, in other words, 
assume that full-fledged propositional thinking occurs, and then seek to explain the experiment 
in light of what is assumed. Presupposing internalised mental state attributions, such as beliefs 
and desires, as central to every person’s intersubjective abilities can therefore be seen as 
problematic (Ratcliffe 2007b: 54). The highly structured environment of these experiments 
lend themselves as important constitutive elements of what is extrapolated from the data (ibid.: 
53-54). By way of example, the original experiments involved a series of debatable 
suppositions upon the part of the experimenters, including the fact that a puppet could be 
interpreted as a “person” by the children, which presupposes an already considerable cognitive 
ability within them. Furthermore, the inclusion of an extensive narrative explaining the 
situation to the children again presupposes a considerable interpretative ability on their part. 
Also, the simple fact that the children must be able to understand the experimenter to begin 
with points to a more socially nuanced interaction between experimenter and child (Gallagher 
2001: 99; Ratcliffe 2007b: 54). Introducing propositional attitudes as central to these abilities 
seems at the very least questionable. 
Taken together, these do not point toward grasping a propositional belief in the particular sense 
that the experimenters are attempting to coax from the children. One wonders instead whether 
the children respond due to the prompting of the experimenter(s) or whether there is an actual 
grasping of the epistemic relations at play. The children display a (relatively) considerable 
ability to even grasp their role within the task, drawing into question the centrality of false 
belief attribution within the social environment (Ratcliffe 2007b: 53). As has been noted (ibid.: 
54), the experiments only required of the children that they point, and not extrapolate their 
epistemic condition in the form of a propositional attitude attributed to Maxi. This makes the 
prominent incorporation of the experiment into the literature hardly indicative of vindicating 
FP as propositional attitude ascription. Therefore, it cannot be unequivocally claimed that the 
children are in fact successfully attributing a “belief” or not. To successfully infer a particular 
phenomenon, in this case a false belief, does not exclude the possibility that one is instead 
focusing on other factors that are typically associated with the phenomenon. It can therefore be 
argued that the children learn their ability to attribute beliefs within contextually-bound 
environments of interaction (Hutto 2008a). If these contexts are removed, the ability would be 
attenuated if what partly constitutes the ability is taken away. Similarly, we could say that the 
attribution of internalised mental states, as advocated by FP, do not capture the intricacies of 
interpersonal understanding (Ratcliffe 2007b: 53). If a child is asked to experience the 
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unfolding of a narrative rather than the more familiar day-to-day interactions with adults (or 
whomever cares for the children), it should not be assumed that they can infer internal mental 
states. The children could instead only be able to infer the mental states of others through the 
highly structured environments of interaction and reinforcement elicited by the children’s 
caregivers. If these structured environments are eliminated from the experiment, we will be 
doing away with important compositional elements which enable the ability of children to 
ascribe the alleged propositional attitudes (ibid.: 54). The understanding of the interpersonal 
would not necessarily be elucidated through experiments which presuppose elements of our 
FP. 
At the end of the day, the false belief task seems to suggest that to grasp a mental state, such 
as a belief, it is sufficient enough to simply re-enact what amount to “rather crude behavioural 
patterns” (ibid.). If a child is able to detect beliefs fairly reliably, it does not necessarily extend 
to the fact that the child is understanding what is being detected. The experiments fail in 
supporting the assumption that it is merely the inferential reading of internal mental states that 
is of central value, while ruling out dispositional attunement toward others, and certain 
sensitivities such as to gaze and expression playing roles in eventual intersubjective 
understanding (ibid.: 54). These additional factors provide visceral data for bodily reaction to 
the information to occur, circumventing the propositional thinking we are alleged to engage in. 
For instance, it has been shown how children react to particular language use without actual 
comprehension of the words or concepts used. For example, it has been shown how even at the 
age of six months, children are more predisposed to paying attention and attending to speakers 
of the cultural group from which they belong57 (Kinzler et al. 2007; Mahajan & Wynn 2012; 
Greene 2015: 50-51). Perhaps as the basis for this, it has been shown how neurons are able to 
anticipate particular environmental attunements dependant upon experience (Shuler & Bear 
2006). Therefore the affective responsitivity of these neurons occur at the same time sensory 
stimulation occurs, and not necessarily after58 (Barrett & Bar 2009: 1325). This can be extended 
to facial recognition of others, even at a young age (Debruille et al. 2012), wherein facial 
expressions and other subtle patterns can provide environmental information for subsequent 
behaviour. This does not necessarily support the explanation given by Wimmer and Perner for 
what the false belief task actually achieves. The main take-home point from this is that while 
                                                 
57 There are linguistic cues which dictate social preference and foster group identity. It appears that children tend 
to be predisposed to favour those who lack a foreign accent (fostering the “Us” vs “Them” dichotomy). 
58 This is more than likely a result of the predictive processing architecture of the brain, introduced properly in 
Chapter Three. 
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the false belief task seems to support the existence of propositional attitudes in these 
interactions, it fails to make the strong case that adherents claim. As Greene puts it, these 
“arbitrary differences can serve a nonarbitrary function” (Greene 2015: 51), as seemingly 
innocuous factors which we do not take into account can affect our understanding of what we 
are trying to model. 
 
3.3 The Emergence of Alternative Viewpoints  
 
Ratcliffe has attempted more than most to problematise the importance of propositional-style 
theorising (2007a, 2007b).The above has led him to consider whether FP is a “theoretical 
imposition” (2007b: 45) upon our day-to-day lives in that the sciences and philosophy can 
result in “a projection of the framework of the latest scientific speculations into the common 
sense picture of the world” (Sellars 1963: 171, from Ratcliffe 2007b). Said differently, the 
attribution within interpersonal understanding of “beliefs” and “desires” is an “abstraction from 
social life” (Ratcliffe 2008: 445). Science and philosophy are understood to elucidate the world 
to us, but there can be slippage if we are not careful. In other words, even if we do value the 
intuitive understanding that the folk have concerning their mental lives in the form of their 
beliefs and desires, we must still be wary of what many of the experts have claimed occurs 
beneath the surface. Dennett (1991c: 137) has also made a similar point in his distinction 
between “craft” and “ideology” within FP. There is the “craft” element of FP, defining it as 
simply what people actually do, and the “ideology” aspect, which is what people think that they 
do. Using Dennett’s distinction within FP, Ratcliffe (2007b: 55-57) points out that we should 
separate the responses from, for example, children and the academic experimenters’ 
interpretation of their responses, which is already informed by a particular ideological basis. 
Ratcliffe argues that we should distinguish this further into four categories of analysis: 
 
“(i) What people do 
(ii) What people think that they do 
(iii) What philosophers and cognitive scientists think people do 
(iv) What philosophers and cognitive scientists think that people think that they do” 
(ibid.: 55). 
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The first category, (i) what people do, is how people interact in typical interpersonal 
interactions at the broad social level, while the second category, (ii) what people think that they 
do, entails the average person’s intuitive understanding of what it is that is occurring during 
their interpersonal interactions. The second does not imply clear facts of the matter, but rather 
assumes them through folk learning. The third, (iii) what philosophers and cognitive scientists 
think people do, refers to the scientific/philosophical understanding that philosophers and 
cognitive scientists have concerning interpersonal understanding (importantly not how people 
typically understand what they are doing during interpersonal interactions). The fourth, (iv) 
what philosophers and cognitive scientists think that people think that they do, is the empirical 
or armchair extrapolation of the available data concerning the reports of individuals from the 
viewpoint of the scientists/philosophers. What Ratcliffe (ibid.: 56) proposes is that even if we 
do not take people at their word, theoretical FP is still an equivocal intermingling of (iii) and 
(iv) above, an imposition of theorising upon daily life, and not an accurate description of reality. 
Whereas what theories like the false belief task are actually picking out is simply (i), and 
occasionally aspects of (ii), in other words the base understanding of the average person of 
their interpersonal interactions. One could take this further and claim that (i) is interpreted 
through the lens of (iii) and (iv), which effectively feeds into Dennett’s point above. None of 
these options necessarily entail actually picking out any actual mental belief or desire states.  
But Fodor (1987: 9-10) has gone so far as to claim that our common-sense belief/desire 
psychology is so ingrained in our everyday practice that it should be seen as transcendentally 
derived in a Kantian sense, and empirical enquiry had better vindicate the workings of FP as 
currently understood. In other words, what the false belief task should be doing, on this 
construal, is proving the validity of our FP as we understand it. Despite this claim, and the 
extensive defence of it (ibid.: 10-26), just which elements of our FP should be preserved on 
these grounds is still not clear. The veracity of FP in its typical guise is, at the very least, 
debatable, but Fodorian FP, problematically, refuses to let go of the importance of the 
propositional attitudes within its framework, as has been noted. However, arguably, describing 
the relevant intentional states in the form of propositional attitudes overly simplifies 
intentionality, since general dispositional states, such as emotional reactions to bodily 
irritations or a general undirected anxiety, are notoriously difficult to express verbally in the 
form of propositions. Perhaps this is more the “failing” of our language range than anything 
else, but propositional attitudes do not necessarily capture the requisite information to 
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accurately describe many mental states. This only further problematises the accuracy of 
propositional attitudes within our FP. 
Due to the issues highlighted above, this drives me to the need to de-essentialise propositional 
attitudes in our talk of FP, to bring forth the physical and social nuances at play. This would 
entail a look under the hood of our neuronal brain processes, not to mention the interactions 
between body and environment, in order to tease out more of an understanding of the mental 
states at issue when we folk psychologise. It should be stressed that this is not explicitly an 
eliminativist project59, but rather a delving below the surface of a common philosophical and 
social practice. In so doing, we may discover a plethora of factors that inform our social 
understanding and which influence our use of the concepts of “beliefs” and “desires” in folk 
psychological discourse. A perfect analogue to the general project of de-essentialising the core 
elements of folk psychology is that of Hayes’s (1978, 1980) original deconstruction of our folk 
physics60 as axioms of knowledge that we all utilise in our daily lives. These axioms could be 
as banal as knowing (expecting) a loud bang to occur as a door is about to slam shut, the 
absorptive effect of cloths, that the throwing of a ball toward a wall will result in its bouncing 
back toward you (depending on the properties of the ball and the wall), et cetera. We are, in a 
very literal sense, dependent upon these axiomatic, often predictively correct, and simplified 
understandings of the physical environment around us. The immediacy and productive 
elements of these understandings provide prolific predictive abilities within our general 
environment. As Dennett (2005: 31-32) points out, in a piece on the efficacy of his 
heterophenomenological61 approach to understanding behaviour, one cannot simply turn off 
one’s “expectations” of what will occur62; it is ingrained upon our mind’s understanding of the 
world. Hayes (1978) attempted an interestingly scientific and anthropological study of the 
counter-intuitive reality of physics in juxtaposition to the, what Dennett calls, “aprioristic 
anthropology of naïve physics” (Dennett 2005: 32). The aprioristic element of this concept 
implies the stark resistance of the folk to any counter-intuitive implications to their learnt 
understanding of the physical world63. Dennett (ibid.: 33) proposes just such an approach to 
                                                 
59 Although, in effect, beliefs and desires as many take them to be will be problematised. 
60 Hayes’ term for this was naïve physics. 
61 Heterophenomenology is the practice of applying scientific principles to the reports of individuals and other 
relevant information in order to ascertain the individual’s mental state. The “hetero-” prefix indicates that it is not 
a first-person perspective, as with more traditional phenomenological approaches. The point is to ascertain the 
individual’s perspective without attributing a high sense of accuracy to their reports. 
62 I shall be returning to this point in Chapter Three of this thesis with reference to the predictive nature of our 
minds. 
63 By way of example, we all tend to experience the remarkable effect that capillary forces exert within a straw. 
The liquid within the straw gets drawn up, against gravity, by the surface tension and adhesion of the liquid to the 
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our folk psychological assumptions on these grounds. We can predict the behaviour of the folk 
(and objects), but this does not mean we understand the more fine-grained reality of the very 
same. We utilise axiomatic generalisations unquestioningly, and it is just this unquestioning 
acceptance of what we do that can be analysed at a phenomenological level. Dennett calls this 
approach “sophisticated aprioristic anthropology of folk (naïve) psychology” (ibid.) (although, 
one wonders whether this was done tongue firmly planted in cheek). 
In a similar move, Hutto (2008a: 2, 26-32) has expressed concern with the conflation of having 
an intuitive grasp of “beliefs” and understanding what it is to actually act for a reason64. He 
points to the six month gap between children assimilating an ability to attribute desires and 
their capacity to pass any false belief experiment (Hutto 2008a: 135-136; similarly alluded to 
by Ratcliffe 2007b: 17). He points out that children’s ability to attribute desires to others, for 
example, arises long before an adequate grasp of what they entail via culture’s “linguistically 
scaffolded mentalistic” framework65 (more of which to follow below) (Hutto 2008a: 135). In 
other words, as has been alluded to above, the narratives children are faced with in their daily 
lives prime them for a culturally-mediated understanding of beliefs/desires and uncountable 
other mental states, and the interrelations of these, for the purpose of reason explanation. In 
line with this, and to pour even more cold water on the interpretations of the false belief 
experiments, it has been found that there are a vast plethora of factors which enable earlier 
capability in conceptual understanding in children. These can range from parental involvement, 
to size of family, and even, as alluded to earlier, the skewing effect of experimenting in atypical 
social environments such as during the false belief task (Dunn 1991; Surian & Leslie 1999). 
All of these factors produce an effect on the results of the false belief task experiment through 
unforeseen means by the original experimenters. The implications of this for theoretical FP is 
that if these experiments are not strengthening our understanding of FP in its canonical guise, 
then the belief/desire attributions to children appear to be misattributed. 
                                                 
inner surface of the straw. And yet our minds still resist the scientific explanation given due to our axiomatic 
understanding of how things “should” behave. The liquid “shouldn’t” act against gravity according to our folk 
understanding. 
64 He, quite rightly in my view, states that to understand an action as performed for a particular reason, it is not 
enough to appeal to a singular propositional attitude. We are in need of very many of them, not simply a lone 
desire, which all act together in “motivational crime” (2008a: 26). 
65 For instance, in one study, data gathered from conversational interaction between children showed that there is 
a propensity to “not use such terms as intend to, on purpose, or mean to until about 3, 4, or 5 years [of age]” 
(Wellman & Phillips 2001: 130). In contradistinction to this, the desires of others are already alluded to at around 
2 years of age, primarily through the use of the word “want” (ibid.). 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 47 
To be clear, and of more interest to this thesis, I argue that our concepts of “belief” and “desire” 
do not correlate to delineated mental states. There are many instances of advocates of 
theoretical FP who tacitly endorse the reality of “beliefs” and “desires” as instantiated on the 
neuronal level. For example, Nichols and Stich (2003: 14) attempt to describe the mechanisms 
which underpin our FP by appealing to “belief” and “desire” boxes in a flow chart that purports 
to describe the architecture of the mind. In fact, these mental states are far more indeterminate 
than these proponents of traditional FP would have it. The psychological individuations which 
are the homogenised “beliefs” and “desires” that we use in talk of FP cannot easily pick out 
our reality. If we are within the same physical space as another individual, we do not (normally) 
explicitly assign a multitude of individuated mental states to that person such as “D believes 
that there is too much noise coming from down the corridor”, or “D believes that there is a box 
of chocolates stashed in the cupboard”. We do not attribute such mental states, as we are in a 
shared environment within which interpretation of the other occurs (Ratcliffe 2007b: 191). In 
other words, there is not always a need to attribute a belief or a desire to understand behaviour. 
Furthermore, the “belief” we attribute to someone who is, for example, moving forward from 
a traffic sign does not easily track reality as their perception is intimately bound with their 
behaviour. We may attribute the belief “D believes the traffic light is green”, but it is difficult 
to distinguish between the perception of the need to react, for instance, and the intuitive, 
phenomenal sensation of “understanding” its practical implication. Can it really be said that 
there is a “belief” in this instance, or are action and perception so intimately interlinked that 
assigning a belief becomes a redundant gesture after the fact66? The concept “belief” does not 
mirror a particular mental state, but rather speaks to an abstract method of referring to a range 
of mental events. We appear to be describing psychological states on the assumption that these 
explanations pick out the “actual” mental states in question. But these explanations are in fact 
given when we stop attempting to describe the actual behaviour of others, and resort to these 
general explanations in accordance with our shared cultural norms of understanding (ibid.: 
195). These reason explanations make the behaviours of others understandable, without 
necessarily indicating the actual reason for their behaviour. As Ratcliffe (ibid.) puts it, the 
norms utilised for the purpose of the reason explanation of behaviour infer good reasoning on 
the part of the one who is acting, but this is not the same as saying that this is a or the reason 
for their behaviour. Furthermore, simply adding more such detail to our descriptions of a belief 
                                                 
66 Chapter Three’s introduction of the predictive capacity of the brain blurs the lines between action and perception 
even further. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 48 
or desire attributed to a conspecific does not elucidate the actual state of affairs at the neuronal 
level. 
Arguably, subtle variations in psychological states allow for a plethora of potential 
explanations for given behaviour, but these would probably not consist in a particular state of 
canonical “belief” as postulated by FP. This results in the inevitable conclusion that there are 
no exemplar cases of belief, merely an uncountable number of mental states which fall under 
the incredibly broad blanket term of “belief” (ibid.: 187-190). Subtle distinctions can be 
explicated within brief narratives (which we all do) in order to elucidate a given state of affairs 
(a particular “belief” for example), rendering FP highly socially constructed. Although, I argue, 
not even these narratives that we tend to provide (once prompted) of particular “beliefs” or 
“desires” provide a description of the unitary mental state of the individual and, therefore, fail 
to denote a distinct psychological state of affairs. On top of this, the emotional influence of a 
scenario is intimately bound up with the current mental state of the individual, rendering a 
description of “belief” in every such scenario necessarily an attenuated version of reality (ibid.: 
198). There is an acknowledgement within the literature that emotions are often experienced 
as intentional states, but not of the propositional variety (see, for example, Chapters Four and 
Five in Solomon (2003) as well as the essays in Solomon (2004)). Within these emotional 
states, our bodily dispositions, internal bodily milieu, externally-derived affect, and the like are 
incorporated into the matrix of our intentional attitudes. This does not leave much space for 
obviously individuated propositional thinking of the sort utilised in many explanations of 
behaviour in our folk psychology. Therefore, we cannot have a neatly-packaged, 
comprehensive, accurate account of behaviour without “emotional experiences, experiences 
more generally, perception of agency, gesture and intention67, normatively configured 
situations, character, motivation, habitual tendencies and so forth” (Ratcliffe 2007b: 199), and 
this seems an impossible endeavour for the “folk” to attempt. To explicate as accurate a 
portrayal of reason explanation as possible, an individuated reason in the form of a 
propositional attitude is not enough to account for the agent’s behaviour, hence the need for 
the incorporation of the above-quoted aspects within the reason explanation. This leads me to 
endorse a view of belief states as comprising indeterminate dispositional states. We cannot 
account for more than “macro-reasons”68 in our explanation of even our own behaviour, from 
within our own “privileged” phenomenological vantage point. 
                                                 
67 In the cognitively loaded sense. 
68 These can be defined as the canonical exemplars of beliefs and desires we all use to describe behaviour. 
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Dennett has argued similarly in his assertion that there is “no fact of the matter” (1991a) in our 
cognitive deliberations, and by extension others’ ability to interpret the same. His view of our 
consciousness as a multitude of “drafts” informs this position, whereby our phenomenal 
experience is constituted by narratives of mental states that compete to “win out”, with no clear 
singular “I” to be found within this interaction except through hindsight (ibid.). This results in 
a view of consciousness that is fuzzy, opening up space for a multitude of competing 
dispositions. If true, this also leads to a non-propositional view of our mental states, 
undermining the efficacy of FP as propositional attitude psychology (as accurately depicting 
reality). Problematising the singular “I” that has clear reasons for its behaviour problematises 
the distinction between competing propositional attitudinal states. These critiques serve to 
elucidate the validity of doing away with the propositional attitudes as accurate portrayals of 
our mental states, and I shall go further in this regard by introducing the concepts of predictive 
processing and teleosemiotics in Chapters Three and Four respectively in order to further erode 
their standing. For now, I shall make a brief segue to a theory on how narratives potentially 
provide the necessary propositions that we utilise in our FP, before concluding the chapter. 
 
4. The Narrative Practice Hypothesis 
In this next section, I want to build upon what has been said concerning the need to de-
essentialise the theory of propositional attitudes with an extension of Hutto’s theories. I will be 
dealing specifically with his Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) (2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 
2008b) or, more specifically, what it entails and how this potentially elucidates our FP within 
our structured but ever-shifting contextual background. Its purpose is to introduce a plausible 
alternative to theories of innate propositional attitudes and to explain how it is that they may 
arise if they are not innate. My own thoughts on the validity of this view shall follow, and I 
shall remain neutral on its explanatory power up until that point. 
Hutto strongly believes that what accounts for our impressive ability to implement our familiar 
folk psychological attributions is the reinforcement of narratives during our ontological 
development (Hutto 2007a; 2007b; 2008a: 23-40; 2008b: 177). The foundation necessary for 
attributing reasons for actions does rest on the basic capacities already available to us. Yet, 
children do not function in their early months of social interaction by attributing any beliefs or 
desires to an external agent’s actions (Hutto 2008a: 135). Only over time do they start to utilise 
the now-familiar propositional attitudes in order to navigate their interpersonal niche. These 
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propositional attitudes are learnt through a step-by-step process whereby subsequent mastery 
of the syntactic (and eventually semantic) components of their mother tongue are assimilated 
into their future interpersonal cognition (Hutto 2008a: 27; 2008b: 182). Hutto states that it is 
not the inherent capacities that are missing in early childhood, but the necessary, for lack of a 
better word, rules of their co-integration, which are learnt through social interaction (Hutto 
2008a: 27). Yet, any resultant competency in the assigning of propositional attitudes to external 
agents does not necessarily translate to actual knowing in the sense of knowing how they can 
be recombinantly constructed to formulate an understanding of reasons (ibid.: 28). In other 
words, it does not necessarily denote the existence of a fully-functioning folk psychologist, in 
the sense that an individual can understand, interpret and manipulate the norms which govern 
how the propositional attitudes help understand reasons. Naturally, the normative interrelations 
of these attitudes must be grasped and understood. As Hutto states, 
 
[w]hat children are missing, on acquiring a practical grasp of the concept of belief, is not 
therefore another ingredient needed for baking the folk psychological cake – rather it is 
the instructions for mixing all the ingredients properly in the making of many such cakes. 
(ibid.) [emphasis added]. 
 
The proposal for how these norms arise from a child’s ontogenetic development is simple 
enough. Hutto introduces the NPH in order to elucidate this transferral of folk psychological 
skills. In short, it is the direct experience of narratives (stories) about people who are clearly 
presented in a manner whereby there are reasons for their actions. These are what Hutto calls 
“folk psychological narratives” (Hutto 2008a: 28; 2008b: 178). As Goldie (2004: 115) puts it, 
the narratives are constructed in order for “…the audience or the reader to make sense of the 
thoughts, feelings, and actions of those people who are internal to the narrative”. 
What should be taken away from this is that the above narratives are what provide the necessary 
ontogenetic preparation for the elucidation of reasons for actions. These narratives are provided 
as “exemplars” (Hutto 2007b: 53, 2008a: 28) which nurture an inherent comprehension of the 
normative components of folk psychological understanding. Children acquire an understanding 
of how the propositional attitudes can be recombinantly formulated in order to explicate the 
requisite belief, desire, and so forth, along with the emotions that accompany them. 
Furthermore, these narratives provide the contextual background, which presents the myriad 
ways in which an agent’s reasons can be shaped and guided by the immediate context, the 
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agent’s historical backdrop, and other things69 (ibid.). This type of co-cognitive70 development 
also appears to occur at the requisite point within ontogeny to lay the framework for more 
advanced folk psychological ascriptions (Hutto 2008a: 28-29). 
The manner in which these folk narratives can perform such a function is due to their existence 
as objects of public consumption that represent complex social interactions (Hutto 2007b: 67, 
2008a: 29). As clarified earlier, these narratives act as exemplars, but in addition, they are the 
requisite apparatus needed for reinforced learning over time. Children learn the interrelated 
rules and frameworks that arise from the continual reinforced use of established folk 
psychological attitudes, and are steered toward an emphasis on beliefs and desires71 as typical 
instantiations of propositional attitude ascriptions (Hutto 2007b: 55, 2008a: 29, 2008b: 178). 
The propositional attitudes are introduced along with the methods of their interrelation, and in 
this way children are taught to perpetually recognise the way in which beliefs and desires seem 
to influence actions72 (Hutto 2007b: 55-56, 2008a: 29). As should be clear, these principles of 
interrelation are not conveyed in an easy list of rules, but reiterated through continued learning. 
As an important aside, this would bias any facets of explanation within the folk psychological 
framework toward already-used and already-understood uses of the propositional terms within 
a context-bound culture, as well as bias the ways in which these terms are thought to interrelate 
(Hutto 2008b: 182-183). It is far easier to make use of already-proven methods for social 
navigation than to develop detailed, fine-grained reason explanations for any behaviour73. For 
simple reason explanation, to understand what the specifics of what an agent’s particular beliefs 
and desires are, how they change over time, as well as the contextual information necessary for 
this understanding, not to mention the why of the above, is provided for through these exemplar 
narratives (Hutto 2008a: 29). In other words, this is the methodology through which children 
acquire the more nuanced folk psychological understanding necessary for understanding 
reasons, and what they need to fine-tune when attempting to make sense of the above. This 
would naturally extend to explanations of their own behaviour, when needed (ibid.). As simply 
                                                 
69 The ways in which children are given the requisite support to flesh out their reason-explanations can be found 
in Chapter Ten of Hutto’s (2008a). 
70 By “co-cognitive” I refer to the ability of an individual to incorporate the inferred thoughts of a conspecific 
within her cognition, thereby being able to predict the conspecific’s behaviour. 
71 It should be remembered that beliefs and desires do not occupy exclusive space within the pantheon of 
propositional attitudes, but it is clear that they are what we could call the exemplars of the exemplars. 
72 The ways in which beliefs and desires allegedly lead to action is perhaps what can be seen as the central thesis 
of folk psychology. 
73 Chapter Three’s focus on the predictive capacity of the brain provides a window into how the brain focuses its 
energies on these already-extant social grooves on the macroscale. 
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as this story is presented, it is a compelling explanation for our early acquisition and 
understanding of the necessary fundamentals of our folk psychology, for how they are applied, 
as well as of the norms inherent in our social understanding. All of this is supplied without any 
overt rules describing how our folk psychologising ought to work. Instead these tacit 
fundamentals of our FP are acquired through repeated engagements in extended narratives 
depicting the contexts in which they function. The variations within these narratives convey a 
sense of what needs to be accounted for when explaining the reasons of conspecifics, as well 
as their own. This is why Hutto states: 
 
In this way children learn which kinds of factors must be taken into account and adjusted 
for when it comes to making sense of the stories that others tell about the reasons why 
they acted, as well as learning what needs mentioning when providing their own 
accounts. It is in this way and in this sense that children acquire an understanding of the 
core structure of folk psychology, its governing norms, and guidance on its practical 
application. (ibid.) 
 
Fundamentally, the tacit norms within behavioural understanding are learnt through the above 
narratives (Hutto 2008a: 32; Hutto 2008b: 179). If Hutto is right, a theory of our FP must 
account for the application of these norms within social reason explanation insofar as these are 
acquired tacitly via learnt narratives. We need to work out a view that can incorporate our 
practically-applicable knowledge into the frameworks as described by the majority of FP 
theorists and their ilk (Hutto 2008b: 185). We must not lose sight of the fact that folk 
psychologising is primarily a practical endeavour, constantly and consistently called-upon to 
provide contextual understanding across multiple scales of interpretation. There is relatively 
little mention among FP theorists of just how children are able to acquire the practical 
applicability of these rules in their day-to-day existence (Hutto 2008a: 34). Adding up the 
ingredients of belief/desire and the assumption that the person is not irrational is hardly enough 
when the person’s psychology, history, and context are vastly important for a suitably 
comprehensive explanation of their behaviour (ibid.: 34). On Hutto’s view, FP narratives 
achieve this because they depict more than the aforementioned “idealised rational agents”, but 
also non-ideal rational agents. They depict how both rational and irrational behaviour is 
engendered within the confines of pertinent contextual factors (ibid.: 35).  
Intuitively, Hutto seems right. When we attempt to provide a reason for a person’s actions, we 
rarely (I would contend never) offer anything more than a truncated view of her social reality. 
Instead, we have an embodied understanding of the social context which is then neatly 
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packaged in “just so” tales for public consumption. But these “just so” tales do provide a 
streamlined explanation of behaviour which gets us by in our social environments. On this 
view, any examples from folk psychology utilising beliefs and desires are “just so” tales. “S 
believes that p” is effectively a social imposition. There is more to the tale than what has been 
included in any “just so” story, and we generally only apply reason explanation on a “need-to-
know basis” (Hutto 2008a: 36). Attention to learned behavioural patterns usually provide 
enough sense for guiding our immediate reactions and we accomplish much of our our social 
interactions without the need for explicit explanations of behaviour, which prompts Hutto 
(ibid.) to declare that in our day-to-day social environment we “do not need to interpret what 
others are doing or why by asking about their reasons”.  
As a result of the above, treating FP as an accurate theory of how our social minds work should 
be discouraged due to “the bad effects it has had (and continues to have) on the imaginations 
of many philosophers, psychologists, and others working on this topic” (Hutto 2008a: 32).  
As compelling as this view on the acquisition of our folk psychological abilities is, I remain 
unconvinced that this much emphasis should be placed on narratives alone74. Hutto does not 
deny, and indeed has advocated (Hutto & Myin 2017: 253; Chapter Six), that there are other 
factors at play when we explain behaviour. Hutto is correct in that coarse-grained intentional 
patterns can be discerned within our interpersonal narratives, but it is far more complicated 
than this theory would seem to suggest. He attempts to stay in the middle-ground with iterations 
of “belief” and “desire” that are not too explanatorily broad or narrow, making our use of these 
folk conceptions permissible, if factually inaccurate. However, one wonders whether this is 
truly informative or another “just so” tale that does not quite capture the psychological 
sophistication that we all appear to employ on a daily basis. Nevertheless, Hutto makes a 
convincing argument up to the point where we should invoke the NPH. There could just as 
easily be a space for it alongside a broader and potentially all-encompassing framework for the 
acquisition of our folk psychological ability. It does, however, appear that it should be utilised 
more as a complementary conceptual tool which explains the base acquisition thereof. It is for 
this reason that a theory of a more generalised “enculturation” in Chapter Four is introduced 
below to provide a broader framework for the acquisition of our FP abilities. The NPH was 
introduced to lay the groundwork for a plausible, non-nativist theory as to how propositional 
                                                 
74 Ratcliffe (2007b: 214-216; 253, footnote 16) also has reservations concerning the all-explanatory nature of the 
NPH, despite their similar projects. 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 54 
attitudes are actually introduced into our lives, and narratives appear to go a long way in terms 
of explaining their origins. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter served to introduce the field of folk psychology by elucidating how it is thought 
(by many) to operate within our cognitive make-up. The notion of propositional attitudes as 
atomistic constituents of our cognition as well as their centrality to our FP was expanded upon. 
Special reference was made to Fodorian FP, which is a straightforward form of propositional 
thinking, in order to introduce the disjunction problem as a problem that stunts our intuitions 
regarding adaptational theories of cognition75. Thereafter, Churchland’s eliminativism toward 
propositional attitudes in the form of vector processing was introduced. The introduction of 
these two theorists also served to highlight the poles of the debate, although neither position 
was advocated for. Fodorian propositional attitudes were argued to be not as fundamental in 
terms of our cognitive functioning as some assume, while the outright elimination of 
propositional attitudes was also discouraged. The core issues with the assumptions inherent in 
theorising about FP were then expanded upon in order to problematise talk around FP as 
propositional thinking in general. The false belief task was used as an emblematic example of 
biases introduced during theorising of this ilk. This was further utilised to endorse a de-
essentialising of propositional attitudes as physically realised in the brain. A window into how 
propositional attitudes possibly get introduced into our discourse was given in the form of the 
NPH. It was explained that the introduction of narratives during ontogeny could potentially be 
a substantial building block for our propositional thinking, as opposed to some form of ToM 
innateness which Fodor (1995) would endorse.  
After all of the above, an important consequence to consider is the possible evolutionary 
benefits of folk psychological ability. One can endorse a view of FP which depicts it as an end-
product of evolutionary development, but one in which both learning and pre-existing cognitive 
architecture constrains it toward a particular form. This view of cognition and FP is 
predominantly what I shall be working with throughout the rest of this thesis. The view of 
propositional attitudes as demarcated and analysable on the neuronal level does not appear to 
align with evolutionary reality. Also, disjunction “problems”, whereby it is alleged that the 
acquisition of mental contents cannot obtain without a suitable demarcation of the necessary 
accuracy conditions, do not appear to be as intractable as they are taken to be, as I shall argue 
                                                 
75 The significance of this point will become apparent in Chapter Four. 
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for in the following chapters. These issues point away from the neuronal reality of propositional 
content, and instead toward the social learning of propositional concepts as useful heuristics 
for behaviour. In line with Humphrey’s (1976) idea that what early mankind was 
predominantly concerned with was the social understanding of conspecific behaviour, as well 
as Dennett’s (1991a; 1995; 2017) views of how language shaped the very consciousness we all 
know and love, the purpose of evolving folk psychological abilities lies in the selection 
pressures of social attunement. Therefore, we can plausibly depict FP in an “as if” fashion, 
while problematising the assumption that it is actual propositional thinking which is 
instantiated within the brain on a fine-grained level. FP, as Ratcliffe (2007b: 23) puts it, is 
 
an abstraction from social life that is misleading in various respects and has no 
psychological reality. At best, it is a convenient way of talking in certain areas of 
philosophy, which has become an entrenched and misguided philosophical institution 
[emphasis added]. 
 
Ratcliffe argues that this is a direct result of the mechanistic naturalism found within the 
analytic and scientific traditions (ibid.: 231-243). These research paradigms have sought to 
explicate a narrative of folk understanding that presuppose biased notions of what it is to 
understand conspecifics. I agree with this analysis, but we must be careful. For to deny 
“mechanistic naturalism” on his construal is to ignore the mechanistic (but intractable) nature 
of even the social world76. Saying it is this view of the world which is at fault in our assessment 
is not the same as saying it is this view of the world which is incorrect in general. We can 
analyse how our internal processes function through a mechanistic naturalism in order to 
explicate the true nature of our mental states, regardless of the indeterminacy inherent within 
them. Arch-scientism has perhaps not always helped our interpretations of the crushingly 
complex world both outside and within us, but difficulties and over-simplifications do not 
necessarily entail that a view is incorrect. Endorsing methodological naturalism, which is a 
form of naturalism that is congruent with the methods and aims of the sciences, is a way to cut 
through these challenges. Methodological naturalism allows us to suspend our disbelief when 
faced with seemingly intractable problems and work toward cogent explanations. We need not 
worry about finding determinate mental states in our cognitive make-up if that is where the 
science lies. As I hope to show in the subsequent chapters, by incorporating the latest relevant 
scientific research into our conception of FP, we will arrive at a more nuanced understanding 
                                                 
76 By the mechanistic nature of the social world, I mean simply that there are “rules of engagement” which 
constrain behaviour, which in turn affect the formulation of our folk psychological ability. 
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that shines more of a light on the nature of our mental states through systematic scientific 
analyses. This shall also highlight that our phenomenal experience is not as rich in 
representational content as we believe it to be, undermining the traditional conceptions of FP 
as consisting of determinant mental states. To achieve this, we shall first look at a rising 
discipline within the realm of cognitive system dynamics in the following chapter: that of the 
Bayesian nature of the brain. 
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Chapter Three: The Mind as Predictive Processor 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall introduce recent literature surrounding dynamic system theory in 
cognitive science, which concerns the fine-grained cognitive processing that underlies our 
cognition. This will subsequently inform the theme introduced in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
My focus in this chapter will primarily be an account of the neuroscientific theories of 
hierarchical predictive processing77 as described by Clark (2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2015; 
2016), with much seminal work done by Friston and colleagues (Friston 2005, 2010; Friston 
& Stephan 2007) as well as Hohwy (2008, 2013). 78 The reason for introducing predictive 
processing (PP) here is due to its rising popularity within the neurosciences and cognitive 
sciences, forcing us to take its implications seriously. There is a growing consensus that the PP 
approach could be the conceptual tool that could unify many aspects of consciousness and/or 
cognition. For example, it could unify cognition, action, and perception to such an extent that 
the conceptual joints meld together, problematising old distinctions. It could furthermore unite 
differing research paradigms under the same PP umbrella, bringing not only different empirical 
sub-disciplines together, but also uniting theoretic-philosophical approaches with the 
empirical. This chapter will first describe the predictive processing paradigm, elucidating it as 
a form of Bayesian processing and describing its general foundational characteristics in this 
light. Then I shall relate these Bayesian roots to the functioning of the brain, introducing the 
concepts of active inference and free energy. Thereafter, I shall look at the results that these 
features would have on our conception of the mental in that the Bayesian model of the brain 
inverts our understanding of the brain as a passive receiver of environmental information, 
thereby upsetting our previously conceived folk notions of ourselves. Therefore, the 
implications of this view of the mind/brain in terms of FP will be elucidated and critiqued. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Originally formulated explicitly in Friston (2005), Lee & Mumford (2003), and Rao & Ballard (1999). 
78 While I align myself closer to Clark, Hohwy’s view is highly similar, with only the glaring exception of the 
solipsistic nature of our predictive brains standing out (Hohwy 2008, 2013).  
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2. Bayesian Prediction and its Relation to the Mind 
2.1 Bayesian Prediction and Predictive Processing 
 
PP in its current formulation appears to be a promising conceptual tool to unify cognition, 
action, and perception under a common banner. To be clear, it is a computational tool, and is 
utilised in an abstract sense to capture the underlying neurophysiological processes of the 
brain79. These computations are thought to predominantly feature below the levels of 
phenomenal experience, although I contend that these foundational computations could be 
applied at higher levels of personal phenomenality. I argue that these underlying computations 
could upscale to folk conceptions of reality, in the form of behavioural reason-giving and other 
phenomena (more to come further below). 
A core tenet of PP can be found in the writings of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1998: 110-
111) wherein he describes the role that our faculties of intuition (our Anschauungsvermögen) 
play in the formulation of our sense-data. In other words, our sense-data is not simply “given” 
to perception, but at least partly constituted by it. This is not the received view of classical 
scientific conceptions of how our brain is thought to process information—that of the “passive, 
stimulus-driven” (Engel et al. 2001: 704) variety80. PP takes further inspiration from Helmholtz 
(1985), who developed Kant’s line of reasoning into the notion that perception is more of a 
subconscious process of inference. He stated that the effects of sensory reality are only 
perceived through the constraining actions of the mind, rather than by simply taking up the 
sensory reality itself. In line with this, PP depicts perception as far more actively constructive 
than first thought. It is also far more selective in that higher processing can influence and alter 
the sensory intake, and thereby utilise what is “given” (or “accepted”) to inform predictions 
relating to potential (future) sensory impingements (Swanson 2016: 9). This is a predominantly 
top-down depiction of cortical processing, wherein prior experiences of the environment 
inform cognition. Consequently, these prior experiences are given pre-eminence and are all-
pervasive in perception. The standard formulation of PP depicts these prior experiences of the 
environment as modelled statistical estimations in some form within the brain (Clark 2016: 
21). These estimations are functionally similar to “representations” of the environment, 
                                                 
79 There have, however, been theories of just how these computations can be actualised in the brain’s substrate 
(Engel et al. 2001; Friston 2005). Furthermore, the reality of Bayesian implementation in the brain has been 
explored to ascertain whether Bayesian frameworks are actually being instantiated within the brain (Maloney & 
Mamassian 2009; Maloney & Zhang 2010). 
80 This “passive, stimulus-driven” conception of brain processing is effectively that of the brain taking up 
information and inducing its cognitive functions purely through external stimuli. 
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although I shall problematise this view in the following chapter. Furthermore, these 
“representations” are continuously updated as a result of any detected misalignment between 
predictions of potential sensory uptake and what is actually received. This happens in service 
of minimising errors in future predictions by the “representational” models of the brain, thereby 
adhering to the norms engendered by Bayesian inference (Hohwy 2008: 17), more detail of 
which is to follow in the next section. Finally, and this truly begins to blur the lines of 
perception and cognition, these predictive “representations” are depicted as primarily “action-
oriented” (Clark 2013a: 185) in nature. This is all in the service of “predictive control” (Wiese 
& Metzinger 2017: 4; Seth 2015) for successful navigation of the body through the 
environment. Many believe (controversially) that this means that action, so conceived, could 
be more pertinent than perception for the survival of the organism, with perception relegated 
to the (still significant) role of acquiring information about the environment, as opposed to 
instigating the body to sample the environment in the first place. Environmental information is 
used in service of action on a contextually-sensitive scale. Effectively, the information which 
is incorporated into our cognitive deliberations is pertinent only insofar as it instigates effective 
action for environmental survival. But, before going into more detail concerning all of these 
features of PP, we need to look into PP’s relation to Bayesian inference. 
Bayesian inference is closely tied to Bayes’ Theorem81, which is a statistical formula that aids 
in prediction of outcomes where there is a degree of uncertainty (Hohwy 2008: 17). This 
formula incorporates considerations of conditional events that have a bearing on the outcome. 
These events are the plethora of factors pertinent to whether a particular predictive outcome 
would occur. One consideration is the demarcated conditional probability82 that is used to 
predict the possibility of an event actually occurring if it is taken that another is, in fact, true 
(ibid.: 18). The general idea is to feed data into the equation to predict the degree of certainty 
with which outcomes of a specific set of events or actions may occur. As an example, if an 
agent experiences uncertainty as to which set of assigned hypotheses holds true, the agent can 
assign differing hypotheses concerning the outcome with degrees of probability. These degrees 
of probability are effectively degrees of belief in a particular outcome. The result of this leaves 
the agent with an increased degree of certainty with which to act upon the world as it becomes 
                                                 
81 It is named after Thomas Bayes (1701-1761), who was an English mathematician (as well as theological 
philosopher). His original formulation has developed significantly since the 18th century. 
82 This simply refers to the likelihood of an event occurring if another event has already occurred. 
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clearer, in theory, which new data needs to be incorporated into the working hypotheses83 
(ibid.: 16-17). In Bayesian terms, this leads the agent to incorporate this latest data into an a 
posteriori (or posterior) computation by conjoining an a priori (or prior) computation with the 
probability (ibid.: 17). This prior acts as the data already available to the agent, while the 
probability pertains to the relation of the data within a target domain with the new target 
domain’s data. This all serves to elucidate the probability of a state of affairs occurring after 
new data has been incorporated into the prior. This, in turn, can be used to diminish uncertainty, 
updating the prior with more precise estimates of probability within the target domain (ibid.). 
The concept used within the literature to capture this process is labelled “Bayesian inference”, 
as mentioned above. The inference between the prior and the posterior is key in the 
understanding of Bayesian modelling of this sort. 
If we were to map this form of inference onto the mind, we are provided with a powerful tool 
for not only probability estimation, but for modelling perception in general. Bayesian 
prediction, generalised to Bayesian inference, can be postulated as a fundamental component 
of PP, which is thought to underpin perception. The priors that model the environment (also 
known as percepts), are the starting point from which posterior models of the environment can 
be inferred at the level of the sub-conscious (Friston 2005: 822; Hohwy 2008: 17-18; Clark 
2013a: 183). Mapped onto the cognitive domain, the priors are analogous to neuronal 
weightings, which model the environment prior to sensory information being taken up. The 
posterior is analogous to neuronal weightings that model the environment after sensory 
information has been incorporated and has “informed” the prior. Before going into more detail, 
it should be noted that the assumption is that perception operates on a “need-to-know” basis, 
incorporating only pertinent data from the environment through Bayesian inference. 
A lingering issue here for perception is that the data obtained from sensory stimuli is, as stated, 
inferred from the environment, leaving us with Hume’s (2009) long-standing problem with 
inductive processes84. We cannot be certain of the validity of our perceptions of the 
environment, which results from such inferred data. Hence, our brains can only perform 
Bayesian inferences to the best possible approximation (Clark 2013a: 183). It is important to 
understand that, here, the perception of the environment does not necessarily entail an accurate 
                                                 
83 As an example, one could infer the conditional probability of a patient’s susceptibility to liver disease. If the 
patient is an alcoholic, this would be a pertinent bit of data which would inform the subsequent calculation. It 
would need to be calculated with a number of other variables (such as how many patients who are alcoholics tend 
to have liver disease etc.) in order to arrive at the best degree of probability. 
84 Hume (2009) famously argued that it is impossible for our causal inferences to be certain. This is known as an 
inductive inference whereby a conclusion is not fully supported by its premises. 
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portrayal of the environment. As noted by Wiese and Metzinger (2017: 4-5), Dennett has a 
humorous take on this age-old problem in his “robot control room” intuition pump, where you 
are asked to imagine yourself trapped within the control room of a robot (which is on board the 
robot): 
The robot inhabits a dangerous world, with many risks and opportunities. Its future lies 
in your hands, and so, of course, your own future as well depends on how successful you 
are in piloting your robot through the world. If it is destroyed, the electricity in this room 
will go out, there will be no more food in the fridge, and you will die. Good luck! (Dennett 
2013b: 102). 
 
On this construal of the mind, “we”, operating within the limiting confines of the body, are 
provided only with an indirect access to the environment (in the case of the robot: through its 
sensor array). This implies that we are secluded from the objects of interest in our environment, 
furnishing us with the epistemological problem that the results of our actions can only be 
indirectly inferred85. Bayesian inference potentially provides us with a way to successfully 
elucidate our world and gain sufficient perspective thereof86. The epistemological concern here 
is known as the “inverse problem” (Harkness & Keshava 2017: 3; Wiese & Metzinger 2017: 
5). The inferential certainty needed to derive a working (Bayesian-like) hypothesis to act on 
the environment must deal with a multitude of (i.e. noisy) signals from the senses. 
Unfortunately, these signals can only be found behind the veil of inference, or “Markov 
blanket”87 (Clark 2013a: 184). It is an inverse problem, as the perceived sensory effects are 
used to infer concealed external sensory causes (think of Dennett’s robot). In other words, the 
effects of sensory inputs are used to infer the causes of the sensory inputs, as opposed to 
passively receiving this information from its source. Bayesian inferential processes are ideally 
placed to explicate perceived sensory impressions from overdetermined (noisy) effects by 
appealing to the best inferred expectation (Burr 2017). These processes provide a way to 
overcome issues of multiple potential causes by assigning likelihoods to the occurrence of each 
cause. Furthermore, they could provide a neuro-computational solution to any disjunction 
                                                 
85 Humanity “hallucinates at the world” in the words of Metzinger (2004: 52) 
86 For some preliminary examples it is worth reading Spratling’s (2016) look at how this would work for the retina 
and in the cortex. 
87 The term is originally derived from Andrey Markov who pioneered the understanding of abstract systems which 
encode information in the form of data points. These values are used to derive a subsequent state within the system, 
thereby depicting a form of inference despite no actual memory being instantiated. Pearl (1988) introduced the 
concept of a Markov blanket to define the surrounding nodes within a network whose values can be used to infer 
a subsequent node’s value by the property alone. The mathematical details are not pertinent in this treatment. 
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problems with regard to mental states88 by simply appealing to the best possible inference, 
given the available sensory data, if we accept the theory of intentionality introduced in Chapter 
Four below. Briefly, the problem of fixing accuracy conditions in the first place arguably has 
it exactly backward, as probabilistic mental states infer only broad accuracy conditions, not 
necessary accuracy conditions. If one will recall the example of the duck-in-the-dark 
misrepresentation, our brains need not actually infer either the chicken or the duck-in-the-dark, 
but rather a cognitive imposition is placed upon what is perceived after the fact of perceiving. 
To be clearer, we only effectively “misrepresent” when we bring our cognitively-loaded 
intellect to bear on the case at hand. What is deemed an error at the probabilistic level is slowly 
weeded out over the course of development (whether we are speaking evolutionarily or 
ontogenetically). Bayesian inference within the brain is not about accuracy; it is about 
facilitating survival in the world. In Wiese and Metzinger’s (2017: 6) terminology, Bayesian 
inference can be conceived of as a “probabilistic inverse mapping”, whereby the myriad 
potential hidden causes are mapped onto a given sensory effect, and the most probable cause 
of this sensory effect is inferred from the mapping. This process leads to generative models89 
of the environment instantiated within the brain, which is central to PP (Clark 2016: 252-255). 
These generative models deal with generalised norms of mental state which are fixed over time 
(evolutionarily and ontogenetically). This form of development shall become clearer in Chapter 
Four; the next chapter introduces a potential causal history of mental states which can explain 
away the disjunction problem. Again, this helps resolve the disjunction problem by side-
stepping the issue of stringent accuracy conditions, while still serving a richly perceptive 
cognition of the environment by utilising generative models which incorporate generalised 
norms of mental state. 
Elaborating on generative models, Clark (2013a: 182) points out that an effective generative 
model of, for example, vision, would be one which attempts to account for the myriad ways 
“lower-level visual responses are generated by an interacting web of causes”. In reality, this 
takes the form of top-down connective processing on multiple levels, resulting in a hierarchical 
processing system (Clark 2016: 19-21). The hierarchical system inferentially generates 
cognitive models of the environment, thereby delineating interactive causes from other 
environmental signals. Within this top-down hierarchical structure, models of the environment 
                                                 
88 As a reminder, the disjunction problem brings to light the problem of distinguishing between causes that 
determine the content of mental states and causes that do not. 
89 These generative models are understood as a common distribution of a set of distributed variables. 
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are generated, predominantly utilising “higher-order” (prior) knowledge90, which distinguishes 
this view of the mind from the passive cognitivist models (ibid.: 20). 
The system therefore creates a “virtual” depiction of the incoming sensory signals through a 
cascade of multilevel processing. These depictions of top-down, hierarchical generative 
models, through these cascades of cortical processing, attempt to effectively predict the 
incoming sensory data, thus explaining this same data away (Clark 2013a: 182; Clark 2016: 
37). What is meant by this is that if sensory data is successfully predicted by the model, it is 
not necessary to incorporate any alignments of the data with the predictive model (this would 
have no noticeable effect on the data). Only errors are propagated upward to inform the brain 
of its errors in prediction, thereby making any sensory matches with the model mostly 
redundant to the inner workings of the mind. This view has led some to reinterpret the brain’s 
main task as approximately predicting the upstream (misaligned) sensory data rather than 
needing to reconstruct the actual sensory stimulation itself (Muckli 2010: 137; Rauss et al. 
2011: 1249). This means that errors in prediction are “acquired” and then disseminated further 
up the hierarchical structure, all in order to influence future modelling of the incoming sensory 
signal for future tracking (Friston 2005, 2010; Friston & Stephan 2007; Hohwy et al. 2008; 
Lee & Mumford 2003; Rao & Ballard 1999, and many others). Furthermore, the precision 
estimates of this PP inhabit a functional role within the mind of the organism. 
Effectively, the hierarchical predictive system is bidirectional in nature (Clark 2013a: 182-
183). This form of prediction was first conceived of to make data compression more efficient 
in the processing of signals in computers (ibid.). For a basic example one can look at the 
processing of pixels within images: a single pixel can quite often be a predictor of the property 
of the pixels which surround it. Any difference in properties denotes a boundary between one 
pixel and that of another. Compression techniques therefore encode an image with only those 
properties that depart from predicted properties. Or, expressed differently, only a variation 
which is not “expected” is included in the image code, and it is only this variance between a 
predicted property and an actual property which is ultimately transferred91. This saves 
processing time and space when applied to processing models of this type92. It is just this form 
of processing which has been applied to neuronal PP to attempt to reconceptualise the way in 
                                                 
90 Or “hyperpriors” if taken to the most general extreme (Hohwy et al. 2008: 691). 
91 This links with a minimal account of content (as an accurate portrayal of the environment) within basic 
perception, which shall preoccupy us in the next chapter. 
92 Prominent examples which have permeated our culture are lossless audio, motion-compressed video, and jpeg 
files. 
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which our minds work. Clark (2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2015, 2016) has developed this 
further into a unified model of action and perception93, whereby they are intimately linked to 
limiting errors in our predictive capacities through the “sculpting and selecting [of] sensory 
inputs” (Clark 2013a: 183). This particular aspect of his theory will be explored in more detail 
further below. 
It should be noted that there is a vast difference between the base misalignment of incoming 
sensory data between environment and predicted model at a neuronal level; and agent-level, 
phenomenologically-accessible surprise. The literature distinguishes between these two highly 
interlinked phenomena, operating at differing levels within the brain. The terminology used for 
the implausible nature of incoming sensory signals is called “surprisal”, which has been 
attributed to Tribus (1961). This is to distinguish it from the more molar-perspective sense of 
“surprise” that is familiar to us all. Prior models of the environment inform the brain as to the 
implausibility of given sensory stimulations, which then induces action on the part of the agent 
to reduce surprisal. This is achieved by altering the prior predictive model through highly 
efficient methods of “encoding” (Clark 2013a: 183). Importantly, the brain is not simply 
perceptually engaged whenever surprisal-inducing sensory input occurs, but under ecologically 
regular contexts there is always already the requisite priors active (ibid.). These priors influence 
cognitive processing of the sensory inputs immediately. 
Interestingly, even illusions can be better explained with this interpretation of cognitive 
processing. One early prominent example has shown how illusions of motion could be the 
result of a “coherent computational strategy that is optimal under reasonable assumptions” 
rather than “sloppy computation” (Weiss et al. 2002: 603, see also Rescorla (2013)). The errors 
in visual perception, in this study, were found to be the natural result of (near) optimal Bayesian 
inference in light of available sensory data. Slower motions were more likely to be predicted, 
hence the illusion of slower object speeds as a natural consequence of the biasing effect of the 
percept (Weiss et al. 2002: 600-602). Hence, a recurring theme in the literature is that it is not 
about optimal prediction, but near optimal prediction of the uncertainties already available to 
our cognitive processes. Our cognitive processes are only able to predict utilising a priori 
information, which consequently biases us toward expected as opposed to accurate predictions 
of the environment. This does not bode well for Fodorian correctness conditions in our mental 
states. 
                                                 
93 This was originally developed within the writings of Friston & Stephan (2007), Friston et al. (2009), Friston 
(2010), Brown et al. (2011), and others. 
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To reiterate, the “hidden causes” (Clark 2013a: 183) that impinge upon our senses can be 
explained away by utilising percepts. These percepts are utilised to form our subsequent 
prediction of that part of the environment which directly affects the sense modality in question, 
thereby, by extension, providing a prediction of the resultant effects in the particular modality. 
On the Bayesian predictive model, this is then contrasted with the actual sensory data uptake94, 
and the discrepancy between the two (percept versus current sensory uptake), if any, is the 
prediction error which is fed upward so that the percept of the environment can be revised 
(Friston 2005: 821). The extent of the comparative discrepancy gives the mind an indication of 
the refinement that is needed of the predicted estimation of the environmental property under 
question. The subsequent revision of the discrepancy is known as prediction error minimisation 
(PEM) in the literature (Hohwy 2013: 41-55), with the idea being that our minds have evolved 
to seek minimisation of this error on a continually rolling basis. These fine-grained estimations 
of the environment are thus computationally incorporated into further predictions, juxtaposed 
with the continually-streaming modality signals, and thereby, all things being equal, prediction 
error is minimised95 (ibid). Consequently, only once models of the environment have been 
suitably constructed from low-level sensory information96 can the phenomenal character of our 
experience emerge. These phenomenal models emerge as a result of continual sensory input, 
informing our minds of the environment in which they are embedded (Clark 2013a: 183). 
Furthermore, these generative models of the environment are built from the past experiences 
of the individual. As individuals consistently take in sensory information from birth, it is not a 
case of “re-building” the environment with every conceivable experience, but rather altering 
via PEM the already-constructed world. Thus, Hohwy (2014: 4) states that priors come about 
not only through the immediate experience of the individual, but “through [past] experience, 
development and evolution”97. 
                                                 
94 Prediction error can be seen, in the words of Feldman & Friston (2010: 17), as a form of proxy for actual sensory 
data. 
95 Wiese and Metzinger (2017: 5) point out that it can occasionally be a good thing if prediction estimations are 
originally sub-optimal as to concealed causes. By continually updating the predictive models of our environment 
we can acquire a sense of “confidence” in these modelled representations of the hidden causes under question. 
96 This is predominantly in the form of information-as-covariance (Hutto 2017: 11), as shall be explained in the 
next chapter. 
97 This is also why Fristion et al.’s “dark room” problem (2012) – which asks why we wouldn’t find a dark room 
somewhere and stay there to minimise prediction error (Mumford 1992; Sims 2017) – holds no weight. Prediction 
errors are bound up with prior predictions, which are in turn intimately linked with experience. We would expect 
to find a light source of some sort if we were truly faced with a dark room. 
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This black box98 approach to cognition and perception (again, think of Dennett’s robot above) 
leads to the seemingly solipsistic world that Hohwy (2012; 2013; 2017) endorses, forever 
wrapped in our Markov blankets. The lines of input/output that feed into and out of the brain 
must convey the most probable causes of impingement upon the senses despite this seemingly 
intractable barrier. All that the brain can discover, in any unequivocal sense, are its own 
fluctuations in its states, even if these have a rich phenomenal character (Clark 2013a: 183). 
Therefore, the brain only has direct access to these states, and nothing more. However, a way 
that the brain can link up with the world is through active motor directives and discover what 
new changes occur within these states as a result. On Clark’s (ibid.) construal, this does not 
imply any “mapping relation” of these inner brain states to the environment. Rather, it implies 
an inference of the incoming data from the environment only on the basis of fluctuating brain 
states. The brain, as a hierarchical processor, uses top-down, generative environmental 
modelling to infer from its own internal states what the incoming sensory data entails. Or, as 
Clark (ibid.) interestingly puts it, an important task that the brain performs is that of inferring 
the “states of its own neuronal economy”. The better the model of the environment, the better 
the inference, and the better the posterior probability of the current model. 
To go into more detail, the way in which the proposed hierarchical predictive structure of the 
brain generates posterior models of the environment lies in the close interaction between the 
different levels of the cognitive structure. Priors at the “top” level can be utilised in a 
continually rolling guessing game to inform the priors “below”. This takes the form of 
continuous “iterative estimation” (Dempster et al. 1977; Neal & Hinton 1998) which leads to 
a co-evolutionary interlinking of priors and the generated models of the environment, all in 
order to successfully predict the world (Clark 2013a: 183). A prior “higher” in the hierarchy 
places a constraint on the level “below”, and these priors are constantly tuned by the incoming 
sensory data99 (ibid.: 183-184). This attunement occurs at multiple levels within the hierarchy, 
while each level of priors attempts prediction of the level below through backward propagation 
(recurrent) connections. It is these backward connections which allow inference to occur, as 
fluctuations in the brain state are transferred higher up in the hierarchy as a new input. If there 
is no incongruity between the higher level priors and those below, then successful inference 
has been performed (Friston 2005: 817; Clark 2013a: 184). Only incongruities are fed 
                                                 
98 This analogy refers to the opaque nature of the internal processes of the mind in juxtaposition to the (seemingly) 
clear inputs and outputs of the system. 
99 A prominent early example of this iteration of structural learning is that of Rao & Ballard’s (1999) use of 
predictive coding within the visual cortex. 
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backward to a higher level to “inform” the priors of the error in prediction. Probabilistic models 
of the environment at higher levels are therefore updated continually on this basis, all in order 
to “explain away” any errors in prediction at lower levels (Friston 2005: 817-819). 
It is thus only the backward connections that do the hard work, propagating the predictions to 
the higher levels, with the forward connections passing on only residual errors in prediction 
(Rao & Ballard 1999: 79; Clark 2013a: 183; 2016). The probabilistic model of the environment 
is thus updated, predominantly via backward propagation. The external environment is 
subsequently revealed to the brain via the gradual reducing of errors in prediction, which causes 
processional cascades within the brain’s hierarchical structure100. The posterior probability of 
specific external environmental features are thus increased, and depicted as an internalised 
model (of some sort) within the brain (Clark 2013a: 184). It is this that allows us to infer what 
is behind the Markov blanket. Hence, we have a complete reversal of the usual paradigmatic 
view of the brain as a passive processor that incorporates external sensory impingements, 
processes this data, and then represents it to the mind in some fashion. Hohwy (2007: 320) 
stresses that the “top-down” predictive model is doing most of what we take to be “perceptual”. 
The “bottom-up” informational signals provide more of a consistent recurrent feedback for the 
downward cascade of predictions, which still allows for heightened sensitivity toward 
environmental contexts. Gradually, the predictive model may be altered in this way, which has 
been depicted as a form of “reciprocal interaction between perception and learning” (Fletcher 
& Frith 2009: 53). 
After all is said and done, the percepts that are provided from the continually updated 
perceptual Bayesian modelling of the environment can therefore be used to pierce the veil, 
thereby breaking through the solipsistic barrier after a fashion. However, in a monograph on 
PP, Hohwy argues that we are nothing more than “mental islands set over against the world, 
which is hidden behind the veil of sensory input” (2013: 258). We cannot delve behind the 
“evidentiary boundary” (Hohwy 2013, 2014). This solipsistic view of PP is perhaps a bit harsh, 
and Clark (2017) has argued that this seemingly intractable barrier is anything but.  Clark points 
out that we are consistently re-configuring our mental boundaries in order to maintain 
successful adaptation with regards to the environment. In other words, he proposes a deep 
coupling of brain and world, which is in line with his view that our minds utilise the 
                                                 
100 These depictions of cognition have been called “forest first, trees second” types (Friston 2005: 825; originally 
Hochstein & Ahissar 2002: 791). The general gist of the environment is depicted, with details following in its 
wake. 
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environment in order to function optimally101. In other words, our minds do construct our 
environment, but this ability is only afforded by very real attunement to sensory information. 
If our brains dealt in rich representations of the outer environment that stand in for the world, 
then it would be difficult to argue against charges of strong solipsism, but we need not view 
our inner neuronal weightings as directly mirroring the world. Hence, there is a sense in which 
our minds can predict the properties of objects within our environment accurately enough in 
that we are near optimal in our predictions. 
The utilisation of these properties do not rely on truth relations of the sort that Fodor would 
endorse as necessary for accurate perception (as encountered in Chapter Two). Indeed, as Clark 
(2015a, 2015c, 2016, 2017) would agree, I propose that this tentative connection with the 
external properties of the world depicts brain and world as more closely entwined than 
traditional cognitivist theories. This view lies within the enactivist tradition. Enactivism, which 
is to be explored in more detail in the next chapter, is a view that depicts cognition as a result 
of dynamic processes of interaction between agents and their environment, blurring the line 
between perception and action more so than traditional cognitivist theories. As the section 
below will show, this opens up space for PP to be the underlying cognitive processing which 
enables the types of features that enactivism endorses. Note, however, that this does not 
necessarily speak to relations of accuracy and representation with regard to the environment, a 
view which Clark (2016: 288-291) shares to a certain extent. 
 
2.2 Active Inference 
 
This dynamic coupling between organism and environment has another dimension. One must 
keep in mind that the above is an explanation of a quite fine-grained, continually updating 
predictive “machine”. The brain needs to formulate predictions in all sensory modalities at 
every moment of existence, dynamically updating its predictive models of the environment in 
order to account for the ever-changing world102. But, PEM must be seen primarily as a way to 
facilitate organismic survival by forming the basis upon which the agent may then subsequently 
act upon the world (Friston 2003; 2010; Friston et al. 2009; Friston et al. 2011). The internal 
environment of the body is also of high importance for the agent, and homeostasis103 should be 
                                                 
101 This is his Extended Mind Hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998), which shall be explored in more detail in 
Chapter Four. 
102 This would include the agent’s influence upon the sensory uptake, adding more layers to an already seemingly 
intractable computation. 
103 Homeostasis refers to the tendency toward equilibrium that physiological and biological systems exhibit. 
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considered as the primary concern of the agent/organism, as stability provides many 
affordances104 within differing environments, while instability leads to low survival rates 
within even the most congenial of environments (Seth 2014b: 270-271; 2015: 9). Affordances 
have a close connection with an organism’s Umwelt, which is the experienced world of the 
organism. The deep connection between the organism’s body, environment and action is a key 
component of the PP paradigm, as perception of prediction errors in interoceptive, 
exteroceptive, and proprioceptive states lead to resultant action in the service of PEM. PP 
implies that the internalised mental states that serve to minimise prediction error in perception 
can be mapped, or overlap, with the mental states that serve action (Friston et al. 2010: 233). 
In other words, this implication effectively binds perception to action in terms of not only the 
information processed, but in the very real sense that they are mutually supported by the same 
mental states. Those steeped in the literature will recognise this as a clear example of the 
ideomotor principle, which has been developed into the general proposal that neuronal states 
of causes derived from the environment map onto the neuronal states that enact preparation of 
action (Stock & Stock 2004: 176). In the language of PP, percepts and motor directives can 
function jointly as the same ideomotor mental state. This type of mental state is similar to the 
phenomenon which is closely tied to it: “mirror neurons”. These “mirror neurons” are areas in 
the brain that have been found to fire not only when an action is performed, but when a suitably 
similar action is perceived when observing other organisms105. It is, in other words, an 
automatic and reflexive action. 
Through PP, the ideomotor principle finds full expression in “active inference” as developed 
by Friston106, which is neatly encapsulated in the following: 
 
Under active inference, there are no distinct sensory or motor representations, because 
proprioceptive predictions are sufficient to furnish motor control signals. […] They 
encode conditional expectations about hidden states in the world causing sensory data, 
while at the same time causing those states vicariously through action (Friston et al. 2011: 
138). 
 
Therefore, “representations”, which entail both sensory and motor functions, serve a dual role 
in both inferring hidden causes within the environment, as well as causing the action to bring 
                                                 
104 Recall, from Chapter One, that this term was originally coined by Gibson (1979) to refer to the positive and 
negative aspects of an organism’s environment that matter to it. 
105 The literature concerning mirror neurons has somewhat overdetermined the range and extent of their impact 
on the mind, at least according to Sapolsky (2017: 535-542) and Hickok (2014). 
106 For example: Friston et al. (2009) and Friston et al. (2011). 
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these hidden causes to light. This results in a “circular causality” that “destroys conventional 
distinctions between sensory (consequence) and motor (cause) representations” (ibid.). Motor 
acts and perception are therefore intertwined, with the mental “representations” serving the 
dual role of being “both intentional and perceptual” (ibid.: 156). Motoric actions can be the 
basis from which “intentional” behaviour occurs through direct sampling of the environment 
caused by direct proprioceptive perception. Of interest to this thesis, this does not indicate that 
active inference appeals to “desired consequences” (ibid.: 157), but rather to prior learning and 
context-dependent inference. Any perceptual experience summarily invokes the percepts 
which, via active inference, conduct the agent/organism within and/or through its 
environment107. 
Active inference, moreover, can be elucidated as the computations that jointly underlie action 
and perception in order to minimise, at base, free energy (see below)108 which in turn is all in 
the service of PEM. These computations are the Bayesian-optimal inferences that unify 
perception and action, thereby updating the ideomotor principle to a more nuanced 
understanding of fine-grained mental states. What this means is that active inference, so 
conceived, works toward equilibrium by bringing about changes in sensory states by directly 
acting upon the environment (Friston et al. 2012: 539). As our bodies are more at risk from 
unexpected and potentially harmful interoceptive states than unexpected and surprisal-inducing 
exteroceptive states, PP and active inference are a natural fit when explaining the homeostatic 
equilibrium of the organism. Seth (2015: 10) uses the example of declining sugar levels in the 
blood as a clear example of this. The percept of a yearning for sugar would result in prediction 
errors if there is a detection of deterioration of blood sugar levels. This leads to the body 
actively metabolising fat stores to minimise prediction error or through the macro-action of 
actively seeking and consuming more sugar. 
This is why Clark (2013a: 185-186) has expanded his conception of PP to what he calls “action-
oriented predictive processing” to drive the point home that this construal of PP (as a predictive 
coding variant on perception) encompasses action. It places action as predominant in these 
depictions of perception, as it is only through action that prediction error can be minimised 
(Friston 2009: 295), assuming a cogent environmental model exists and has been implemented. 
                                                 
107 This also ties in with the idea of minimal content in the next chapter, if the percepts are minimal content models 
of the environment. 
108 This is enacted by a change in the internalised mental states of perception and those of sensory states by 
subsequent action on the world (Friston et al. 2012: 524). Take note that Friston et al. use active inference as a 
blanket term to refer to the intertwined inference of both action and perception of the agent. One could still make 
the case for separating the two. 
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On this understanding, action and perception are both instantiated using the very same 
processing capacities109. If perception is primarily concerned with matching incoming sensory 
signals with prior models of the environment in order to create the aforementioned posterior 
probability models, action utilises a similar strategy. The systems involved with errors in motor 
commands “self-suppress” (Friston 2003: 1349), not through neuronal facilitation, but through 
the movements that can change sensory signals. If your mind locks onto an environmental 
pattern, it causes a predictive cascade of what should be experienced as a result. As this 
predictive cascade progresses, motor action is provoked in order to successfully realise the 
aforesaid prediction (ibid.). This motor action could be very subtle, such as the above-
mentioned maintenance of blood sugar levels, or movement of the entire body. In the literature, 
this means that action, in the form of control of motor commands, is mathematically the same 
as the Bayesian inference explained above110 (Friston 2003, 2005, 2010; Friston et al. 2010; 
Friston et. al. 2011). 
Action-oriented PP depicts motor commands as actively causing the continual sensory streams 
that our brains are in the business of predicting, leading to active inference (Clark 2013a: 186). 
Therefore, we are left with a view of action that depicts behavioural predictions as not only 
preceding sensation, but determining sensation. During active inference, the individual uses 
and/or moves their sensor arrays in order to seek, and as a result actively create, the sensory 
predictions that the brain expects in the first place (Friston 2009; Friston et al. 2010; Friston et 
al. 2011). Examples are the moving of eyes, or arms to manipulate the environment, in order 
to confirm an expected sensation. In the case of social interactions, we actively sample people’s 
bodily language (gaze, expression and others) to confirm predictions. Action, therefore, fulfils 
our learnt expectations, depicting action and perception as intimately bound (Friston et al. 
2009: 12). If active inference does not succeed in fulfilling a prediction, a cascade of prediction 
errors ensues, until the prediction is aligned with the individual’s reality through further active 
inference (Friston 2010: 134). If this is not possible, the predictive model of the environment 
needs to be altered to fit the particular context. Again, this is closely tied to enactivism and its 
conception of direct coupling between body and environment, and may even inform the 
                                                 
109 As Clark is constantly at pains to point out, this is the only game in town which could finally unify perception, 
action, and cognition (Clark 2013a; 2013b; 2016 and others). 
110 It is especially prevalent in “optimal feedback control theory” (Todorov 2009; Todorov & Jordan 2002), where 
a goal state is given, and Bayesian inference is utilised in order to discern the actions which will successfully 
achieve this goal. This is also prevalent and analogous to some literature on planning (Toussaint 2009), whereby 
a goal is given, and in order to plan the best course of action Bayesian inference is again used to infer the different 
states which will prove successful. 
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amendment to teleosemantic theories of content that shall be introduced in the subsequent 
chapter. 
 
2.3 The Free Energy Principle 
 
This is where an interesting element develops in the literature, intimated earlier, concerning the 
minimisation of free energy. This will be a recurring theme within the rest of this thesis as it is 
this very minimisation of free energy which I propose leads to minimal content in our 
cognition. This in turn shall inform my view of minimal instantiations of propositional attitudes 
in our folk psychological interactions. As described earlier, the problem for the agent/organism 
lies in the parsing of incomplete and noisy data into useable, actionable data. The 
agent/organism is not in a position whereby it has direct access to the probability distribution111 
that results from surprisal of the data within its environment. 
The link between this fine-grained probability distribution and phenomenal perception can be 
found within the free-energy principle (FEP) developed by Friston and his colleagues (Friston 
2003, 2008; Friston et al. 2006; Friston et al. 2008; Friston et al. 2009; Friston et al. 2010: 229-
233, Friston et al. 2011: 139-144; Friston & Stephan 2007). The mapping of the expected 
outcome (i.e. the internal probability distribution) to the posterior (which has incorporated the 
hidden causes in the environment) needs to occur. But what also needs to occur is the changing 
of the sensory signals in order to facilitate lower surprise/surprisal as efficiently as possible 
(Wiese & Metzinger 2017: 12). This may appear, from the outset, to provide two sets of 
intractable problems: the mapping of the expected outcome to the posterior, as well as the 
minimisation of the surprise/surprisal of the sensory data (i.e. minimisation of prediction error). 
The FEP, as its name suggests, is concerned with the free energy within any entropic system, 
and in particular the minimisation of this free energy. This is not free thermodynamic energy, 
which is the energy available to the organism for successful navigation and action within the 
environment. In Friston’s formulation, free energy on this construal is an information-theoretic 
quantity112 that can be minimised in some fashion within the brain (Friston 2008, 2009, 
2010)113. Information-theoretic quantities on this construal are simply the strength of the 
neuronal weightings that underlie the conveyance of pertinent data to the predictive 
                                                 
111 This simply refers to the predictive model, which itself is a distributed model that infers the probability of a 
state of affairs. 
112 Informational theory deals with statistical analyses which trade noisy information for more refined statistical 
certainty. 
113 To do the topic justice, a more thorough explication of the FEP can be found within Bogacz (2015). 
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environmental models in the mind. This minimisation of free energy underlies both of the 
aforementioned operational problems concerning the mapping of the expected outcome to the 
posterior as well as PEM. 
Therefore, we find a picture taking shape of the human organism as confined to its senses and 
actions but still able to find a way to provide as accurate a sensory prediction of the 
environment as possible. This is in order to satisfy the minimisation of free energy constraint, 
which the human body, in an attempt to survive in an entropic world, is in a constant battle to 
sustain. As Clark points out, the FEP is interesting even in isolation from PP, and could open 
the door to understanding “self-organisation within biological systems” (2013a: 187). As 
Friston (2010) has persuasively argued, the PEM theory can be depicted as a macro-
consequence (in relation to the FEP) of the fundamental need in organisms to minimise free 
energy while existing in their environment114. Depicting free energy within the cognitive realm 
casts it as the difference between the way the world is and how it is “represented” (in an 
information-theoretic sense) within the mind (Clark 2013a: 186). In other words, in the 
information-theoretic sense, free energy is analogous to the energy needed to minimise 
prediction error. The better that an organism is able to predict the environment, the less 
thermodynamic energy is needed for its subsequent actions within said environment. Prediction 
error is effectively a stratagem to “report” the (information-theoretic) free energy (ibid.). 
Entropy can be depicted as “the long-term average of surprisal” (ibid.), in that the surprisal 
induced over time amounts to the entropy of the system, and any reduction of the free energy 
within the organism’s cognitive modelling of the environment would result in an improvement 
of the environment’s model. This leads to a reduction in prediction error, and therefore 
surprisal. 
As Friston (2010: 133) has depicted it, the better the model of the environment, the better the 
organism can sustain its organisational structure through the minimisation of entropy. This 
would only be possible if the organism is able to resist an entropic increase within its neuro-
cognitive system. Therefore, there would need to be a resistance of the second law of 
thermodynamics115 over finite lengths of time through improvements of sensory modelling of 
the environment116 (ibid.: 127-128). The minimisation of entropy, therefore, leads to a 
                                                 
114 Or, to be exact, “an information-theoretic isomorph of thermodynamic free-energy” (Clark 2013a: 186). 
115 The simplest way to put this would be to say that entropy always increases within any closed system. Our 
bodies are open systems which exchange energy with the environment, which means that evolution has furnished 
us with the capability to mitigate immediate decay.  
116 Stated differently, the average free energy over a period of time is closely linked with adaptive fitness, or “free 
fitness” as it is known within evolutionary biology (Sella & Hirsh 2005). 
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minimisation of information-theoretic free energy. As a result, our brains are improved as 
predictors of sensory impingements, and therefore our chances at surviving within our 
environment are improved at the same time117. Therefore, the better we are at modelling our 
environment, the better chance we have at navigating it appropriately. If, as an abstract 
example, a predicted model of the environment elicits a response that accurately aligns with a 
threat, we are more than likely to avoid that threat than if there is significant surprisal between 
the model and the environment. 
In line with the rest of this thesis, Friston (2009; 2010) has utilised the FEP to unite perception, 
action, and inference under a single stratagem of cognitive processing, as mentioned above. As 
an example, and of great interest to this thesis, I propose that we can actively strive to construct 
niches within our environment in order to minimise free energy and, by extension, prediction 
error. This can encompass the general social strategies we utilise in daily life, without a second 
thought, such as our use of belief/desire psychology. Under the FEP (if it is correct and it does 
unite perception and action in just such a way as to minimise free energy) human social 
interaction could be aimed at minimising free energy on the macro-scale. I propose that FP, as 
currently practiced, could be an unwittingly derived evolutionary adaptation toward 
minimisation of free energy on a bigger scale118. Propositional attitudes, if nothing else, pick 
out macro-reasons for behaviour in order to allow us to better model our environment for 
successful navigation thereof. Note that this does not entail an accurate portrayal of reality, as 
such, but merely those aspects of reality that matter to the organism itself. Socially constructed 
propositional attitudes within the context of humanity’s folk psychological paradigm can be 
seen as just such a successful strategy for survival (in a broad sense) within the social 
environment. Also note that any future change in our FP could still adhere to the principles of 
energy minimisation, as this change could be a gradual shift in our understanding, rather than 
a wholesale and wasteful change119. 
 
 
                                                 
117 It should be noted that the FEP, according to Friston (2010), extends to all systematic structural organisation, 
from the entire morphological structure of the organism right on down to specific processes within the organism 
itself. Therefore, cognitive data processing is simply one element within this overarching principle.  
118 Hirsh et al. (2013) made a similar claim when they wrote that “personal narratives” are the molar-level 
integration of the underlying predictive processes of the mind (ibid.: 216-217).  
119 For a list of both the accepted and still contentious characteristics of PP, see Wiese and Metzinger (2017: 1). 
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3. Predictive Processing and Folk Psychology 
But what room does the PP conception of mind leave for propositional attitudes and their 
interrelations? The two prominent philosophical adherents of PP have made mention of the 
negative impact this would have on our self-conception (Clark 2013a; 2016; Hohwy 2013: 2). 
Hohwy begins his monograph on PP with a capsule statement highlighting the fundamental 
changes that this view would afford us, and part of that radical shift is our very conception of 
“who we are” (Hohwy 2013: 2). Clark (2013a: 197) has similarly expressed the impact 
predictive modelling would have on “agent-level experience”, potentially giving us a more 
coherent picture of our perception than “the basic framework of ‘folk psychology’” (Clark 
2016: 82). He also states that this would be a vindication of Churchland’s neuro-computational 
elucidation of the inner workings of the mind (which the reader will remember was discussed 
in Chapter Two) (Clark 2013a: 197; 2016: 82). What Clark and Hohwy are alluding to in these 
statements are the more traditional iterations of FP as propositional attitude folk psychology. 
As I have expressed in the previous chapter, this is the predominant view of FP within 
philosophical literature on the topic, whether tacit or not. Therefore, looking at the impact that 
PP would have on our canonical depictions of beliefs and desires would be illuminating on this 
score. 
3.1. The Impact of Predictive Processing on Canonical Beliefs 
 
Firstly, it must be remembered that belief, as conventionally understood, is a propositional 
mental state linked to an attitude that bears an epistemic relation to the proposition where the 
proposition is regarded as true120 (Dewhurst 2017: 4). This leads to interaction with other 
mental states, which create subsequent actions so as to act in accordance with this state of 
affairs (that of the proposition being true). This blanket statement concerning belief can still 
have a place within the PP conception of mind, as predictions generated by cortical processing 
could be interpreted as “beliefs” about the state of affairs in the world (ibid.). However, on the 
PP view, belief would be produced through the prior model, and subsequently juxtaposed to 
the world in order to produce the posterior probability model. 
Friston has described beliefs as predictions in many of his works (Friston 2010; Hobson & 
Friston 2014), and so have Clark (2013a; 2016) and Hohwy (2013). While this may be an 
                                                 
120 The mental state of belief is usually expressed in the typical formulation of a propositional attitude, such as “D 
believes that he has gone over this before”. 
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innocent usage of the term “belief” within the PP framework, it is useful to separate the way 
“belief” is used within FP as traditionally conceived and the way it is used within the PP 
framework. As Dewhurst (2017: 4) points out, beliefs within traditional FP are usually treated 
as determinate mental states in the sense that either one believes what the mental state 
represents or one does not (as explained in Chapter Two). On the other hand, belief on the PP 
construal is a predominantly probabilistic disposition. For example, to believe that one is stuck 
in traffic or at a traffic light (from Bach & Dolan 2012: 573), the PP cognitive system would 
consign a probabilistic quantity to this state of affairs, which in turn provides impetus to act in 
the form of moving forward or not (although when the impetus occurs is of course 
problematised on this view). The example that Clark (2013a: 188; 2016: 41) uses is that the 
brain does not represent “CAT ON MAT”, but instead a “conditional probability density 
function” that is indicative of the external reality (or at least indicative enough), taking what is 
given to the system. 
It is clear from these examples that even writing, let alone thinking, about beliefs within PP 
forces upon us a radical shift in our conception of the interrelations of propositional attitudes 
and the mind. We can conceive of beliefs as probabilistic, similarly to Pettigrew (2015) who 
juxtaposes determinate belief with probabilistic belief and finds the former wanting. He sees a 
pluralistic take on beliefs to be more useful in terms of explicating the ways in which beliefs 
can be described on differing levels of analysis (ibid.: 201-203). We do use determinate beliefs 
in explaining behaviour, but these beliefs become increasingly indeterminate the further 
“down” the cognitive processes involved we go. Again, assigning an emblematic belief stating 
that one is stuck in traffic or at a traffic light as either being true or false is different to 
conceiving of predictive beliefs that contain finer details of the environment, those “such as 
edges and light gradients rather than the ‘middle sized dry goods’ that populate the folk 
ontology” (Dewhurst 2017: 4). Even the more determinate (but still importantly probabilistic) 
instantiations of belief within the PP system involve all the modalities, as well as somatic and 
emotional affectations, as described in Chapter Two with reference to beliefs and desires. These 
intermingle in ways that irreparably warp the typical conception of belief toward a strangely 
probabilistic distribution within the mind. Clark’s conception of PP entails complexities that 
loop into mind and environment, thus rendering us incapable of adequately delineating 
canonical beliefs utilising the common conceptualisations within everyday communication 
(Clark 2016: 292). 
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In other words, the differing roles of our internal cognitive states do not correlate with typical 
conceptions of belief. We may express in language the notion that we are entertaining a belief, 
but our language is merely a way of fine-tuning, and hence manipulating in an artificial way, 
the precision gain on our predicted models of the world (Clark 2016: 284). Having said this, 
Clark (2013a: 199) argues that we must not discount the “causal potency of the folk-
psychological constructs”. These constructs are experienced and manipulated “just as surely as 
we encounter and model other constructs such as marriage, divorce, and taxes” (ibid.). Hohwy 
(2013: 60-61) similarly views beliefs as probabilistic, but also states that the interactions 
between the PP mind and the dynamic environment result in eventual regularities. These 
regularities, as more determinate mental states, are cognitively higher-order than the 
aforementioned probabilistic density functions and akin to our canonical conceptions of belief. 
Hohwy uses the example of a moving cat partially occluded by a picket fence to make his point 
(ibid.). Dewhurst (2017: 4-5) takes Hohwy to mean that the propositional belief “there is a cat 
moving behind a picket fence” is cashed out by both a coarse-grained prediction of the whole 
cat, as well as a finer-grained prediction of the parts of the cat seen through the fence over a 
period of time. The PP models therefore instantiate both the “diachronic” (ibid.: 5) slices of 
temporally immediate cat slices, as well as the higher-order “belief” of the existence of a whole 
cat. If this higher-order “belief” is suitably pertinent depending on the context (in this case: 
needing to have a conception of what is moving behind that fence), it is held at the conscious 
level. In other words, we should expect mental states which broadly resemble typical folk 
psychological mental states at higher levels of the predictive hierarchy, but these are still 
fundamentally probabilistic and too coarse to be determinate in the propositional sense (ibid.). 
I am partial to this view, as it encapsulates both the probabilistic and abstractly non-linguistic 
conception of belief, while allowing a seemingly determinate state of belief. 
Predictions, through active inference, enable us to act upon our beliefs. In other words, the 
predictive models provide visceral, “off-line” norms for action. Clark (2016: 187) has 
elaborated that this is very similar to the Millikanesque representations of the Pushmi-Pullyu 
kind (Millikan 1995, 2005). These concepts and the lingering problems thereof shall be 
expanded upon in the next chapter, but briefly: Clark envisages predictive models as 
instantiating a form of content that is dually “descriptive as well as imperative” (Clark 2016: 
187). This notion of representational content informs his view that the PP paradigm enables us 
to both model our environment as well as act upon it. The astute reader, as attested to by 
Dewhurst (2017: 5), will recognise that the line between beliefs and desires begin to blur. The 
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desire to act upon the world seems to be subsumed into the belief that the world is the way it 
is. This is why Hohwy has suggested a reconceptualisation of our concepts of “belief” and 
“perception” to something more akin to an all-encompassing “expectation” (Hohwy 2013: 70-
73). Beliefs and desires, in other words, are done away with, and coalesce into one another as 
a singular cognitive state. 
On this view of cognitive dynamics, it is difficult to place the traditional understanding of belief 
in relation to the fine-grained processing of PP. Ontologically-speaking, “belief” only exists at 
a far more molar level of observation. Yet, using the term “belief” to describe predictions does 
not necessarily delineate the typical propositional attitudes that inhabit our talk of FP. The 
determinate and linguistic nature of FP beliefs are starkly different to the probabilistic and fine-
grained predictive models instantiated within the mind on this view (Dewhurst 2017: 5). At the 
very least, these predictive models are not propositional in any real sense. As alluded to above, 
these models may appear to coalesce, during higher-order processing, into something akin to 
our publicly-accepted notion of folk psychological belief, but this has a distinctly “as if” quality 
to it. As Chapter Four’s depiction of the effect enculturation has on our beliefs and desires will 
show, we learn to attribute these beliefs and desires in a particular way through the effect of 
our ontogenetic development. 
 
3.2. The Impact of Predictive Processing on Canonical Desires 
 
Desires are similarly affected by the probabilistic framework of PP. Desires, as stated earlier, 
can be subsumed, along with beliefs, into a general expectational state. The action-oriented 
predictive qualities of this state do not simply model the environment, but stimulate the 
cognitive system to act within it through the motivational tool of active inference. This 
capability, that of stimulating the system into action, takes the place usually reserved for 
“desires” within our common understanding of FP (Dewhurst 2017: 5). A “representation” of 
what the predictive system depicts the environment to be like is generated, analogous to the 
“beliefs” of how it actually is, and subsequently action is entrained to bring these “desires” to 
fruition. The feeling of “desire” therefore features as a by-product of these sub-conscious 
processes, as the active minimisation of surprisal brings the body in line with the inner 
“representation” of what is expected121. It is an open question as to whether this phenomenal 
                                                 
121 This is an all-pervasive phenomenon on this neurological framework. Everything from the surprisal induced 
by low glucose levels (instigating the chain of events that eventually lead you to eat) to the alignment of visual 
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by-product is either selected for via natural selection, or an arbitrary relic of the evolutionary 
past.  
But this is a quite radical reversal of our conception of desire and action as seen through a 
traditionally folk psychological lens. Causation of action is reversed from a desire for a state 
of affairs to come about leading to behaviour, to an expected state of affairs being predictively 
generated, which then causes behaviour (via active inference). It appears, if we are to take the 
PP account seriously, that the phenomenological experience of desire is no more than the 
emotional and somatic instantiation of the predictive modelling process of a state of affairs in 
the world (ibid.: 6). Desire, as typically conceived, does not in any real sense inhabit a 
functional position which is causal in any manner. Said differently, active inference within our 
predictive minds “does not invoke any ‘desired consequences’” (Friston et al. 2011: 157). 
Desire, therefore, does not lead to behaviour in any obvious sense. Clark (2016: 129) endorses 
this view by reconceptualising desires (along with beliefs) as complex interrelations between 
predicted models and the world. Cognition and perception, as traditionally construed, become 
entwined in such a way as to become “fuzzy” (Clark 2013a: 190). Perception and desires have 
no clearly distinctive properties, and are rather thought to be variations within the cascading 
cortical processes, further influenced by the spatial and temporal differences depicted within 
the models themselves. Cognitive, more “overt” processing reacts to conceptualisations of the 
environment that are more abstract (and potentially culturally mediated). By contrast, 
perceptual, low-level models react to finer-grained levels of detail in the environment. It is the 
“precision-modulated […] interactions between these levels” (ibid.) which are the driving force 
of adaptation to the environment and intelligent behaviour. Thus, the world is perceived by this 
use of information, which is used to “explain away” driving sensory signals. Cognitive desires 
and perception are distinct only insofar as they are taken to be conceptual, rather than actual 
differing processes within the mind. The same internalised processes are utilised in their 
instantiation, and they are multiply-realised within the neuronal substrate (ibid.). 
This is all very fine and well, but there is an existential issue with the aforementioned. This 
view comes at the cost of the conception of our personal agency and volition. Desires as 
consequences, as opposed to being the original instigators of behaviour, is a profoundly 
counterintuitive depiction of our experience. Here, active inference (depicted here as agency) 
is purely in the service of the PEM of the Bayesian system. It is not about wanting to do things, 
                                                 
sensory uptake with environmental expectations (the expectation that a child is cute leading to the confirmation 
thereof), can fall within the remit of PP. 
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instead: “…we feel like we want to do things because doing them will minimise prediction 
error” (Dewhurst 2017: 6). Hohwy (2013: 89) similarly states that it is not what the agent wills, 
so much as the process of PEM that instigates action. This would therefore not place our 
canonical folk conception of desire in significant interactions with action generating processes. 
The general predictions that instantiate action subsume folk psychological desires into 
themselves, and active inferences ensure that action is taken to make the predictions come to 
fruition. 
 
4. Issues Going Forward 
In summary, beliefs and desires of the traditionally folk psychological kind become something 
decidedly different on the PP picture. Firstly, both our beliefs and our desires are subsumed 
into a singular predictive state, which is action-oriented. Secondly, and more disconcerting in 
terms of our sense of personal agency, desire is not primary in our cognitive ontology, rather it 
is PEM which acts as the fundamental impetus for action. This is all very upsetting for those 
that insist on a FP predicated on semantic propositions as mental content. A move that these 
proponents can perform to undercut the impact of these theoretical impositions is to cede 
ground to the adherents of PP. Even if the PP picture were correct, the above does not entail a 
full picture of the way that we utilise folk psychology within our everyday interaction. What 
about the typical mentalistic states that can be attributed to ourselves and others? Are these 
theorists not performing some form of obfuscation, taking something away that exists in some 
obvious sense and has been useful in predicting mental states? Not exactly, since, as can be 
recalled from the previous chapter, contemporary theories may fail to vindicate folk 
psychological propositional attitudes in their canonical guise, but such propositional attitudes 
can be subsumed into a broader framework of learnt narrative competency. If these learnt 
narratives are what fix the propositional attitudes in behavioural explanations, we should be 
looking toward culturally-mediated influences on our folk psychological discourse, if we are 
to evaluate it. Arguably, our “beliefs” only appear determinate and linguistic because we have 
been taught to think of them as such.  
The reader may also have picked up on elements of the disjunction problem within the 
Helmholtzian idea of multiple sensory causes potentially bringing about a particular effect, as 
discussed above. This issue, too, can be addressed. On the PP view, the predictive mind goes 
some way to explaining away the need for accuracy conditions, and instead advocates a mind 
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which collates probability over accuracy by “analysing” a gradient of likely sensory causes 
from a fixed history of generalised norm fixing. The existence of multiple causes potentially 
bringing about a particular effect are assigned weightings relative to each other, which 
subsequently attunes the mind to the most probabilistically pertinent cause. Again, this need 
not be accurate as such, but “accurate” enough for appropriate bodily response. There is 
nothing obviously contradictory about this beyond intuitive cognitivist bias, which means that 
the disjunction problem need not arise on this view. 
The view of cognition that PP affords us could be an important component in answering the 
question of how it is possible that we acquire the information that fuels our perception and 
drives our action in the first place. In other words, how is it that our accuracy conditions are 
fixed such that our mental states can misrepresent? It may go some way to answering how the 
“spike trains”122 within the brain are capable of “representing” knowledge as stored content for 
representation of the environment. It appears that it is only these “spike trains” that are available 
to the brain moment to moment after all. A way to alleviate these worries is to “go radical” 
with regards to representation. 
To “go radical”, as Hutto and Myin would put it (Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017) in terms of 
representation in the mind, is to be eliminativist toward content. In this way, a view of the mind 
that can incorporate the positives of PP while doing away with the problematic elements of 
traditional FP, and which posits rich semantic mental content as foundational to our cognition, 
can be achieved. This account will be unpacked and expanded upon in the next chapter. Going 
radical with regards to representation in the mind is necessary as, although Hutto and Myin 
(2017: 57-66) find much to admire about PP, they balk at its insistence on representation as the 
hallmark of the mental. They see Clark’s (2016) recent take on PP to be a cogent account which 
unifies the disparate phenomena of the mind into a coherent conceptual framework, partly 
because of its propositional attitude eliminativism (Hutto & Myin 2017: 58). But they have 
distinct misgivings with the lingering representational element of the PP paradigm, arguing for 
a minimal construal of content within the neuronal economy of the mind. This is due to the 
need to eliminate unnecessary processing in the brain, a view that is also adopted in this thesis. 
The admiration is similarly limited from Clark’s side, as he considers it impossible to tell the 
tale of PP “in entirely non-representational terms” (Clark 2015c: 5, emphasis added). Clark 
does, however, have many affinities for the enactivist tradition with his previously formulated 
                                                 
122 Action potential is the change in electrical potential of the axons within the brain, and spike trains are a temporal 
sequence of such action potentials.  
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Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) (Clark & Chalmers 1998), but this will be briefly expanded 
upon in the chapter to come. I will argue that a reconciliation of these related, yet marginally 
opposed viewpoints is needed in order to provide a more accurate theory of the inner workings 
of our cognitive processes, and by extension, of their effect on our folk psychological discourse. 
In relation to the above, the gulf in understanding between our folk conception of ourselves 
and the scientific conception of the same are still poles apart. Sellars (1962) has termed these 
two spheres of discourse the “scientific” and “manifest” images. The manifest image denotes 
the day-to-day folk psychological understanding that we all employ123, whereas the scientific 
image denotes the physical realm to which we have no direct cognitive access, such as atoms, 
molecules, the interaction of such, and everything in-between (such as the neuronal structures 
and their sub-personal processing currently under review). As Dennett has remarked (2013a: 
209; 2017: 61-63), the role of the philosopher is to close the gap between these two images or, 
stated differently, to bridge the gap between surprise and surprisal124. This is why Dennett 
(2013a: 209-210) endorses the predictive processing paradigm, and goes on to draw an analogy 
between it and our folk predictions. He begins with what he has termed “Hume’s Strange 
Inversion” (Dennett 2013a; 2013b; 2015; 2017):  there seems to be something in the world 
known as causation, but we only see correlations, from which we infer causation, and these 
very correlations within the environment cause us to “see” the causation “out there” (Dennett 
2013a: 210). For example, throwing a ball and seeing it cause the shattering of the window-
glass elicits a sensation of perceiving the causation as out there in the environment (ibid.). But 
as Hume has long ago argued, this is actually an example of the mind’s “great propensity to 
spread itself on external objects” (2009: 270). Instead, we are misrepresenting an inner 
sensation or, more correctly, an anticipation, for an external property of the world. In other 
words, we are misattributing internalised mental perception to particular occurrences in the 
environment, as a form of “user-illusion” (Dennett 2013a: 210). Hume (2009: 271) stated that 
we cannot seem to do away with this illusory sense of the reality of causation. Dennett (2013a: 
210) states that this is still the contemporary case, as the cognitivist viewpoint is one in which 
perceiving representations of the world is primarily a case of receiving incoming sensory data 
from the outside125. 
                                                 
123 Or, as Dennett (2013a: 209) puts it: “[Our] everyday world of folk psychology, furnished with people and their 
experiences of all the middle-sized things that matter”. 
124 Clark (2013a: 199) and Hirsh et al. (2013) also allude to Sellars with reference to PP. 
125 Here are a few other examples that he states are in need of “Strange Inversions”: the intrinsic sweetness of 
sugary products; the intrinsic cuteness of babies; intrinsic sexiness of objects of lust; the funniness “in” the joke, 
and many others (Dennett 2013a: 210; 2015; originally Hurley et al. 2011). 
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Dennett proposes that to tie the manifest and scientific images together, we need to look to the 
predictive coding strategy (Dennett 2013a: 210). All organisms, from the single-celled up to 
humanity, have affordances that matter to their particular well-being, and which are pertinent 
to predictively discern (ibid.). Humans have a set of affordances that are vastly different from 
the simple homeostatic inclinations of a single-celled organism, including avoiding cars in the 
road, being able to open doors, and even being able to communicate socially. The Bayesian 
model sees the mind as deploying its resources toward doing as good a job as possible at 
“representing” the environmental features around us that matter to our future behavioural 
action (ibid.). We expect to not survive the impact of the car; we expect the door to open as we 
turn the handle; we expect certain social conventions to hold within social interaction. These 
expectations extend to our very selves, as predicting our behaviour is a good implicit survival 
technique when we are able to predict what we will think, do, and expect next (Clark 2013b: 
240; Dennett 2013a: 210). As in the example of social conventions above, we expect the social 
conventions to hold, despite them not being intrinsic to the nature of any conversation. It is 
rather a felt dispositional projection of one’s own expectations onto the conversation. It is not 
simply the existence of cues within the conversation, but an expectation of these cues that are 
projected onto it, providing the illusion of the intrinsic nature of these cues. Therefore, we 
“expect to expect” (Dennett 2013a: 210) the existence of these cues within the conversation. 
When these are proved correct, there are no prediction errors to propagate forward, which 
confirm the expected existence of the properties “inherent” within the conversation. It should 
be stressed that, as incorrect as this view of reality is from a certain vantage point, it is an 
evolutionary adaptation which has served us immensely well in surviving the vicissitudes of 
the world. My reading of this is that our nervous systems have evolved to the point of projecting 
properties onto the world that are not there, all in order to better serve our continual existence. 
Clark himself has emphasised the disconnect between our folk conceptions of beliefs, 
expectations, fears and the like with the emergent picture of neuronal processing (Clark 1989; 
2013a: 198-199). This disconnect forces us, he believes, to apply our latest scientific and 
conceptual understanding “to improve social relations and education, to increase human 
happiness, or to inform our responses to social problems” (Clark 2013a: 199). The coming 
together of these two depictions (the above-mentioned manifest and scientific images 
respectively) is a worthy project to undertake in order to achieve as much as possible from our 
emerging understanding of both. Extended to the realm of FP, we need to expose our 
conceptual failings between what we think we do and what the science is telling us. This is all 
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in order to expand not only the understanding of our world, but the understanding of our place 
within it. Conflating beliefs and desires can be an example of the gradual project of merging 
our manifest and scientific images. But, as Clark (ibid.) put it, our scientific conception of the 
world must also allow for the causal influence of the folk psychological framework. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced a rising view within the cognitive sciences, that of PP. It depicts 
our minds as operating primarily through the Bayesian modelling of the environment. 
Perception, therefore, is potentially nothing more than an “explaining away” (Clark 2013a: 
187) of incoming sensory data matched with hierarchical cascades of predictions at a multitude 
of temporal and spatial gradations. The predictions depict what the PP system has already 
gleaned from the environment (along with “doubts” within its own cognitive functioning). 
According to Clark (ibid.), this leaves us with a “theory-laden” view of perception whereby 
our priors (or hyperpriors) take prominence in our perceptions of incoming sensory data. Error 
signals, which are all that remain after the cancelling out of predictions and incoming sensory 
signals, are fed forward through the system126. Therefore, it is primarily the recurrent (or 
backward) connections that carry the pertinent informational burden. The unifying potential of 
this view was introduced in showing how PP within the brain is seemingly action-oriented 
toward environmental cues. This action-orientation elicits a dual role for our underlying 
neuronal architectures by seemingly incorporating them for both perception and action. It was 
further explained that this is all in the service of minimising free energy due to the energy 
constraints of the homeostatic system that is our brain and body. Thereafter, the effects of this 
view of our fine-grained processing on our canonical conceptions of “belief” and “desire” were 
discussed. The conclusions derived were deflationary and decidedly anti-realist as to what 
exists within our neuronal interactions at this level. Firstly, both beliefs and desires were found 
to be subsumed into a singular expectational state (Hohwy 2013: 70-73). Secondly, it was 
found that desire does not feature as primary in our cognitive ontology. It is more a felt 
disposition which is the result of the aforementioned expectational state. These have very clear 
implications for our understanding of our cognitive structures (as PP is counter-intuitive), as 
well as our conception of our own volition (which adds to the free will debate). 
                                                 
126 To put a stop to “the gossiping”, in the words of Friston (2005: 829). 
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It was proposed that the problems for us going forward with this view of brain functionality 
could be mitigated by endorsing a view of “representation” within the mind which is at the 
very least deflationary, opening the door for a radically enactive depiction of our inner 
cognitive processing. Furthermore, endorsing a research paradigm that emphasises a closing of 
the gap between our scientific and manifest images would go some way to mitigating any 
misgivings as to the decidedly counter-intuitive theory of our internal processing that PP 
provides. The next chapter will expand upon the radically enactive approach in order to further 
undermine traditional FP, by advocating a minimally-contentful depiction of our mental states. 
This shall advocate a “representation-less” view of our mental states, and incorporate PP in 
achieving this task. I shall start by introducing the literature on enactivism, and thereafter 
further problematising definitive content within our cognitive deliberations. This shall help in 
bringing PP and this radically enactive approach together, and in so doing, potentially sweep 
away misconceptions about the existence of propositional content. 
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Chapter Four: Teleosemiotics and the Minimal Turn 
 
“Conscious thought doesn’t have much to do with this stuff. Doesn’t have much to do 
with the way we live our lives, period, if you believe the psychologists. A bit of 
rationalization, most of it with hindsight. Put the rest down to hormonal drives, gene 
instinct, and pheromones for the fine-tuning. Sad, but true”. 
- Richard Morgan (2002: [s.p.]). 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will move beyond PP to explicate a theory of mind which endorses minimal 
content-acquisition for the majority of our cognition, and by extension, for our day-to-day FP. 
As with PP, it is a view which does not have a use for unnecessary processing if there are more 
frugal ways to arrive at the same output. This view of minimal cognition is called radically 
enactive embodied cognition and is proposed by Hutto and Myin (Hutto 2011, 2015; Hutto & 
Myin 2013a, 2017; Myin & Hutto 2015). It employs a more direct fit between body and world 
to arrive at its radically embodied view. Fundamentally, it proposes an alternate framework for 
our general cognition in day-to-day existence than more mainstream theories of mental 
cognition and representation, such as the teleosemantic theories of content. Currently, these 
teleosemantic theories of content (Millikan 1984, 1993, 2004, 2005; Papineau 1987; Dretske 
1988), to be explained below, serve as the dominant theories in which to ground intentionality, 
and by extension content, into a naturalistic worldview127. This means that this alternative view, 
as proposed by Hutto and Myin (2013a, 2017), offers a more naturalistic proposal in grounding 
our intentionality by taking a more scientifically viable, and therefore not exclusively 
philosophical, position. I shall go briefly into the problem of content within cognition, before 
describing the shift to more enactive theories of the mind and consciousness. After describing 
these foundations, I shall elucidate the particulars that make minimal cognition an appealing 
theory in juxtaposition to teleosemantic theories of content. I shall throughout show how this 
theory can capture the inner processes of our predictive minds, thereby linking its literature 
with that of PP. I shall then describe the functional role that social scaffolding potentially 
inhabits in our enactive and PP minds. This opens the door for an understanding of our general, 
                                                 
127 Recall that naturalism in its most general sense advocates a congruency with our best sciences (and 
therefore precludes the supernatural from its theorising). 
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day-to-day internal mental processes as necessarily streamlined and frugal (but not without its 
shortcomings as a result). The reason for introducing this lies in the need to ground the enactive 
and the predictive capacities of the mind within our social realm. This is necessitated by the 
need to explain how it is that our folk psychological concepts arise from our cognitive 
architecture, as described in the foregoing chapters. I will show how it is possible for the 
features of our basic cognition to be separate from, but still inform, the fully representational 
content that FP trades in. In this way, FP is preserved as a “just-so” relic that is nevertheless 
parasitic upon, and is descriptive of, our molar-level social lives. This view of the mind is one 
that does not trade in rich content and representation at a neuronal level. Utilising the 
conceptual framework of this thesis, I shall end with an endorsement of a view of our FP as 
explicable in terms of the basic functionality of our embodied selves, which is a far cry from 
previously formulated theories along the lines of propositional attitude psychology. 
 
2. The Myth of Content 
To begin with, recall from Chapter Two that the way that our FP is allegedly instantiated at the 
neuronal level is separated from the processes we invoke once we seek to explain subsequent 
behaviour. It is only once we seek to explain that we delve into the mire of personal reasons, 
thereby invoking the now infamous belief/desire pairing that supposedly describes the causal 
chain of events which produce the resultant action. The content of these folk ascriptions, recall, 
are traditionally thought to be derived from our sense-data. Beliefs and desires in canonical FP 
are inherently content-involving. But if action and attendant processes occur below the level of 
overt thought, I argue that we need not involve content-inherent processes in our theories of 
cognition. As intractable as it is to unravel the implicit thinking we all employ, it is usually 
understood that to be able to employ a truly structured and instrumental thinking, we must be 
dealing with content-rich internal cognitive procedures (Hutto 2008a: 43). It is understood, as 
stipulated in Chapter Two, that these content-rich cognitive procedures are what constitute the 
propositional attitudes, the propositions that encapsulate our beliefs and desires, and which 
allow us to systematise a coherent framework of instrumental cognition (Hutto 2008a: 43; 
Hutto & Myin 2013a: 13-14, Hutto & Myin 2017: 1-2; Muller 2014: 171). These propositions 
are thought to be the constituents of our content-bearing states, which need to be reciprocally 
connected in order to obtain the sort of instrumental reasoning128 needed for intentionality. 
                                                 
128 Recall that instrumental reasoning denotes overt cognitive deliberation. 
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These propositional attitudes, traditionally, are seen as the framework that makes the 
apprehension of our environment possible in a way that provides an informationally-accurate 
and integrated understanding (Hutto 2008a: 2). This propositional content is then what enables 
us to cognate in an intentional way. But, to free ourselves from this increasingly tenuous 
cognitivist paradigm, there is a need for us to distinguish between content-rich intentional 
attitudes and those that do not adhere to this form of intention, namely, proposition-less 
attitudes. But it is often thought that if instrumental reasoning is to be instantiated, the requisite 
propositional attitudes must be sufficiently constructed in order to achieve this (ibid.: 44). 
Fodorian-style thinking on this score depicts holding particular thought content (the semantics) 
as a token which can be re-utilised within a syntactic chain of thought (Fodor 1994: 97; Hutto 
2008a: 45). This is how we can acquire our different propositional attitudes within differing 
contexts, through the re-utilisation of these delineated semantic contents. Or so it goes. To be 
able to grasp a thought with particular propositional content enables instrumental reasoning, 
while communication is only possible through grasping the same content by more than one 
person (ibid.). On this view, in order to instantiate a thought with the requisite content one must 
have more than solely an intention toward a particular state of affairs: as I have mentioned 
above, we need to separate content-rich propositional attitudes from purely intentional 
attitudes129. More specifically, for reasons that shall become clear below, I shall argue for a 
form of minimally-contentful, directed behaviour which can be described as ur-intentionality; 
the “ur-” prefix denoting a more originary and foundational intentionality than that typically 
invoked in these discussions (see Hutto & Myin (2017), Chapter Five). Content-rich attitudes 
are those of the propositional variety, while non-vocalised responsive behaviour need not be 
instantiated by this variety of intentionality for it to do work, and by extension it does not need 
semantic130 referential characteristics of the sort needed in traditional propositional folk 
theorising131 (Hutto 2008a: 46). Simply appealing to the overt functionality of FP in social 
discourse need not speak to a fundamental cognitive role for propositional attitudes, as shall 
become clear below. 
What basis does the above have in reality? Arguably, it is a very plausible model of our 
cognitive processes, in that it can account for their functioning in a very parsimonious manner. 
                                                 
129 Or, more accurately, intentionally-directed dispositional states. 
130 Recall that mention of semantics refers to the representational content of the mental state. 
131 Evans’ (1982) is the modern seminal text on perceptual states as primarily content-rich. It is very forthrightly 
stated that the subject’s perceptual state has content which can only be represented as true or false (Evans 1982: 
226-227). It is further elaborated that any content-rich internal state is intimately related to behaviour (ibid.). 
Furthermore, these internal states are created through perception of the environment (ibid.). 
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For starters, we should not think that incorporating sense-data, which seemingly informs the 
content of our thoughts, into our cognitive apparatus is in need of transduction132 from its 
originary, non-conceptual form into a finalised conceptual vehicle. Furthermore, it is not 
necessary to incorporate this transduced content into further cognitive functioning. This is what 
Dennett has called “the myth of double transduction” (1996). He called it a myth, as many in 
the field still feel the tug of intuition toward a theory of the “encoding” of environmental 
information derived from the senses. This “encoding” is of sensory information into a different 
medium that is actually used within “true” consciousness. He has used this as a useful metaphor 
to undercut our intuitive understanding of mental representation133. 
It is difficult to pin down what extra explanatory work is being done when we invoke additional 
vehicles of content to explain the way that sense-data is represented to us (Hutto & Myin 
2013b). It would seem that on this view the brain is doing more internal processing than is 
needed and, based on the preceding chapter’s discussion  of the notion of free energy 
minimisation, it would not make sense to evolve in such a way. PP theories’ form of 
representation could perhaps be deflated to contain minimal content. Yet, we are still adding 
unnecessary processes to the brain’s inner workings due to our need to incorporate semantic 
content at some level. This, to my eyes, is a direct result of the traditional analytic paradigm 
and, on a more fundamental level, the natural human inclination to humanise biological 
processes. Even teleofunctional theories of mind (introduced earlier in this thesis) endorse a 
view which is too dependent on information that affords a capacity for content to represent a 
state of affairs (Hutto 2008a: 47). Recall that teleosemantic theories attempt to explicate the 
notion that the norms of mental content, if they are accurate/true or not in virtue of their 
environmental causes, are fundamentally derivative of their functional norms134. Therefore, the 
accuracy or truth evaluability of mental content ultimately comes down to a biological form of 
functional normativity. But the degrees of fit which instantiate relations of a semantic nature, 
thereby guiding the organism toward a directed action, are thought to refer to semantically-
defined vehicles within the brain and the features of the external environment which they 
represent (Hutto & Myin 2017: 43), and this also extends to the social environment. For me, 
there is no need for semantically-implicated vehicles of content. 
                                                 
132 Transduction here refers to the change of one form of signal into another.  
133 For example, to assume that the information from the neuronal signals that are registering pain need to be re-
encoded (transduced again) in order for us to properly cognate this pain, is a misunderstanding of how our mental 
processes work. 
134 The functional norms being those representational relations that have been fixed due to the particular 
evolutionary attunement of an intentional state toward distal stimuli. 
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Content-rich representation within the mind has often been automatically assumed, but now it 
appears that adherents are more defensive. For example, Colombo endorses a representational 
view akin to Clark and Toribio’s (1994) wherein “representations are necessary to tackle 
representational-hungry” tasks (Colombo 2012: 9). Yet, notice how what is to be defended is 
assumed from the start. Of course one would need representations to explicate representation-
hungry processes. It’s the existence of representation-hungry processes in basic functional 
cognition that is in need of defending, not the form of the representations themselves. Hutto 
and Myin (2013b: 6-8) call this the “constitutive-explanatory fallacy”, in that the biases 
inherent within theorising constitute and constrain the explanations derived therefrom. As a 
paradigm case for the invocation of representations within our basic cognitive processing, 
Colombo fails to introduce a single basis for preferring a representational approach to the mind, 
or even to explain how it adds any explanatory weight toward explaining “representation-
hungry” processes, such as social attunement. No singular mental state accurately representing 
an external state of affairs is necessarily going to add anything over and above what a non-
representational view would. Consider the following: Colombo states that neuronal 
information is transduced from sense-data and then “decoded” in the form of an “extraction of 
information […] from neuronal spiking” (ibid.: 7). This does not add anything more to the 
story. Effectively, Colombo does not base his explanation on an empirical basis, but instead 
relies primarily upon armchair philosophy to arrive at his conclusions. One can begin to see 
the issues at play here. 
Representationalists need things in the mind which can account for, or stand in for, properties 
which are “abstract” and “absent” (Clark & Toribio 1994: 419). This would enable sensitive 
responsitivity to environmental stimulation, as these stand-ins represent the states of affairs and 
also somehow represent what is not present. The “absent” is that which is either previously 
experienced, or newly formulated within the mind. A certain form of sensitivity must be in 
place to account for that which is not present, but which nevertheless informs our perception 
of the state of affairs. Granted, this is an intractable issue regardless of how we think about the 
mind, as the difficulties of unravelling the complexity of the mind continue to sit with us. But 
this is an issue which we can empirically work toward solving if we ignore the distraction of 
the issues surrounding content and representation. Consider again: Colombo (ibid.: 6) states 
that neuronal firings correlate with environmental stimulation in a functional manner, and this 
functional relationship can be explicated as a form of code. But there is then quite a leap: 
Colombo (ibid.: 7) goes on to say that “neural representations can be said [to be] the 
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constituents of the neural code” (emphasis in original). Why are neuronal representations 
invoked at this point? For what purpose other than to shoehorn conceptual favourites into a 
preordained theoretical structure? We are even told by Colombo (ibid.: 20) that Bayesian 
predictive modelling of the sort introduced in the previous chapter necessarily entails 
representations of the content-rich kind. According to him, we can only account for our mind’s 
ability to manipulate and control behaviour if representations are introduced, as representations 
are alleged to afford us the ability to “identify particular signals” (ibid.: 18). But there is current 
debate as to whether this is an accurate portrayal of just what “representation” means within 
the context of PP (eg. Gładziejewski 2016; Downey 2017; Dolega 2017). Secondly, he states 
that the explanatory power that the representations afford within cognitive science should also 
not be discounted. But an appeal to how scientists and philosophers have traditionally 
conceptualised their theoretical work is not a knockdown argument. In conclusion, to be 
naturalistic, one needs to adopt a rigorously scientific perspective, but in such a way that we 
are not restricted by traditional theorising on cognition and an over-emphasis on 
“representation” as the mark of the mental (see for example Ramsey (2014: 4-11) for a more 
extensive review). Effectively, taking representations “as both interesting explanatory 
constructs and as a necessary condition for a legitimate account [of the mark of the mental]” 
(ibid.: 8) comes across as circular.  
 
3. An Enactive Turn (For The Better) 
 
3.1 Theories More Radical 
 
Before laying out a minimally-contentful picture of mental representation, a brief outline of the 
foundations of this view is necessary. Minimally-contentful theories of cognition stem from 
the “E-theories” of mind. Hutto and Myin (2017: 1-2) list the “embodied, enactive, extended, 
embedded, and ecological aspects of mind” to drive home the “E turn” within cognitive 
philosophy. These “E-theories” arose primarily to account for the fluid nature of cognition and 
to overcome the rigid constraints of utilising propositional processes to explain the mind 
(Sutton et al. 2011; Dreyfus 2014). These theories are canonically known as the “4E conception 
of the mind” (Rowlands 2010: 3, attributed to Shaun Gallagher), which refers to the mind’s 
embodied, enactive, extended, and embedded aspects. Recall that enactivism is a catch-all term 
which refers to theories endorsing the view that cognition arises through the dynamic coupling 
between body and environment. This dynamism arises through the actions of an active body, 
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wherein reality is constructed through the body’s selective interaction with the environment, 
and in the way that the environment acts on the body in turn. The “embodied” refers to the non-
neuronal processes of the body which nevertheless influence the mind, while the “embedded” 
refers to the influencing effect of particular scaffolding within the environment, a typical 
example being the enhanced cognitive ability that language affords. In the absence of these 
scaffoldings, both bodily and environmental, the mind operates, at the very least, sub-
optimally. There is also the notion of the extended mind, in terms of how the mental extends 
outward to incorporate the environment into its processing (more of which to follow). 
Even though there has been an underlying acceptance of some form of propositional thinking 
in writings on the topic, there has also been a gradual shift toward other conceptions of 
cognition which can account for our quintessentially fast and seemingly streamlined thinking. 
The apparent dynamism of our minds is difficult to account for through brute, rigid 
propositionalism. Therefore, there has been a move toward the embodied, enactive, and 
extended forms of cognition, which make much of new empirical research into motor control 
functionality, mirror neurons, proprioception and the like135. In other words, the concepts of 
embodied, enactive, and extended cognition do not follow the contours of the traditional 
cognitivist paradigm. 
E-approaches seek to move beyond the dominant cognitive theories which have been around 
since the middle of the previous century and which take it as fact that the mind is a 
representational and computational machine (Hutto & Myin 2017: 4). These two key concepts, 
representationalism and computationalism, are the backbone of the cognitivist approach, and 
in themselves rest on more fundamental methodological commitments. Firstly, in terms of 
mechanistic analysis, parts of the mind/brain are often analysed along with their interactive 
processes, and secondly, it is shown how these interact to create the target phenomena under 
analysis (Horst 2007: 16-17). Taking this further, it is assumed that the cognitive components 
of the brain, and the brain alone (Aizawa 2015: 2), are the foundation of intelligence. Linking 
with this thesis, the computational mechanisms which are thought to produce this behaviour 
entail brain-bound computational processes with inherently contentful mental representations. 
This neuronally-bound depiction of mind is quintessentially of an interiorised intellectualism, 
                                                 
135 There are too many studies to count here, due to the vast proliferation of research on this theme. Research on 
motor circuitry reutilised for memory (Casasanto & Dijkstra 2010), mirroring within motor functions and 
emotions (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010), and many others have expanded our body of knowledge on the topic. 
These studies serve to highlight the interrelations of mind and environment, and hence depict them as not wholly 
distinct from each other.  
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where the “I” is paramount (Hutto & Myin 2017: 5). In contrast to this, E-approaches depict 
the cognitive realm as directly intertwined with bodily processes (embodied), the environment 
(enactive), and with non-neuronal objects within the environment (extended, embedded, 
ecological). 
Not all theorists necessarily ascribe to every concept equally or even at all, with some even 
supporting fundamentally unaltered cognitivism with a few enactive or extended bells and 
whistles. The paradigmatic enactivist stance, for example, usually takes the form of some kind 
of embodied representationalism with inherent content (see Goldman & de Vignemont 2009; 
Goldman 2012, 2014; Gallese 2014). We could call these the conservative cohort of the 
embodied mind theorists. According to these theorists, the science points toward the re-
deployment of embodied mental representations (representation of the body itself) as necessary 
for a vast number of cognitive processes. These embodied mental representations136 
“represent” information about the body in such a way so as to perform a useful function in 
cognitive processing. While having issues with some of the conclusions derived from research 
on embodied forms of cognition, Aizawa (2015: 4) puts it most clearly when he states that our 
cognitive processes are embodied in such a way that the underlying mechanisms of perception 
and action-response are the very same for conceptual reasoning. Therefore, the conservative 
branch of the E-theorist tree sees our mind as embodied in ways that extend beyond the confines 
of brain and skull, but claims that the ultimate processing of conceptual reasoning occurs via 
contentful handling of (semantic) representations. 
The next and more radical step in extending the bounds of cognition appears in the writings of 
the extended mind theorists. They are more explicit in their views that cognition can be a 
temporally-extensive, non-neuronally-bound, embodied interaction with the environment and 
the objects within it. The most renowned version of this view is the extended mind hypothesis 
(EMH) as originally formulated by Clark and Chalmers (1998). On this view, the mechanisms 
which enable cognitive functioning extend beyond the body and into the environment, thereby 
offloading some of the cognitive burden during certain cognitive processing tasks (see also 
Clark 2008; Rowlands 2009; Wheeler 2010). The theorists who endorse this view place much 
emphasis on the extended capability that tools provide. These can consist of objects such as 
computers, bodily implants, or even the mundane in the case of the vast powers that words, 
                                                 
136 For example, an inner “representation” of our bodily position in relation to the environment. 
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whether written or spoken, provide137. The general idea is that without complementary props 
(or extended cognitive vehicles) (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8) in the environment, our minds 
are simply not capable of certain forms of enhanced cognition. These theorists usually advocate 
that causally effectual sources of information from these environmental props are what actually 
drive cognition (Aizawa 2014: 15). There is still a nod toward representationalism as inherently 
pertinent within cognitive processing, as any reading of Clark would attest to. But the strictures 
of traditional cognitivism have been relaxed to extend the boundary outward beyond the brain. 
However, there still appears to be a form of “intellectualised enactivism” (Hutto & Myin 2017: 
61) at work here. For example, Clark often writes in a way that incorporates cognitivist 
references to “representations” (Clark 2013a; 2016 and others). This speaks to an enactivist 
who still believes that representation is necessary for the mental to do work. Clark quite clearly 
sees precision-weighting of estimates from our predictive minds (for example 2013a: 188) as 
the primary instigators of action, but these cannot be captured within “ordinary daily speech” 
(Clark 2015b: 5). What, then, can these precision-weightings be of if they perform the role of 
the contents of representations within the cognitive make-up of the brain? Clark proposes that 
the inferential processes that generate representations from within the “black box” of our mind 
are adequate to satisfy any philosophical qualms (2013a: 189). However, Clark does not see 
them as propositional in nature, so some adjustment needs to be made in order to tie this 
propositionless picture of the mind and his construal of PP together. 
There has been another trend within the literature that moves even further away from the old 
cognitivist paradigm. This further move has coalesced into the sub-discipline of sensorimotor 
enactivism, first articulated within Noë’s (2004). It is a thesis which emphasises fully embodied 
interactions with the environment in such a way as to blur the line between the two138. It differs 
from other forms of extended cognition in its rejection of functionalism, and especially the 
multiple realisability thesis. What this denotes is that it is only through our bodies that we can 
have our particular brand of cognition (Noë 2004: 25; 2009: 62), and any other substrate is 
                                                 
137 Clark (2003), as well as Myin & Veldeman (2011), introduce abstract art as an unlikely yet perfect 
encapsulation of this thesis. They point to the work of van Leeuwen et al. (1999) who uses the example of 
sketchpad use within abstract art. External sketches, which are often used within abstract art, are necessary due to 
the difficult task of maintaining simultaneous interpretational images in the mind. These sketchpads therefore 
augment our limited processing capabilities. 
138 As a clear everyday example, consider the skilful riding of a bike (Degenaar & O’Regan 2017: 2). To 
successfully ride the bike, one must be able to keep one’s balance despite mitigating circumstances (an upcoming 
bend, bumps in the road, excessive wind). This is an enactive process, as the “dynamic engagement with the 
environment” (ibid.) cannot be described in purely representational terms. 
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insufficient to account for our embodied interactions139. Further, it rejects the internal, richly-
representational models of perception which are found in other views on cognition. Noë (2004: 
216; 2009: 7) states (in an admittedly abstract fashion) that perception should not be thought 
of as something occurring within us, but rather something we actively do. So, while the neurons 
within the brain are necessary for perception to occur, it is only through the action of the 
individual that it can come about140 (Noë 2004: 227; 2009: 47). Despite this radical shift in 
trying to explain cognitive processing, Noë’s theory still holds onto the idea that rich content 
arises after the use and manipulation of sensorimotor information (Noë 2004: 17, although 
Noë’s position has changed slightly since then, see 2009; 2012). On this formulation of 
sensorimotor enactivism rich content is still invoked, but it is dependent upon the utilisation of 
sensorimotor information. Therefore, there is still a reliance on representationalism within even 
basic cognition, despite this view’s less conservative outlook than the extended mind theorists. 
While this need not be incorrect at face value, it does not go far enough according to the next 
theory to be reviewed. 
There is one more step to take to arrive at the requisite platform for this thesis. This platform 
is what Hutto and Myin (2013a: 1; 2017: 9) have dubbed the “radically enactive, embodied 
account of cognition”, or simply “REC”. It takes a cue from sensorimotor enactivism in that 
cognition is still interpreted as an activity that individuals do, but it is instantiated through 
dynamic processes which loop back onto themselves while remaining attuned to the 
information (in an attenuated sense) derived from variables within the environment (Hutto & 
Myin 2017: 9). These informationally-attuned processes do not involve any content-inherent 
perception on a basic level (ibid.). Content, again, refers to correctness conditions which inform 
a state of affairs in the world as being accurately represented, while basic refers to the 
fundamental functioning of our minds, and not a simpler form of our brain processing. 
“Fundamental functioning” denotes what is left when content-rich social vehicles of thought, 
such as the propositional attitudes, are subtracted. In other words, this is what allegedly lies at 
the base of all of our cognition141. 
                                                 
139 One is wary of stating it in this way, as while it has the potentiality to be true for our particular cognitive 
processing, we should not think that this precludes other substrates from being able to instantiate a form of 
consciousness. 
140 Again, think of the example of riding the bike. 
141 This view of the mind rubs against the theories which posit an extended view of mind, but which still include 
a rudimentary form of content in their theories. Hohwy (2013) and Clark (2016) are examples of this within the 
PP view. 
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REC is a movement within enactivism which is primarily inspired by the latest in “robotics, 
dynamical systems theory, and ecological psychology and which finds philosophical support 
from the phenomenological, American naturalist, and Buddhist traditions of thought” (Hutto 
& Myin 2017: 9). While some of these elements are less scientifically helpful than others, they 
have provided inspiration for the general approach of the philosophers working in the field. As 
far as REC is concerned, it primarily falls under the umbrella of work begun with Varela et al. 
(1991) and their phenomenological approach to cognitive science inspired by the work of 
Merleau-Ponty (1962). Their project entailed a distinctly left-field approach by incorporating 
Eastern influences into their theorising which most have balked at, but their seminal text has 
inspired a proliferation of work in the field regardless. What all of the theories that have 
followed since have in common however, is that cognition is a situated142, embodied, and 
enactive process, which also does not necessarily entail richness of semantic content. 
There are a number of theorists in this sub-discipline who emphasise their own agendas, but 
they gravitate toward the same explanatory goals (Thompson 2007; Di Paolo 2009; Chemero 
2009; Froese and Di Paolo 2011; Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017; Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014). 
To reiterate, people who follow REC do not endorse content that relies on any form of 
“correctness condition”. This usually amounts to talk of “representing” phenomena in a 
particular way so that there is the possibility of it not being so (Hutto & Myin 2017: 10). This 
is usually the quintessential view of content by philosophers of an analytic mindset that 
associate content with propositionality, whereby correctness is equated with accuracy, which 
in turn is synonymous with truth conditionality (ibid.: 10-11). For example, Brogaard (2014: 
2) insists that perception is “accurate in virtue of some proposition p being true”. The REC 
view opposes this. People who follow the REC path acknowledge the malleability of the 
concept of “content”, and thus seek to relax the rigid strictures often tacitly accepted by 
philosophers of mind. This relaxation provides a notion of content which does not necessarily 
everywhere and always equate to a form of truth conditionality (Crane 2009; Burge 2010: 303). 
To be clear, this does not mean that REC endorses no content across the board (Hutto & Myin 
2017: 11). This form of eliminativism would be really radical, even more so than REC. There 
are states of cognition which possess content in the rigid form of “correctness conditions”, but 
it views these as not part of our basic functionality. Rather, it views these cognitive (truly 
propositional) states as a specific and late-developing ability enabled by cultural “scaffolding” 
                                                 
142 Broadly-construed, this simply means that our brand of cognition is always found within particular contexts 
which in turn affect our theorising. Knowing is never seen as separated from our context. 
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(more of which to be explained below) (Hutto & Satne 2015: 527). Therefore, “basic minds” 
are our default, with semantically contentful minds denoting the “non-basic”. Or, as Hutto and 
Myin (2017: 13) take it, basic minds are “phylogenetically and ontogenetically fundamental”. 
There is nothing “basic” about basic minds beyond their lack of semantically-derived content 
(which does make one wonder why the terminology was chosen if it was inevitably going to 
lead to confusion). Content is parasitic upon our basic minds, and content is only introduced 
once social vehicles of content are introduced into the equation (which shall be looked at further 
below). REC, effectively, depicts our basic functionality as dispositionally directed toward the 
environment in a non-semantic way. 
Fundamentally, REC finds its origins in ecological dynamics, which consists of the twin 
disciplines of ecological psychology along Gibsonian (1979) lines and dynamical systems 
theory. Gibsonian ecological psychology argues that organisms are tightly bound to their 
environment in such a way that perception is primarily in the service of action (ibid.). 
Perception, in other words, serves as the primary means for acquiring a practical grasp of the 
environment in a continually active manner. Furthermore, these directed and dynamic actions 
toward external phenomena do not require mental representations as mediators (ibid.: 279-
280). Dynamical systems theory provides the mathematical capability for outlining this 
approach143 (Hutto & Myin 2017: 9). 
The basic understanding of REC (and other radically enactive theories), is that organisms’ 
cognitive abilities evolve in context-sensitive capacities eliciting a constrained interaction 
between the body and environment over time144 (ibid.: 22). These interactions are closely 
related to the affordances of the organism, being those things within the environment which 
matter most to it. It is this which enables and changes organisms’ dispositional capacities. 
Neuronal weightings145 are effected and changed, but this does not require positing a 
representational intermediary for causal power146. Being able to remember is simply a 
dispositional re-enactment of embodied capacities attuned to affordances, with minimal 
                                                 
143 For example, Chemero (2009) has done an exemplary job of combining these two approaches to describe the 
efficacy of a radically enactive approach to mind in dissolving representationalism. 
144 Or, to acquire “a grip on the patterns that matter for the interactions that matter” (Clark 2015b: 5, emphasis 
in original). 
145 It is worth taking note of Kandel’s (2001) seminal work on memory and the learning capacities of the brain in 
which he won a Nobel Prize. Kandel demonstrated (within simpler animal isomorphs) that it is not the properties 
of the neurons within the hippocampus which serve learning capabilities, but rather the interaction between these 
synaptic interconnections. Although, Kandel himself explicitly sought to reconcile this with representationalism 
in his writings (ibid.: 1035). 
146 Again: no double transduction in the brain. 
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content needed to derive an explanation for the dispositional processes of the organism 
(Ramsey 2007: 151-187). Barandiaran and Di Paolo (2014), in their genealogical review of the 
concept of “habit”, point toward theorists who endorse the ways in which organisms enact an 
embodied responsitivity without any knowledge invoked during the process. Habits accrued 
through the lived experience of the organism can do the work needed for adequate 
responsitivity. No “thinking” in the full-blooded sense is occurring here at all (Rosenberg 2014: 
25-27). To make this clearer: during the instantiation of environmental information within the 
brain, the function of differing regions within the brain which “represent” this information is 
dependent upon the moment that the information was instantiated. This is why memories are 
more of a “dispositional property” wherein the particular regions of the brain are “triggered by 
the right cue, in roughly the same pattern of activation they underwent during encoding” (De 
Brigard 2014: 169). Therefore it is the past lived experience of the organism which is 
paramount here, and not a focus on information as conveying contentful data. 
But then what drives the notion that content is the harbinger of the meaningfully cognitive? It 
is seemingly primarily derived from the intuitive notion that abstract properties inherent within 
working memory must be coherently re-presented (Hutto & Myin 2017: 33). This intuition 
precludes the existence of minimally-contentful, basic minds. This persistent conception of the 
“mark of the cognitive” (ibid.: 13) insists upon vehicles of representation within the brain 
which carry experiential content, which are the necessary components for behavioural changes. 
The thinking is that abstract properties are transposed and replaced by these vehicles of thought 
in order to make them useable to the mind147. Clark himself states that it is necessary that “an 
inner item, pattern, or process whose content then corresponds to the abstract property” exists 
in order to be truly cognitive (Clark 1997: 167). The force of this intuition (perhaps driven 
primarily through our perceptual modality of sight) can overwhelmingly drive us toward the 
view that our brains deal with information processing and representational vehicles of thought 
(ibid.: 37). Of course, as discussed above, the crux of the issue is precisely how positing 
representations adds any explanatory weight over and above bodily dispositional learning 
through environmental engagement. The content/vehicle distinction in the classical cognitivist 
formulation falls away as a lack of content necessarily entails a lack of vehicles. Therefore, we 
need to step away from the Hard Problem of Content148, as conceived of by Hutto and Myin 
                                                 
147 A fairly (philosophically) recent primary text on the idea that representation within the brain is pertinent for 
fully-realised cognition is Clark & Toribio (1994).  
148 This is a play on Chalmers’ (1995) notion of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Chalmers posited that the 
actual problem, the really, truly, difficult problem of consciousness, lay in the explication of how we have our 
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(2013a, Chapter Four; 2017: 29). A “gapless naturalistic account of cognition” (Hutto & Myin 
2017: 41) is what is at stake here, and only depicting information in terms of covariance (see 
below) and the norms engendered by biological functionality seem to be able to provide this. 
Granted, explanatory naturalism has notoriously found it difficult to account for the move from 
content-less to contentful cognition. Yet, many have proclaimed that content is not the problem 
it is purported to be: Chalmers (1996: 24) has spoken of content as not posing any mystery, 
while Strawson (1994: 44) and Miłkowski (2015) have similarly put forward that content does 
not pose any great problem for us. For these theorists, content should be invoked, but not only 
that — the problem of content has been solved. According to Miłkowski for instance, what has 
solved the problem of content is the explanatory power of teleological biological function as 
proposed by Millikan and others, which shall be explained further below (ibid.: 83). This does 
not appear to be as obvious as it has been made out to be, as it is my contention that content 
has not been suitably naturalised, which is a position I originally argued for when describing 
Fodor’s views in Chapter Two. In light of this, if the framework of the paradigm restricts our 
deliberations, it is worth looking at our fundamental suppositions and altering them. We can 
walk away from the Hard Problem of Content by not assuming content from the outset. This is 
not a defeat, as some may surmise (Aizawa 2014, 2015), but a changing of the rules of 
engagement. The environment need not be accurately represented by cognition, but instead it 
should couple the organism with its environment in order “to stabilise appropriate coordinated 
patterns of behaviour” (Beer 2000: 97). Full-blown propositional attitudes will only follow in 
the wake of these basic forms of directed behaviour, once sufficient social scaffolding has been 
introduced. 
While there have been many arguments for cognition along REC lines (also see Dreyfus (2014) 
for many examples), the depth of opposition to this view is vast. It is often argued that for 
something to be truly cognitive, it must equate with content as representational. We often lapse 
into talk of the representational ability of our minds. For example, it is thought that without 
representation we are “bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence” (O’Brien & Opie 
2009: 54). Similarly, REC has been labelled as more a theory of behaviour than illuminating 
any truly useful phenomena about the mind (Shapiro 2014; Roy 2015: 95). It is in this manner 
that representational views of cognition, even if more radical in the form of extended cognition, 
                                                 
phenomenal experiences (or qualia). The issues that plague cognitive and neuroscientists are the “easy problems” 
(ibid.). See Dennett (2005, Chapter Three) for why this is an unhelpful and distracting formulation of 
consciousness. 
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are argued to be more coherent approaches, without having to fully tackle the validity of a REC 
conception of mind. However, a better explanation is needed to show the worth of 
representationalism as a superior framework to REC-like cognitive theories, and this 
explanation should not be circularly touted as a necessary condition for cognition in the first 
place (Hutto & Myin 2017: 15-16). 
 
3.2. An Amendment to Biosemantics 
 
Arguably, to take a REC view of the mind, we are compelled to describe our particular brand 
of intentionality in another form, one which does not include content-rich representation. I do 
not believe that intentionality has been suitably naturalised in its attempt to explain the way in 
which content is allegedly instantiated at the neuronal level. To me, invoking content at this 
level is misleading, and we can go further to naturalise our understanding of our intentional 
states. We all know that biological organisms are attuned, or sensitive, to contributions from 
the contextual environment, even if it is difficult to extricate how some of these sensitivities 
are effected. It is these attuned sensitivities which allow for the identification and delineation 
of specific environmental discriminations that are of high significance for the organism in 
question (see Sterelny (2003), Chapter Two). Once these discriminations have impinged upon 
the sensory-intakes of the organism, a response is elicited in order to accommodate a successful 
synchronisation of action149. This array of processes is the end result of selective pressures 
within the environment, formed purely due to prerequisites for the continual survival of the 
organism150 (Hutto 2008a: 50; Sterelny 2003, 2015). What one would perhaps notice is that 
there is no real need for the encroachment of content-involving actions for these creatures, 
including ourselves. This is an all-pervasive feature of our minds (except once content-rich 
public symbols are invoked), and introducing content at this level does no extra work. There is 
no need for the introduction of content-rich representations or the like at this stage of cognitive 
processing due to their lack of explanatory weight, and thus it cannot be said that it is these 
representations which elicit appropriate responses. To perceive through sensory attunement 
instantiates an immediate response which is characteristic of the context due to the 
aforementioned selective pressures (Hutto 2008a: 51). Affordances accrued through the 
                                                 
149 One will note that PP depicts this sensory impingement and resultant action in a much more entwined fashion 
than explained here. 
150 Otherwise known as end-directed means. 
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evolutionary and ontogenetic development of the organism151 provide perception “shortcuts” 
that bypass overt cognitive processing. Depending on the organism and its evolutionary 
environment, the differing adoptive approaches can be quite marked (again, see Sterelny 
(2003), Chapters Two and Three)152. Also, while the highly complex response-attunement of 
(for example) predator and prey or human social communication may be a world away from 
the modest, visceral actions/reactions of detection-response coordinations, these 
aforementioned are up-scaled versions of the very same basic processes (Hutto & Myin 2017: 
13). 
The character of the receptivity of these detection processes are explicable through the actions 
of what Hutto (2008a: 51) calls “indexically inspired Action Coordination Routines”, or ACRs. 
These coordination routines are instantiated through the “scripted” configurations of recursive 
action, incorporating mechanisms that cooperate to achieve this end. These ACRs produce, 
after paradigmatic features are detected, changes within the body, which include 
proprioceptive, exteroceptive, and interoceptive alterations, resulting in a suitable paradigmatic 
action-response (ibid.). These detections are therefore responsive to sense-data and induce 
neuronal activation in the typical sense, but do not involve “contentful” responsitivity. 
Therefore, ACRs should be seen as minimally contentful action-response routines, but they are 
the base from which contentful comprehension flows153. In other words, what matters for my 
current argument is the realisation that these ACRs are, in Hutto’s words, indexical, and 
without content (Hutto 2008a: 51). This indexicality refers to the ability of these ACRs to 
sensitively indicate phenomena in the environment despite shifting contexts. ACRs are the 
brain states which indicate, are sensitive to, and are therefore triggered by, particular 
environmental phenomena in particular environmental contexts. Furthermore, there is no need 
for transduction of this sense-data into another “content-bearing” state, and these minimally 
                                                 
151 An everyday example would be the affordances that specific objects have for us: buttons can be pushed, levers 
can be pulled, wheels can be turned. Of course, affordances extend to much more than these obvious, everyday 
objects, and include direct attunement to the environment in general. These examples highlight instances of 
everyday interaction with the environment that do not necessarily require an overt thought such as “I believe that 
I should push this button”. It does no extra work than what an implicit learnt mechanism of behaviour can attain. 
152 For example, in a series of experiments it was shown how capuchin monkeys are seemingly unable to utilise 
reasoning capabilities when given a choice of sticks to acquire peanuts out of a tube (Visalberghi & Limongelli 
1995). Occasionally they would even use the tape that some sticks were bound with. In contradistinction to this, 
tamarins were shown to have the ability to select appropriate sticks for the job in a subsequent study (Byrne 2000). 
This need not point toward overt reasoning capability on the part of the tamarins, but the environmental space in 
which they have evolved has facilitated an ability to re-enact a skill-set across multiple domains. 
153 Dennett says something similar to this when explaining the affordances that all organisms have within their 
Umwelt that enable degrees of competence, but importantly not yet comprehension (Dennett 2017, Chapter Five). 
However, this was within the context of degrees of cognitive ability across species, and not differing levels of 
cognitive function within the same brain. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 102 
contentful states do not “represent” as cognitive thinking is often thought to. The environmental 
types (or kinds) that are relatively consistently identifiable provide the platform from which 
intentional behaviour is instantiated and at which it is directedly focused. It is perhaps here that 
the priors which inform predictive processing models154 find their apparent ability to accurately 
enough guide the organism through the environment. At the very least, this indexicality has the 
potential to explain non-communicative cognitive processes far better and parsimoniously than 
needing to invoke actual understanding and comprehension on a conceptual level155 (ibid.: 51-
52). Bringing this into the PP fold, we can call them what Clark has termed “desert landscape” 
(2013a: 186, 200) depictions of environmental attunement, wherein 
 
proprioceptive prediction errors act directly as motor commands. On these models it is 
our expectations about the proprioceptive consequences of moving and acting that 
directly bring the moving and acting about. (ibid.: 186). 
 
Furthermore, the responsive and intentional nature of non-communicative cognition could 
potentially be explained through the use of biological proper functions. These denote those 
biological attunements to the environment which have evolved through paradigmatic cases 
which have fixed their performative function over time (Millikan 1984: 17). Therefore, a good 
depiction of proper functions are those biological traits that organisms have accrued through 
the selective adaptation of evolution. There is a sense that there is a “proper function” that a 
particular trait has evolved to perform (through blind biological processes). This does extend 
further however, as even beliefs fall under this category, as the fixing of a belief is due to 
particular selective pressures within the environment (ibid.: 17-18). A more concrete 
explanation will occupy us further below in this chapter. 
To determine proper function, as Hutto (2008a: 52) rightly states, we should investigate the 
difference between what the organism in question does with how it “ought” to behave. 
Cognitive mechanisms have evolved due to selection pressures toward a particular 
functionality, but if this functionality “misrepresents” a state of affairs leading to an 
inappropriate behaviour from the organism within a particular context, this does not negate its 
evolutionary function. It merely points to the fact that these mechanisms have not been 
optimally “designed” or that they have been deployed in the wrong context. Taking this 
                                                 
154 As first introduced in Chapter Three. 
155 Millikan (2004: 211-220) also points to the important difference between thinking in terms of detached 
representations and “getting by” within the environment via sensitive indexical responding. This was in her 
juxtaposition between nonhuman and human modes of cognition, however. 
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perspective circumvents the issue surrounding proper functions and the disjunction problem, 
as it explains the potential for error within each bodily response. Fodorian issues regarding 
correctness conditions can be avoided if this approach is taken. Recall that the disjunction 
problem highlights the philosophical (and biological) issue of how to distinguish between 
causes that correctly determine the content of mental states and those that do not. To belabour 
a point, any mental states develop their “proper biological function”, and therefore their 
accuracy conditions, according to a long historical process of “selection by consequences” 
(Hutto & Myin 2017: 105). To appreciate the accuracy conditions of a mental state, one cannot 
simply look at the current dispositional make-up of the mental state, but at how it became 
historically fixed to perform such a function. Advocating the need for synchronous accuracy 
conditions for each mental state, such that they fix the norms for each mental state about a 
particular thing in the world in order to be able to represent or misrepresent an object in the 
world, is an unnecessary theoretical imposition. Upscaling the biological proper function of 
mental states, we can begin to see space emerging for sufficient “norms” of function lying at 
the base of our intentionality which are fixed over time. To invoke accuracy conditions beyond 
this is to impose socio-cultural norms upon our base intentionality. The significance of 
undermining the disjunction problem lies in the fact that an unnecessary philosophical hang-
up is discarded, forcing a more robustly biological grounding in the process. The 
evolutionarily-forged mechanisms were not created for optimum end results at all times but, 
rather, for optimum end results for most of the time, within environments suitably similar to 
that which selected for the mechanisms in the first place (ibid.: 105-106). Furthermore, the 
accuracy conditions may be upscaled to a generalised form of norm fixing, which is arguably 
all we need for the mental to do work. Talk of “accuracy conditions” in light of which a mental 
state can misrepresent something in the world does not make sense on the intentional scale. 
The paradigm case of the issues that arise when attempting to naturalise representation in terms 
of adaptation is that of frogs and their fly-catching habits. In scientific experiments, these frogs 
are found to lash out for both flies as well as black dots. The epistemological issues surrounding 
what mental content is represented within the mind of the frogs has been a philosophical issue 
ever since (Ritchie 2008: 169). It follows the contours of the disjunction problem (from Chapter 
Two) in that philosophers have agonised over what can reliably be said about what is actually 
represented in the frog’s brain when it mistakes a moving black dot for a fly. There is no 
suitably appropriate method for distinguishing between differing explanations which are 
equally likely to account for the semantic mental content of the frog. Any description of the 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 104 
causal history of what created the attunement between mind and environment here would 
suffice. The evolutionary development of the frog would slowly fix the norms that matter to 
the frog in terms of base intentionality. To explain this causal history somewhat, we need to 
project our minds into deep time to see it more clearly. By way of example: a chemical 
differential between a unicellular organism and its environment may develop over time into 
more and more sophisticated attunements to the environment as it evolves. As time progresses, 
the “norms” of behaviour are fixed according to the homeostatic inclinations of the evolving 
organism. As evolution progresses, we eventually come to more complex creatures further up 
the phylogenetic tree which possess what we would call “minds”. Along the way, these 
creatures have slowly and painstakingly acquired sensitive attunements to the environment 
which do not trade in accuracy conditions as such, but are nevertheless norms of biological 
behaviour attuned to the base biological needs of the organism. As for the frog, it merely 
continues in this vein, consistently striving to ingest the fly which it unwittingly “understands” 
as necessary for survival. We need not invoke accuracy conditions over and above what the 
frog has simply had hardwired into itself to survive.  
The corollary to this, as the worry goes, is that such attunement is simply not fine-grained 
enough to provide the necessary (in other words unique) semantic mental content (Rosenberg 
2014: 26).  Only a subclass of the entire category of “moving black dots” need to obtain enough 
times for it to be a satisfactory evolutionary benefit for the frog. What is it then that the frog 
“represents” when confronted with a fly as opposed to a black pellet or a black dot on a screen? 
It, again, becomes an empirical issue whereby the intuitions of many a philosopher or scientist 
cannot reconcile the “root mismatch between representational error and failure of biological 
function” (Burge 2010: 301).  My claim is that there is no further need for selective pressures 
to reinforce a more semantically fine-grained picture of the world, unless the failures really 
started to add up (Hutto 2008a: 68). It does not make sense to say that the frog “misrepresents” 
in the way that we mean it. We are imposing our own socio-culturally mediated accuracy 
conditions upon that which is more mentally autonomic than we suppose. 
Proffered naturalised theories of representation which do not take into account evolutionary 
processes (broadly speaking) will always come up short, and these processes need not lead to 
a semantically fine-grained picture of the world. If one were to describe the reasons for an 
organism’s behaviour, drawing from the informational content in the brain, it would not 
necessarily describe responses to specific environmental kinds (ibid.: 52-53). Again, we come 
back to the issues surrounding the “decoding” of content, or double transduction, and how no 
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re-interpretation of signals are needed for immediate and visceral response156. No internalised 
content-discrimination need be made on the back of internal content manipulation which states 
that this is indeed the current state of affairs. In other words, the cognitivist foundations of 
information processing and representation are potentially unnecessary for bodily action-
responses. As a result, the disjunction problem, that of the problem of being able to accurately 
represent differing phenomena that elicit the same pattern of activation within the mind, is 
circumvented. In other words, as long as responsitivity to the environment is more or less 
consistently appropriate, then the disjunction problem is of no real import. Again, doing away 
with the disjunction problem weakens views which have strict conceptions of the correctness 
conditions of mental states, allowing for the more relaxed, embodied depiction of mental states 
advocated within this thesis. 
In light of this, we are in a position to adaptationally explicate intentionality in a way which 
does away with issues of accuracy conditions and content-fixing. Typical philosophical 
theories which reflect on the biological nature of cognitive (semantic) norms derived from 
norms of function (or proper function) tend to formulate and expand on theoretical frameworks 
which rely on representational content (Millikan 1984, 1993, 2004, 2005; Papineau 1987; 
Dretske 1988). These are the teleosemantic theories of content, which attempt to naturalise the 
intentionality of brain states. Millikan’s theories are perhaps most well-known in this regard. 
Her cleverly appropriated Pushmi-Pullyu “icons” (Millikan 1995, 2005) are depictions (of 
some form) of just what I have been speaking about in terms of the indexical ACRs. She still 
appeals to a rudimentary form of semanticism when she states that Gibsonian affordances are 
more than likely representational (ibid. 1995: 191, 2005: 174), however. These representational 
icons have a double purpose as they both lock onto a feature of the environment and, further, 
elicit an appropriate response to this tracked feature157 (“pushed” from within and “pulled” 
from without158). 
                                                 
156 Another well-known example which illustrates this in a clearer light is ring-dating the trunks of trees to 
determine their age. Their age may be represented from within by inference as extrapolated from our knowledge 
of how the seasons effect trunk growth, but this is purely content-less data which is not used in any assimilable 
way by the trees. Again, no translation from one state to another occurs, except through analogy. 
157 Or “indicative” and “imperative” features as they are sometimes called. 
158 For example, hens often emit a cry once a food source has been found, effectively letting chicks know there is 
food in a particular spot, while also imperatively driving the chicks to eat (Evans & Evans 1999). This denotes 
both the descriptive (“pulled”) as well as the imperative (“pushed”) aspects of a tracked feature. 
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Millikan’s original agenda in the creation of her theory of content had more to do with the 
driving need to reconcile Wittgenstein’s picture theory159 with his later work (Millikan 2005: 
77). In other words, although it was still an important component thereof, the primary example 
for naturalising content never had the primary intention of being biologically plausible in the 
first place! Natural selection was used primarily to satisfy the necessary correctness conditions 
which supervene on the dispositional state of the organism. Hence, she does not invoke her 
proper functions purely for biological necessity, but through a need to naturalise 
representational accuracy conditions160 (ibid., see Chapter Four). For her, from the very basic 
level of environmental accuracy conditions we can then jump to language use amongst humans 
(ibid.: 87). If semantic rules govern the natural order of organismic responses, the semantics 
within language is thought to closely follow. Wittgenstein’s later theories were, in her eyes, in 
need of alteration if they were to provide a more coherent outline for the normative features of 
content in biological organisms (ibid. 71-72). Therefore, the naturalisation of norms was 
needed to help her elucidate semantics within language-use. The only way for her to achieve 
this was to invoke natural selection as the over-arching rationale for maintaining correctness 
conditions, and by extension truth, through a distinct form of representation of the environment 
(ibid.: 87). Much like proper functions fix biological intentionality, forms of language are fixed 
with the environment in an intentional fashion (ibid.: 98). Of course, if we were to take this 
seriously, we run into problems immediately. To fix the representation of an object accurately 
enough is problematic for a teleosemantic theory, as the example of the frog striving for its 
black dot has shown. We are therefore still stuck with Fodor’s disjunction problem. 
But accuracy conditions need not matter if we move toward a more truly naturalistic approach 
that concerns itself with slow adaptational attunement to the environment. Moreover, there is 
something which can be salvaged from Millikan’s teleosemantics: the relation between the 
neuronal state of the organism and the environmental features which it can denote (Pietroski 
1992: 268; Hutto & Myin 2017: 114). We can still outline intentionality in terms of a natural 
relation between neuronal states and the environment, even if “true” representation is not 
instantiated (Godfrey-Smith 2006: 60). If we take the trusty example of the frog and its eating 
behaviour, we sidestep the issue of propositional representation if we acknowledge that its 
                                                 
159 While the details of this need not divert us, it must be noted that Millikan even stated that she went for “picturing 
themes” in a paper on the topic (Millikan 2005: 77). 
160 Bee dances are her usual go-to in explaining her teleosemantic ideas. She states that bee dances have truth 
conditions wherein the rules which govern the nectar locations that they denote are fully semantic in nature. They 
are “designed to correspond to nectar locations as semantic rules” (Millikan 2005: 98). 
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behaviour has been hardwired by the incredibly extensive evolutionary processes of selection. 
We do not necessarily need representation to exist in the frog’s brain to explain the naturalised 
behaviour of going for black dots and/or flies if this has been fixed through evolutionary 
processes. The reason for going for that black dot, which would denote a misrepresentation on 
the teleosemantic approach, is simply because this behaviour has enabled the continual 
propagation of the frog species in its normal environment. So we find that intentionality can 
still be saved, but propositionality of content can be done away with (Muller 2014: 158), as 
will be discussed below. I am more inclined to endorse this view, as no full-blown content, 
unless invoked in a weaker form, is explicitly necessary to explicate the internal processes of 
perception- and guidance-response. I argue that this upscales to human mental processes; 
reintroducing the chicken and duck-in-the-dark example from Chapter Two relating to the 
disjunction problem, we can effectively state that it does not matter if a particular mental state 
is undecidable with regards to being either a chicken or a duck-in-the-dark. Either can represent 
mental state M as long as we are suitably guided through the environment. 
To replace Millikan’s representational “pushmi-pullyu” proposal with a more plausible 
alternative, Hutto (2008a: 54) uses what he calls “Local Indexical Guides” (LIGs) to describe 
a process which is non-representational yet achieves successful action coordination in response 
to environmental features. These LIGs incorporate sensory intake into a vaguely structured 
order for the organism to be able to respond (ibid.). At this level, these LIGs do not exhibit any 
capability of incorporating practical know-how (of the overt propositional variety) into their 
make-up, but again, this is not needed. 
An appropriate, but tired, example, is that of Millikan’s bees, which she uses to explain the 
visceral responsitivity of organisms toward stimuli. Briefly: bees often perform dances which 
directly indicate the distance and direction of nectar for other bees to locate. These bee dances 
do not include semantic information explaining the location of nectar, but instead guide the 
organisms directly to their intended goal (Hutto 2008a: 54-55). This direct guidance occurs 
through indexical covariance with the environment, utilising the sun and the hive as a 
coordination mechanism. For example, the information conveyed by the bee dances cannot 
capture time and place, and they must alter their dances depending on where the sun is relative 
to the hive161. As these dances denote entirely specific information concerning the location of 
nectar, the bees can respond to this directly without needing further information. The dances 
                                                 
161 I do not presume that this extends to all species of bee everywhere, but such simplification is necessary here. 
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do not “say” anything (i.e. they are not symbolic in the way that language typically works), but 
still point to a salient point of interest within the environment. Extending this line of reasoning, 
these vaguely structured directions could be related to the Bayesian models of the environment 
that are an important part of PP. We can see the beginnings of how these models can be the 
extension of these very low-level LIGs in action. It is possible that nested levels of LIGs could 
build upon each other and impart upon the organism, even humans, extensive cognitive 
capabilities when responding to environmental stimuli. By extension, if active inference is to 
be believed, these very LIGs could operate in such a way so as to instigate the action of the 
organism, without the need for any overt cognitive reasoning. This fundamental bodily 
responsitivity is arguably all that is needed for much of our more complex cognitive processing 
of a predictive nature. The environment could elicit behavioural response through direct 
neuronal linking to environmental cues (after sufficient evolutionary and ontogenetic 
development), such as immediate action-response to the imminent danger of an oncoming car. 
REC and PP could go hand-in-hand in their biologically-plausible explication of our cognitive 
mental states, eliminating semantic theories of representation in the process. As intimated 
above, a direct coupling between body and environment, thereby constituting minimal content, 
could be the basis for the active inference of the PP brain. One can see how this could 
undermine theories of neuronally-based, propositional FP.  
Therefore, from the above, we should not assume that any successive action-response routine 
instantiated in an organism is primarily dependent on representational information being 
distilled from environmental features. These natural indicators from the environment do not 
provide representational content but, as explained above, they serve as a direct guide for 
subsequent action (Hutto 2015: 13). Again, one begins to see space opening up here for the 
applicability of PP within the context of mental “representation” and the way in which it is 
allegedly used by biological organisms. Active inference within PP is synonymous with this 
kind of direct embodied interaction. It is highly misrepresentative to state, without any further 
elaboration, that bodily responsitivity points to true representations of distal environmental 
cues (Hutto 2008a: 59). We can instead refer to a form of indexical content here. A further 
point that needs emphasising is that there is no sense in seeking to decompose an LIG into what 
amounts to imaginary constituent parts. Any change in an LIG would necessarily precipitate a 
change in resultant action from its end users. This leads Hutto to state that LIGs “guide action 
in an online and thoroughly context-bound way” (ibid.: 55), in the weaker sense of “online”. 
Any significant change results in a failure to adhere to the LIG’s “directive” (ibid. 55-56), but 
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this does not rule out accidents when these LIGs are operating normally (think of the frog 
striving for that black dot). Any failures can be explained by mitigating environmental 
circumstances which do not provide enough indexical information for predictively modelling 
the world. If predictive models are constituted by nested LIGs, it would necessitate highly 
context-bound predictive models of the environment. Also, with no determinate content, there 
is no way for our language to encapsulate the operations of these LIGs without resorting to 
some form of baseline presumption and “storytelling” of the sort associated with traditional 
FP162. 
Despite this inherently minimally contentful state of non-representation, we find that LIGs are 
all that are needed for perceptual reaction to have intentionality and even a normative basis 
(ibid.: 56). Normativity, here, refers to the baseline guidance that these LIGs exhibit for 
successful action-response to the environment. It manages to avoid the charge that 
teleosemantic theories face, which is that they do not provide an adequate conception of how 
the response of an organism can be misaligned to stimuli within the environment. It also, by 
extension, avoids the charge that such theories cannot elucidate how the mental can have truth-
evaluable content to begin with (Hutto & Myin 2017: 43). This is because, as many argue, there 
is an important difference between “functioning properly (under the proper conditions) as an 
information carrier and getting things right (objective correctness or truth)” (Haugeland 1998: 
309). Similarly, Stich has stated that natural selection cares more about “reproductive success” 
than truth (Stich 1990: 62). What teleosemantic theories fail to explain is the content of our 
representations. The method by which mental states represent a state of affairs is a notoriously 
intractable problem, and it has not been obviously solved of its disjunctive issues with 
teleosemantic theories of content. The solution on these theories has more been hinted at than 
thought through to its conclusion. 
Arguably, then, LIGs are more suitable depictions of what actually enables the instantiation of 
even complex ACRs, as derived from the historic evolutionary environment of an organism 
(Hutto 2008a: 56). These succeed to sufficiently direct action-responses for organismic 
survival, without the need for any content, despite the sophisticated resultant actions of the 
organism. There need not be entirely accurate correspondence to external “facts” of the world 
when survival does not require accuracy-at-all-times (ibid.: 56-57). Again, using the frogs and 
their striving for the black dot as an example, accuracy need not come into the picture if the 
                                                 
162 As outlined in Chapter Two, Hutto (Gallagher & Hutto 2008; Hutto 2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b) has 
described the effect that narrative storytelling has on our ontogenetic cognitive development. 
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path of least resistance, that of simply striving for “black dot-like things”, is enough for the 
animal to survive and propagate in its natural environment. Linking this with the previous 
chapter, it makes far more sense from an evolutionary perspective for minimally contentful 
attitudes of the individual organism to guide action, as this minimises the free energy of the 
system. This is why the concept of covariance is useful here, as covariant relationships are 
those that maintain their function, regardless of variable changes (within reason) (ibid.: 48-49). 
Tracking a distal environmental cue need not obtain in the sense that talk of “accuracy” and/or 
“truth” entails, but rather that the functionality of the covariant relationship obtains (Hutto & 
Myin 2017: 29). In this case, the sensory impingements would eventually trigger the requisite 
neuronal firings in such a way that the implicit detail derived from the environmental cue and 
its attendant neuronal populations is secondary to the teleofunction that it engenders. 
Therefore, function is what matters in covariant relationships, not accurate-at-all-times 
correspondence between environment and representation thereof, which diverges somewhat 
from the literature on proper functions. Teleosemantics (or biosemantics), as developed by 
theorists such as Dretske, Millikan, and the like, seeks to preserve a minimal role for semantic 
representation. But, as I hope is becoming clear by now, we need not invoke content-involving 
attitudes in order to be able to grasp the fairly basic directed intentionality of an organism. In 
other words, we need to appeal to a kind of ur-intentionality (again see Hutto & Myin (2017), 
Chapter Five). As alluded to above, this form of intentionality is a more semantically basic 
intentionality than that often involed in these debates, hence the “ur-” prefix. This ur-
intentionality provides the necessary causal determination, without invoking proper functions, 
seeing as a semantically-free conceptualisation is enough to derive an understanding of our 
resultant action. What I have been explaining above concerning basic organismic response-
routine is termed biosemiotics (Hutto 2008a: xiii, 57), or teleosemiotics (Hutto 2011: 335; 
Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017), by Hutto, who wants to separate this reworked understanding of 
organismic response from the content-involving teleosemantic literature. In summary, he 
states: 
 
Organisms are informationally sensitive to and selectively end-directed at certain worldly 
features, objects, and states of affairs in a way that explains their success and failure on 
certain tasks. The intentionality they exhibit is an attitude of the whole organism 
expressed in their behavior; it is neither a property of the signs themselves nor of 
organismic inner states (Hutto 2008a: 57). 
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He is consistently at pains to emphasise that the relationship between environmental cues and 
the bodily responses elicited are of a covariant nature, dealing purely with information and not 
relations of truth or reference. This covariance entails the baseline coupling between our 
neurons and the environment, thereby attuning the mind toward appropriate cues within said 
environment. Therefore, the body responds effectively when faced with multiple opportunities 
for action within a particular context163. This is how teleosemiotics differs from teleosemantics, 
and which provides a theoretical advantage in its more biologically plausible alternative. 
But what teleosemiotics lacks as a base theory are its ties with modern cognitive science. It can 
be proposed, however, that basic organismic response can be predicated upon PP’s notion of 
active inference introduced in Chapter Three. Covariance could perhaps be indistinguishable 
from how PP is understood to relate the mind to the world. Active inference is an embodied 
response which could be depicted in terms that need not trade in truth-relations. Covariance 
relations enable suitable action responses at a fundamental level, as does active inference. 
Additionally, a bodily response which has been misdirected, which has exhibited inappropriate 
behaviour in relation to environmental cues, does not simply point to an “incorrect” internal 
representation that misses the “true state” of the environment (Hutto & Myin 2017: 111). It 
points more toward an incorrect covariance with the environment. In this way, PP and 
teleosemiotics may be similarly fundamental in their explanation of basic organismic 
responsitivity. The top-down model associated with PP can be what enables the covariant 
relationships endorsed by the teleosemiotic framework to have a grip on the world. 
To express in language the set of conditional state of affairs that would need to hold for an 
organism to be successful in a specific action can mislead us as to our theorising on this level. 
To think of content that is non-conceptual is difficult enough, but we should be cognisant of 
whether we are expressing existant true content from the person’s inner mental state, or 
expressing “faux” content derived from a fundamental environmental covariant relationship 
(ibid.). We often project thoughts into the heads of organisms to explain successful actions due 
to our extensive need to anthropomorphise internal processes and, to me, this has been extended 
                                                 
163 Boxers are a clear example of this. They tend to position themselves and adjust their method of striking the 
punching bag relative to the space between them and the bag. Without realising that they are doing it, boxers learn 
to inhabit an “optimal metastable distance” from the bag which creates affordances for action (Bruineberg & 
Rietveld 2014: 10). This is a clear example of the ways in which experience and learning can alter base biological 
attunement to the environment, without overt propositional thinking. 
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to postulate inner (human) mental states which need not exist in the first place164. It is 
comfortable to posit organismic action in the form of propositional attitudes, but this is 
potentially a vital empirical error. To explain a state of affairs that would need to obtain for 
successful action-responses could equally well entail an organism not having any true 
intentional (fully cognitive) comprehension of the context in the way traditionally understood 
(ibid.: 116). Inferring organismic cognition from complex outward behaviour is not as 
straightforward as it would seem, and yet it could come down to the far more baseline, yet 
surprisingly elegant, solution of teleosemiotic, minimally contentful, bodily responses to 
environmental features. Active inference as proposed by the PP framework could potentially 
provide the bodily responses in terms of which this teleosemiotic account can ground its role 
in explanations of overt organismic behaviour. 
Instead of having to unpack the inherent problems with needing to explain representational 
content gleaned from non-verbal actions, we can potentially sweep the problem away, and not 
simply under the rug, but out the door. This is to avoid, quite rightly, the Hard Problem of 
Content (Hutto & Myin 2013a, Chapter Four). To summarise the conclusions derived from this 
teleosemiotic approach, we can say that non-verbal action-responses can indeed be 
intentionally-directed (as well as causally determined) despite (1) not having content as 
traditionally construed; this directed intentionality is (2) a result of the entire organism’s 
response to environmental cues; is (3) a result of the evolutionary history of the organism 
(Hutto 2008a: 59); and adding to this, (4) can explain the potential for error even if only LIGs 
are utilised to maintain action-responses, as cognitively-loaded intentionality is more than 
likely not instantiated at this level. Finally, (5) the top-down predictive models of PP can 
provide the necessary grip upon the world needed by covariant relationships. 
I hope, by now, that it is clear that proponents of the cognitivist view could be highly misled 
due to, as mentioned above, our tendency to explicate behaviour in terms of concrete and 
representational mental states which “cause” the behaviour (Currie & Sterelny 2000: 155). 
Visceral organismic behavioural responses may be sensitive to information derived from the 
environment, but this responding does not entail the needed structure to integrate said 
information into the cognitive milieu beyond an in-built “scripted” pattern of response. This 
pattern of response could suitably be provided by the LIGs, with no need for modules 
                                                 
164 Currie and Sterelny (2000: 155) make mention of anthropomorphism in belief ascription in their discussion of 
modularity of mind-reading. They use the example of inanimate objects which appear to possess purposive 
intentional movements, much like the cellular automata in Conway’s Game of Life (originally in Gardner (1970)). 
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representing content denoting a desire or a belief (Hutto 2008a: 60). Thus, when we describe 
non-verbal behaviour as “intelligent”, we need not justify it upon the back of a mental 
representation with inherent content (ibid.). We also need not believe that it is the existence of 
these recombinant representations, once amalgamated together, that provide the ability to 
formulate more sophisticated intentions and planning within non-verbal human cognition. As 
mentioned before, this form of sophisticated intentional thinking, propositional in nature, is 
arguably only introduced through the introduction of linguistically-scaffolded learning (ibid.: 
60-61). Therefore, what has been described above can only be up-scaled to more sophisticated 
thinking in line with everyday human cognition once a form of enculturation has occurred. 
Further detail on this will occupy us further below. 
I have been arguing that some if not most cognitive processes do not necessitate propositional 
thinking. Due to impingements on the senses having minimal informational content, as dictated 
by the teleosemiotic approach, there is no need for this information to be “attained”, 
“transformed”, and then “deployed” in subsequent operations. Positing semantic content does 
no additional work in explaining how cognition occurs. This should remind us of what Dennett 
proposes occurs in the brain, with our propositional style of thinking being more of a “user 
illusion” (2013b; 2017) coalescing into a fictional narrative of coherency. Our “thinking” 
selves are the result of those underlying processes which give rise to our emergent phenomenal 
consciousness. If we accept his theory, wherein the mind operates in a less determinate fashion 
than typically thought, we can incorporate a teleosemiotic approach to this view of the mind as 
a “fuzzy” processor165. Indeterminacy need not be an issue if the brain, and by extension the 
mind, operates on a need-to-know (or hardly-need-to-know?) basis with regards to its action-
response routines. To elaborate, the brain needs to incorporate information from the 
environment only insofar as it is useful in tracking given events in said environment, and 
furthermore, the detail of this sense data need only be accurate in terms of covariance with the 
environment. This means that our experience of the world from within our phenomenological 
vantage point is always a truncated “representation” of the world. As a result, tracking 
sensitivity toward distal objects should be thought of in terms of sensitivity to information, not 
acquisition of content (Hutto 2008a: 61-62). Again, we need not assume double transduction 
of content into something “useable” if our responses are triggered by environmental cues, and 
we certainly need not assume a representation of the environmental milieu whereby the senses 
                                                 
165 This denoting something which does not deal with computing accuracy so much as computing that which is 
salient for the present purposes of the organism. The “fuzziness” alludes to its indeterminacy. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 114 
incorporate content which is then transformed into a useable format, comprehensible to thought 
(as endorsed by Fodor). 
We must not confuse ourselves by talking about information “contained” within a signal, 
instead of the more plausible explanation whereby information is frugally gleaned through the 
effects engendered by covariance. Along these lines, Hutto (ibid.: 63), in a move which has 
many affinities with the PP approach, makes the important and oft-overlooked point that we 
must not confuse ourselves by assuming that perception and action are always distinctive 
operations within the brain. Input-output mechanisms within the brain that rely on full-blown 
representation as their end product need not exist if immediate response can be initiated. 
Ratcliffe (2007b: 192) also makes the point that action and perception are inextricable166, and 
we needlessly deconstruct seamless action along imaginary joints—content-involving and 
drive-motivating (very roughly: beliefs and desires). Again, if we go back to the PP framework 
and its central component of active inference, we can see that the current scientific literature 
supports this view with immediate action-response predicated on the inner predictive power of 
the brain. 
The action-response routines instantiated by worldly cues do not rely on a “central observer” 
(Dennett 1991a) in order to function, as these routines would have evolved at a time which pre-
dated any thinking, let alone belief, which itself requires language (if the above picture is 
correct). Basic action-response routines are, by extension, opaque to explication through 
language. They are instantiated without any representational thought, which serves the brain 
well, as it does not need to wait for the outputs of upper-level cognitive processes in immediate 
environmental tracking (Clark 2016: 179). As proposed in Chapter Three, the predictive 
capacity of the brain to process worldly cues is due to pre-modelling of the environment 
throughout the development of the organism, with only alterations to the environmental 
mapping that the brain already possesses. In a similar vein, Hutto almost has it right when he 
states that: 
 
[Action-response routines] kick in without any background thought. And, surely, this is 
a good thing. If creatures had to wait for the top-down verdicts of central cognition before 
responding in the simplest cases they would be effectively crippled. Indeed, without some 
such bottom-up responding to get a grip on worldly offerings, there would be no way for 
                                                 
166 Ratcliffe (2007b: 192) asks us to imagine an explanation of someone playing tennis, who “believes” that the 
ball is approaching, and subsequently “desires” to return the ball. Can it really be said that these are two discrete 
preceding components of the resultant action? This would need to be interrogated a lot more before we could be 
so sure of our assumptions on this point. 
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“central cognition” to judge, on reﬂection, which considerations are relevant to particular 
cases (Hutto 2008a: 63). 
 
As he did not take into account the existence of PP when writing this, this is only partly correct. 
We cannot expect the brain to at all times wait for top-down responses before reacting on 
environmental cues, just as we need bottom-up signalling to alert the system to the same. But 
PP presents us with a view of the brain whereby minimal environmental cues are fed forward 
to impress upon the already extant cognitive model of the contextual environment. This means 
that it could fit the minimal content agenda that Hutto advocates on his teleosemiotic construal, 
while also allowing for the immediate, sensitive bodily responsitivity that needs to be 
accounted for. This could be a rare case of having our cake and eating it too, as there are 
important roles to play for both the top-down and the bottom-up responses of our brains, with 
top-down models of the environment being the predominant cause of action which provide the 
very shortcut that Hutto seeks. It is a neat package which could fit into his teleosemiotic and 
covariant picture of mind responsitivity rather well167, along with tying it all into the literature 
on action-oriented PP. 
But what does this mean for modular propositional thinking? LIGs, as contextually-bound 
bodily dispositions, are potentially all that are needed for even complex behaviour, even up to 
and including social behaviour. As expanded upon in Chapter Two, it has been shown just how 
little we actually use propositional thinking in our day-to-day living. Ratcliffe (2007a: 233-
240, 2007b, Chapter Seven) goes further than this to show the lack of coherency in the general 
FP framework, elucidating quite starkly the proliferation of background assumptions we all 
employ on a daily basis (ibid.: 187-197). His description of the everyday cognitive capacities 
employed while enacting our FP abilities points to a lack of fundamental reasoning in our daily 
interactions. To reiterate what was said previously: 
 
The norms that feature in explanations of behaviour do, of course, include norms of good 
reasoning, in addition to situational norms. However, there is a difference between 
reasoning and having a reason (ibid.: 195). 
 
                                                 
167 Although, not wanting to cede defeat, Hutto and Myin attempt to pour cold water on this “bootstrap hell” 
(Hutto 2017; Hutto & Myin 2017: 67-74), despite their affinity for the PP paradigm in general. They use the term 
“bootstrap hell” to point toward the difficulty in constructing models of the environment from the ground up 
(“bootstrapping”) through continuous sensitivity to representational content, which is what Clark proposes (2016: 
19). Clark’s distinctly more conservative approach fails to deal with the HPC (Hutto 2017: 10). 
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In other words, we are good at rationalising behaviour, but this does not mean that this picks 
out the main reason for a particular behaviour (refer to the example in footnote 172). Reading 
his work, I am drawn to propose that this insight could be extended to the forms of mental 
states that are picked out by much of our folk psychologising, with these mental states 
predominantly being minimal in content. The implication for this thesis being that, regardless 
of the result of a person’s behaviour, there need not be any content-inherent (fully 
propositional) processes of reasoning that have brought this behaviour about. Ratcliffe supports 
Dennett’s position on indeterminacy of beliefs168 (ibid. : 205-211), which is a similar position 
to that which led Needham (1972: 125) to describe our use of the term “belief” as a “peg word” 
which takes the place of uncountable dispositions169. Through similar reasoning, Hutto (2008a: 
60) denies that there need be an assumption of a basic architecture inherent to non-verbal 
action-response. Nichols and Stich (2003: 15) have described this basic architecture as an 
assumption made by theorists on the basis of the mind’s representational states; i.e. that it 
contains the two distinct states of belief and desire. From what has been argued so far, it should 
be clear that I do not endorse this basic assumption either, primarily as a result of the picture 
of the indeterminate borders of our neuronal states, driven by probabilistic processing, 
proposed by PP. To simplify, if our neuronal states do not accurately represent the environment, 
then these neuronal states do not clearly relate to propositional beliefs and desires, and are more 
fundamentally dispositional in nature. 
Taking a cue from Clark (2016), Dennett (1991a, 1995, 2013b, 2017), and others, it is clear 
that the ability to represent a coherent picture with regards to the world requires externally-
derived props which have only recently been afforded to humanity in the form of our natural 
languages. While it is difficult to prove with any degree of accuracy, they propose that language 
is that which has afforded our minds an infinitely powerful tool to conceptualise and imagine 
our world, leading to the type of consciousness we all have. This brings us to the underlying 
point concerning the invocation of propositional attitudes within theories of FP. Traditionally, 
theoretical FP constructs a framework for embodied, non-linguistic action-response on the 
basis of our linguistically-facilitated thinking (Hutto 2008a: 73). It is thought that for non-
linguistic action-responses to be content-involving, there must be roles played in our mental 
                                                 
168 Dennett’s (1987) theory of the “intentional stance” states that in order to read and/or predict behaviour, we 
take a detached stance toward a person or object rather than actually reading their mental states. This detached 
stance consists of inferring information about the person’s or object’s dispositional state. It is a form of neo-
behaviourism. 
169 Needham (1972: 131) also states that belief “…can be so far translated away that the concept must disintegrate 
in correlation with the dispersal of its connotations”. I am inclined to agree. 
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states that are similar to the roles that concepts, beliefs, names and others inhabit in our 
languages (ibid.: 74). It is assumed that there must be a counterpart which fulfils what amounts 
to the same function at this mental level, namely, a symbolic mental language, as proposed by 
Fodor with his LoT. As Hutto (ibid.) rightly states, the analogy falls apart here. It has been 
difficult enough to argue for a system of conventions that manages to “fix” name or concept 
use in natural language. And to utilise a similar strategy for what I argue to be a fine-grained, 
embodied, predictive “know-how” at a mental level appears to be fruitless. An appeal to direct 
functional processes holds far more explanatory power than traditionally-conceived ToMs. 
With a lack of a structured method of instantiation, the proposed mental symbols cannot co-
refer in the way that names and concepts are capable of within language discourse, as Millikan 
(2000: 166) would also attest. 
I propose that the “neat and tidy” approach of something like a LoT provides a dilemma which 
both over-complicates and over-simplifies what is occurring in our minds. The first horn of the 
dilemma is due to the over-complication derived by adding unnecessary functional processes 
to our minds which we need not have evolved a use for. Drawing from our discussion in the 
previous chapter concerning the minimisation of free energy, we must be wary of over-
extending the bounds of what I call “least resistance processing”. The frugality of the mind 
dictates that the path of least resistance will almost always be taken, arguably leading to 
covariant relationships between brain and environment, instead of necessarily contentful 
representation thereof. The second horn of the dilemma is due to the over-simplification of 
theories like the LoT. These theories appear to posit mental processes acting as decoupled 
instantiations of a sentential nature a little too easily, without any truly coherent framework on 
which to base these suppositions beyond armchair reasoning. We tend to gravitate toward 
explanations which make sense to our lived experience, which perhaps goes some way to 
explaining talk of not only a LoT, but the far more pervasive use of propositional attitudes in 
our discourse surrounding the mind. But if language-use is necessary for truly propositional 
thinking, perhaps we have not been utilising propositional attitudes for the purpose of practical 
reasoning as long as many have surmised within our evolutionary history. At least with regards 
to animal psychology, this is a consensus which appears to be growing, with Akins agreeing 
that much of the simple behavioural response of organisms could be explained by the operation 
of “narcissistic” systems (Akins 1996: 344-355), as opposed to representational concepts 
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within the mind170. Papineau (2003: 99) has stated that we cannot assume that more simplistic 
organismic behaviour takes the form of “means-end reasoning”. Andrews (2008; 2012; 2015a; 
2015b) has also recently advocated a view on FP highly similar to Hutto’s from her perspective 
within the field of animal psychology. There is no empirical reason not to extend this approach 
to basic human minds. Non-linguistic (early) humans and some animals can be said to engage 
in a rudimentary form of FP, but this is not the propositional kind that we usually attribute to 
ourselves in our overt reasoning. 
I am picking apart the use of propositional attitudes in explanations of non-linguistic action-
responses in order to show that if we reject this, we are left with a far more useful and frugal 
explanation for behaviour. If we posit that the mind behaves in a manner that precludes the 
need for coherent propositional attitudes, we are some way to embedding our theory of mind 
into its evolutionary history. The content that informs representations of our environment 
serves no additional purpose in basic FP. But even if this is accepted, the teleosemiotic theory 
of action-response routines which downplays the propositional forms of thinking will have its 
detractors. What about the more sophisticated feats of FP that we are all capable of? To finalise 
this depiction of the non-propositional nature of the basic processing of our minds, and tying it 
up with its social aspect, this chapter will finish with the role that enculturation arguably plays 
in the development of full-blown propositional thinking. Denying propositional content in 
basic mental processes does not necessarily mean denying propositions across the board. It will 
be shown below how both the PP and the teleosemiotic processes discussed here underlie the 
eventual enculturated aspects of our learnt narrative competency. 
 
4. Predictive Processing, Teleosemiotics, Social Scaffolding, and their 
Effect on Extended Folk Discourse 
How does the preceding tie up more strongly with PP and its probabilistic account of the mind-
world relation, as discussed in Chapter Three? Furthermore, while the preceding potentially 
explains indexical world responsitivity, how does it enable the fleshed-out propositional 
thinking that we all appear to employ? If the PP account of the mind is correct, if prediction 
error minimisation, and more fundamentally free energy minimisation, is the reality in need of 
                                                 
170 An example of a “narcissistic” system can be that of our temperature gauging of the environment. Our 
thermoreceptors do not record the temperature (an accurate depiction of the environment), but what the 
temperature has evolutionary meant for the organism (via a covariant depiction of the environment). 
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explanation, we can see on the horizon a fundamental shift in our understanding of not only 
our allegedly propositionally-laden phenomenological experience, but also our social co-
cognition. If PP were fundamental to our cognitive functioning, what does this say for our 
interaction with others who are operating on similar neuronal frameworks as ourselves? What 
does this mean with regards to our FP? These are questions too large for this dissertation alone, 
but it is worth formulating a general hypothesis of our cognitive functioning, incorporating a 
scaling up of perspectives from the fine-grained and the embodied theories (teleosemiotics and 
PP), to personal development (NPH), and beyond, to the co-cognition which the preceding 
arguably affords. This would naturally affect our thinking concerning FP, both in terms of how 
it is thought to function as a ToM as well as how we think when attributing reasons to the folk. 
These two barbs of folk psychological practice should be separated as there could still be a 
place for an aspect of FP within the PP fold if we acknowledge that FP, as understood by the 
actual folk, is not always explicitly formulated when attempting to explain behaviour 
(Dewhurst 2017: 10). Perhaps there is a place for a form of predictive FP in our cognitive 
makeup, but would this necessarily entail some form of propositional thinking? 
While I have been deflationary with regards to folk psychology, one cannot deny the existence 
of folk psychology. However, it is its epistemological reality which concerns me. Taking the 
potential truth of both a teleosemiotic and a PP approach to cognition into account, we cannot 
easily maintain the view that our FP picks out a cognitive reality. We have seen that if we do 
not accept the reality of propositional attitudes as necessarily fundamental to our neuronal 
states, we begin to see that scientific (and/or philosophical) issues concerning content-
acquisition, cognation of this content, and others, falls away. If the embodied mind 
evolutionarily acquires shortcuts (the frugal aspect of mind), assimilates them into its 
framework, and continues to utilise them in order to minimise free energy, many errors and 
environmental/social misfiring can be predicated on the activities and proclivities of the 
cleverly lazy brain (Clark 2015c: 9-12; 2016, Chapter Eight). 
With the rise in popularity of PP theories, some theorists have begun to tackle the implications 
arising from the relation between PP and our socio-cultural environments. Fabry (2015, 2017, 
2018) envisions complementary roles for PP and our developmental socio-cultural practices. 
More specifically she utilises the concept of enculturation as the primary complementary tool 
to the underlying PP framework, whereby socio-cultural practices support our predictive brains 
in particular ways. Furthermore, this enables our brains to be representational in the 
propositional sense. I see this as another, yet broader, formulation of what Hutto has written 
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concerning narratives and their fundamental role within ontogeny for the development of our 
folk psychological abilities. Enculturation, in other words, can be developed as a broader 
formulation of the NPH in that our socio-cultural practices inform our cognitive capacities. 
This extends to how propositional thinking becomes introduced into our cognitive abilities. 
Despite the fact that she does not focus on folk psychology in any overt way, I believe the 
foundation which she lays can be expressed as an up-scaled, general explanation for our folk 
psychological understanding. This would neatly complement (or, more accurately, lend 
empirical validity to) Hutto’s views as well. Enculturation can be the means by which our 
brains are able to enhance our representational abilities. 
Arguably, as the minimisation of prediction error and the ongoing processes of precision 
estimation are improved upon throughout an agent’s life, the generated prediction models 
become more defined and therefore more accurate with regards to the agent’s environment. We 
can therefore state that the ongoing process of prediction error minimisation delineates a vector 
through which the agent, throughout its existence, develops (Fabry 2017: 4). Fabry (ibid.) calls 
this continual updating of predictive models over the agent’s lifespan, and primarily during 
ontogeny, the “predictive acquisition of cognitive capacities (PACC)”. These capacities are 
what enable suitable and effective environmental interactions, and are formed through the 
frugal processing of the predictive brain. The computational system that the brain employs is 
an economical evolutionary trick which better serves the need for continually updating the 
predictive models of the environment. PACC and the acquisition of resultant cognitive 
practices are Fabry’s primary focus, with cognitive practices denoting evolutionarily recent 
cognitive abilities such as reading and writing. Cognitive practices can also be defined by what 
Roepstorff et al. (2010: 1-2) have called “patterned practices”. They are those practices which 
are utilised by many agents within our shared cognitive niches, the norms of language being a 
prime example. These practices are acquired and streamlined throughout the extended 
experience of the individual, a point often emphasised by Clark (2016). PACC, on the other 
hand, is achieved through enculturation specifically (Fabry 2017: 7). Enculturation is therefore 
the dynamic, tacit influence on neuronal plasticity that results from being embedded within a 
particular socio-cultural niche. This can include fine-grained changes in precision estimations 
as a result of what the agent is exposed to during ontogeny. Those who argue that enculturation 
is central to the acquisition of our higher cognitive abilities, such as Fabry (2015, 2017, 2018), 
further hypothesise that enculturated cognition requires us to commit to an understanding of 
the inner workings of our cognition as dependent upon the collaboration between our embodied 
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selves and our “cognitive niches”. We can define the cognitive niche (somewhat pretentiously) 
as the contextual reality delineated by “the incrementally, trans-generationally structured 
socio-cultural environment that provides human organisms with epistemic resources for the 
completion of cognitive tasks” (Fabry 2017: 7-8). Epistemic resources are those that enable 
extended (and whichever other E-terms one wishes to include) cognition in the form of systems 
of representation and tools. Some simple examples would be the use of a calculator, or even 
the structured nature of schools. 
The “patterned practices” mentioned above are objects of public consumption, much like 
Hutto’s narratives171. “Patterned practices” can be seen as a generally defined concept under 
which the NPH can fall, as our cognitive practices are constrained and guided by inherent 
cognitive norms (see Menary (2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2013, 2015a, 2015b) for more on this view). 
What this means for the NPH is that particular folk narratives have been formulated for others 
to publicly consume and effectively communicate with. While more can be done to 
significantly align Hutto’s theories with the literature on PP172, we can see shades of it in 
Fabry’s (2017: 8) formulation of the “normative aspect of enculturation”, whereby the norms 
inherent within our cognitive practices are regulated by epistemically salient public markers 
(such as the communicative symbols of language). Therefore, public objects of consumption 
(such as symbols) are used to regulate and maintain the norms inherent within our cognitive 
practices. These norms are in a sense the “programming” that we acquire during development. 
Clark himself has pointed to the cultural processing of our cognitive practices within our socio-
cultural environment, leading to his formulation of “scaffolded” dissipations of the cognitive 
load into culture173 (Clark 1997: 179-180). Broadly speaking, the concept of socially-derived 
scaffolding denotes any set of “augmentations that allow us to achieve some goal that would 
otherwise be beyond us” (ibid.: 194-195). A simple example is that of using a pencil and ruler 
to draw an accurate line, but examples also extend to how people assist others (think of a child 
learning to walk). Therefore, social scaffolding can be seen as the structuring of our cognitive 
practices in a systematised procedure of “novice-expert interaction in the cognitive niche” 
(Fabry 2017: 8; see also Fabry’s (2015) commentary on Menary’s (2015a) paper on the topic). 
The “novice” in this interaction acquires the cognitive practices (such as learning a folk 
narrative), and the “expert” imparts the necessary skills within a particular domain (such as the 
                                                 
171 Which were introduced at the end of Chapter Two. 
172 Although see Hutto (2017) and Hutto & Myin (2017: 57-66, 82-83, 150-163) for brief comments on the 
growing body of work supporting PP and its relation to their view on content. 
173 This is the broadly conceived functionality of his EMH in action (Clark & Chalmers 1998). 
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epistemic saliency of public symbols used within folk narratives)174. Fabry (2017: 8) calls this 
the “scaffolding aspect” of enculturation, and Hutto’s notion of narrative development can 
quite easily be seen as a form of scaffolded learning in its depiction of the normative 
reinforcement of learnt folk psychological understanding. Hutto has indeed alluded to 
scaffolding in his writings (Hutto 2008a: 183, 224; Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017, Chapter Six; 
Hutto & Satne 2015). 
According to Hutto, human behavioural responses to the contextual environment occurs 
through non-accidental dispositional attunement toward distal cues, including others’ 
intentional attitudes (Hutto & Myin 2017: 140). This view sees cognition as weaved into the 
patterned practices mentioned earlier. As Clark states: 
 
…higher cognition…is made possible only by our history of encounter with the 
increasingly exotic sensory flows created by our own culturally crafted ‘designer’ 
environments (Clark 2016: 138). 
 
The effect that scaffolded learning and the norms that it engenders have on our cognitive 
practices can be profound. These cognitive norms can include the learnt targeting of specific 
intentional behaviour of others. As Sterelny (2003, Chapter Four) has argued, the ability to be 
attuned to others would require the gradual evolution of specific mental states in order to handle 
the complexity of social interactions. A clear example of this would be the learnt folk 
psychological dispositions which we all accrue over time. But this requires the ability to cope 
with multiple social triggers across extended temporal scales. On the view presented here, the 
social and physically embodied environment provide the norms which are subsequently 
assimilated to delineate “the content of environmental vehicles and how we manipulate them” 
(Menary 2010a: 229). With the help of cultural practices, our minds learn to attune to salient 
points of information gleaned from the environment, such as what a particular facial expression 
denotes, and what an appropriate response would be in light of this. Of course, if the 
teleosemiotic account of cognition is to be believed, it would render talk of content and vehicles 
superfluous to the baseline processing of the mind. Nevertheless, important for our purposes is 
that idea that these norms restrict our interpretation and subsequent manipulation of 
epistemically-salient environmental cues (Menary 2007: 136-141). Scaffolded learning enables 
the acquisition of such norms, which adjusts the ability of the agent’s cognitive system to 
incorporate epistemic resources in service of these acquired cognitive practices (Menary 2010a; 
                                                 
174 Sutton (2015) calls these developmental niches “cognitive ecologies”. 
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2013). Interestingly, the interrelated components of cognitive norms are assimilated and 
adapted over time, resulting in these components shifting “from being entirely explicit and 
context free to being entirely implicit and embodied” (Menary & Kirchhoff 2013: 618).  
This form of “content learning” occurs along a constrained pathway of development, which 
means that some capacities are only possible once others are already set up to enable them. For 
example, educational learning can set in place specific ideas which can be built upon to enable 
finer modes of cognition. This path-dependent learning is an important component of the 
aforementioned scaffolded learning. Clark (1997: 205) emphasises its importance by stating it 
implies that “you can’t get everywhere from anywhere, and where you are now strongly 
constrains your potential future intellectual trajectories”. Path-dependent learning, as the 
constraining effect on the learning process, provides the vector through which scaffolded 
learning unfolds. And, the inner processes of PP are ideally placed to provide support for this 
view of the complex interrelations of path-dependent learning (Clark 2016: 288). As Fabry 
(2017: 10) states, the systematised and temporally extended exposure to socio-culturally 
embedded epistemic resources during scaffolded learning (or in Hutto’s more truncated 
paradigm: narrative learning) is corralled by the fine-tuning of precision estimates. On the PP 
view, the continual updating of predictive models of the environment is constrained by the 
particular cognitive resources available. These changes are shaped by the “functional biases” 
of the brain as well as body morphology (Fabry 2017: 7). For a clear and simple example, the 
physiological and anatomical structure of our arms and hands constrain the rolling prediction 
error minimisations necessary for proficient writing (Phillips et al. 2009: 585-586). The brain 
and body are only capable of fine-tuning its prediction within the straightjacketing effect of 
bodily limitations. Embodied active inference is therefore biased within these constraints, 
which complements the predictively-derived plastic changes within the brain to shape 
subsequent cognitive function acquisition. Likewise, within folk narrative learning, we acquire 
narrative competency only insofar as we are able to incorporate it into our existant cognitive 
makeup. This speaks to an embodied form of social cognitive capacity acquisition, which 
guides action in step with brain plasticity. 
And what about the arrival of propositional-style thinking within our mental lives? These arrive 
on the scene through what Ramstead et al. (2016) call “cultural affordances”. Cultural 
affordances are salient markers that help to predict the behaviour of others, and are therefore 
of vast import when navigating shared social spaces. Furthermore, during ontogenetic 
development, these cultural markers are internalised through repeated “social interactive 
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inference” (Metzinger 2017: 20). This points toward the possible gradual development toward 
more and more complex propositional-style thinking (Ramstead et al. 2016: 17) and the 
eventual formulation, usually around two to four years of age, of the autobiographical self175 
(Metzinger 2013: 5). This is in order to arrive at more fine-tuned models of the social 
environment, predicated on the successful navigation thereof. Only in this way is the much-
vaunted content that is needed for a full-blown FP, in the form of propositional thinking, 
acquired. It is this, as Hutto and Myin have also pointed out above, that gives us any semblance 
of “full-blown” representation. Hence, we should see propositional attitudes as the enculturated 
artefacts of public discourse, and not instantiated in our neurons in their fully propositional 
form. These artefacts develop over time due to their useful benefits. PP and our teleosemiotic 
processes also have a profound effect on our culture, in that they shape our folk narratives, and 
by extension our propositional attributions (remember that our cognitive niches are also 
constrained by our inherent cognitive abilities). In turn, narratives serve to limit the behaviour 
of individuals “so as to make themselves more easily predictable [to] other agents” (Clark 
2016: 286). This is important as it limits the otherwise debilitating plethora of potential causes 
from which behaviour could follow, providing other individuals with a foothold from which to 
infer actual causes. This does not speak to the need for ontological accuracy so much as 
pragmatic markers that enable successful inferences.  
The picture painted above is fairly indistinguishable from Hutto’s formulation of how 
narratives work within his NPH. There appears to be a growing consensus toward construing 
folk psychological discourse more holistically than as merely reflecting actual instantiated 
propositions within the brain. Naturalising folk psychological discourse by incorporating PP 
and teleosemiotic theories into our understanding of FP does not eliminate our practice of folk 
psychologising, as discussed in Chapter Two in relation to Churchland (1981). Rather, it entails 
the broadening of the traditional notion of our FP capacities as consisting in fundamentally 
content-rich representations at a neuronal level that cause us to act. Therefore, folk 
psychological discourse and the narratives which enable it could still be a fundamental 
component of a fleshed-out theory of cognition. The propositional thinking which we all 
employ is an important part of our reason explanation, and seems to have developed in such a 
way as to be parasitic upon our neural architecture, such as when we explicitly state “I believe 
that….” or “He desires that….”. A tokening of linguistic propositions enables us to get a grip 
                                                 
175 This more than likely contributes significantly to our inability to recall our lived experience at younger ages 
than this. 
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upon the world, but it puts a realist gloss on our actual neuronal interactions. As mentioned 
before, narrative and social scaffolding (or niche creation) are highly important aspects of the 
cognitive picture (Clark 2008; Clark 2016: 275-288), and folk psychological discourse can be 
depicted as a form of the very same (Dewhurst 2017: 9). This means that we can still find a use 
for it within a future theory of cognition. Folk psychological discourse, through the social 
norms which serve as the regulative principles for human behaviour, could also be understood 
as a macro version of active inference (ibid.). What we are left with is a more anaemic depiction 
of FP which can still act as a pragmatic framework for reason explanation, even if it does not 
depict the reality of our cognitive processing. 
As Hutto and Myin (2017: 134) as well as Hutto and Satne (2015) note, the grasping of public 
symbols is necessary for proficient development and sensitivity toward practices of an 
intersubjective nature (from basic communication to the most complex of multi-agent projects). 
They also make the link between this and the growth of cognitive niches within humanity’s 
sociocultural environments (Hutto & Myin 2017, Chapter Six). Sociocultural practices, as well 
as their continued maintenance, are the primary enablers for the prevalence of contentful 
cognition (Hutto & Myin 2017: 134). Basic minds176, including our own, are only capable of 
specialised content-involving social interactivity once these sociocultural practices (such as 
propositional-style thinking) are incorporated into our cognitive make-up. As this sets 
contentful minds apart from other forms of minds, this truly does separate these minds from 
what has come before or since. They stress that this difference can be seen as one in kind, not 
degree, between humanity and the rest of the animal kingdom177 (ibid.). Publicly available 
symbols supervene upon the basic structure of our minimally contentful minds178. Essentially, 
our basic minds utilise public epistemic markers to accentuate our basic functionality toward 
full-blown content-rich cognition. The details of how the mind acquires these abilities 
operationally is an open question, but one worth exploring. 
From all of the above, one can see differing levels of functioning at work here. The fine-grained 
processing on the PP level, the teleosemiotic environmental attunement, and structured 
environmentally-discriminative path-dependant learning. I propose that the co-cognitive level 
of interrelated folk propositionality, as described above, is realised only after all of these 
                                                 
176 Recall that a “basic mind” does not denote a “lesser mind”. 
177 They in no way advocate a “special” place for humanity in the evolutionary game, but merely point to the 
unique shift in humanity’s cognitive capacity as a wholly other form of consciousness. 
178 Something akin to what Dennett has been saying for quite some time (Dennett 1991a: 171-208, 1995, 2017). 
See Churchland (2002) for a brief critique of his views, and a rebuttal in Dennett’s (2006).  
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components suitably interrelate. As the theory of PP has increased in empirical validity, we are 
in need of upscaled theories of its basic functionality at higher levels of cognitive functioning. 
The teleosemiotic account could explain how we acquire contextual features for our ever-
updating (non-propositional) models of the environment. I believe that the underlying PP 
account of the brain, and by extension the embodied theories of the mind, could go even further 
to account for the behaviour and bodily dispositions of people in their social environments. 
Just how this would work is up for debate, but to elucidate how folk psychological interaction 
would work within the structure of PP would include a tale of abstract, high-level predictive 
models of behaviour which include the agent as well as the socio-cultural environment within 
which the behaviour occurs (Dewhurst 2017: 9). Dewhurst points to the supplementarity that 
particular learnt narratives179 afford basic behavioural prediction (ibid.: 7), as does Fabry 
(2017: 10), as discussed above. This is more than the regular prediction of subsequent 
behaviour using current behavioural markers, but is instead a modelling of the context of the 
behaviour utilising already-learnt normative explanations of behaviour acquired over time. For 
example, knowing what a colleague’s “belief” within a particular situation is, is informed by 
learnt information about past behaviour, which in turn attunes one’s cognitive attention toward 
particular, salient behavioural markers. This differs from traditional FP, as behavioural 
regularities are all that is needed for what I would call an embodied folk understanding of the 
contextual environment. One can see how this can align with talk of PP and narrative structures 
within our FP. I call this iteration Dispositional Folk Psychology (DFP), as it moves beyond 
talk of overt mentalistic language toward a visceral, embodied understanding that is 
nevertheless normative. As described earlier, we navigate our everyday environment in an 
embodied fashion, but our embodied interaction with the environment also includes the social, 
which necessitates understanding norms of behaviour. This embodied interaction is a 
somewhat structured, predictive framework which does not incorporate overt language-use but 
nevertheless positions the embodied mind to react appropriately toward these distal social cues. 
Any learnt social cues, such as body language, are incorporated into our cognitive models, 
which allow us to minimise unnecessary overt processing of social cues, thereby allowing us 
to predict behaviour in a thoroughly immediate and visceral fashion. The shift toward implicit 
and embodied cognitive norms as discussed above (Menary & Kirchhoff 2013: 618) enables a 
                                                 
179 Dewhurst does not use the word narratives in this particular context, but I argue that one can slip this term in 
and not lose anything significant from his original point. He does appear to state that there is more overt reasoning 
occurring during these everyday occurrences, more than I contend is possibly happening at any given moment, 
but any difference in our opinion is purely conjecture at this point. 
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use of cognitive resources which is frugal and adaptive to appropriate environmental 
stimulations. 
In my eyes, DFP is what is left when the ascription of propositional attitudes are off the table, 
for most of our cognitive processes. One will recall that propositional attitudes as our primary 
means of folk understanding is an outmoded depiction of our neuronal reality. As DFP is a 
predominantly dispositional180 experience of the environment, there is space here for an 
understanding of our base folk psychological behaviour as a minimally contentful form of 
prediction. What I am proposing is that DFP predominantly occurs throughout PP brains 
incorporating cognitive norms through teleosemiotic covariance181. This results in an updating 
of our predictive models while moving beyond an obvious need for vehicles of content. In 
addition, our predictive framework provides an embodied shortcut so as to operate according 
to the strictures of least resistance processing, restricted by the information-theoretic free 
energy of our cognitive system. These are not explanations or predictions as such, but more 
akin to “recognition-response patterns that generate embodied expectations” (Hutto 2007b: 
44). In our continually evolving experience of social discourse, the consistent need for “online” 
reasoning when reacting or “understanding” social cues is done away with. Incorporating our 
knowledge of brain processing, it appears that consistent “online” reasoning would be far too 
burdensome a drain on our cognitive apparatus, and, as explained earlier, our brains have been 
evolutionarily jury-rigged along the path of least resistance. On this view, failure to predict 
behaviour is a prediction-error-in-waiting, which would be fed upward to update our looping 
predictive model of the social milieu. This need not be “content-involving”, as an already 
extant predictive model of social understanding is partly acquired throughout the lived 
experience of the individual (which would include narrative learning). This model is already 
dispositionally embodied, but in need of occasional alignment in light of any failures of 
prediction through active inference. As DFP entails environmentally-coupled dispositions 
toward social cues, what can be seen as the “understanding” of behaviour could be more of a 
somatic, yet still emotionally affecting, experience, intimately associated with and elicited by 
the circumstances themselves. In other words, our experienced “intuitive” understanding of 
others can perhaps be seen as the emotional by-product of this immediate action-response. On 
top of this, folk psychological narratives inform the overt propositional attitude ascriptions 
which we apply after the fact. All of this brings our theories of FP in line with current theories 
                                                 
180 Recall Ratcliffe’s (2007b: 205-211) notion of beliefs as indeterminate dispositions. 
181 Covariance was described in detail in Section 3.2 of this chapter. 
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of cognitive processing, as discussed above, and hence makes it much more plausible than 
traditional theories based on armchair speculation constrained by linguistic commitments. 
Regardless of which model we eventually arrive at, I argue that the most plausible theories of 
the operation of our brains lean toward a PP view of our internal cognitive processes. Simply 
put, if PP is on track to be the comprehensive answer to the above, its central notion of free 
energy minimisation should influence our embodied minds even more than is currently thought. 
The teleosemiotic account of our cognitive capacities which emphasises a propositionless, 
content-minimal mode of thinking, is an important upscaled expression of this frugal 
minimisation of energy. To function in the contextual environment, minimising free energy 
would make sense from an evolutionary perspective, which in turn leads to the minimally 
contentful responses of the embodied mind (as argued above). Therefore, PP and the 
teleosemiotic account of cognition go hand-in-hand as complementary theories that 
accommodate a fundamental biological need. Taking this further, enculturation (including the 
influences elucidated by the NPH) could be seen as an important component of our neural 
development, which extends into the embodied long-term existence of the agent. The cognitive 
load that differing types of narratives support, relates to a frugal use of cognitive processes 
which, again, minimises free energy for temporally-extended survival within the cognitive 
niche of the agent. This phenomenon supports the introduction of cognitive norms into the 
process, which provide further frugality in their ability to constrain behaviour along well-worn 
(socially-attuned) cognitive paths. This, I suggest, is the positive aspect of folk psychological 
discourse: its ability to guide us along paths already trodden, providing opportunity for free 
energy minimisation while “downloading” a form of coded norm programming. In other words, 
through social learning, folk terminology is gradually incorporated into our very baseline 
interactions with our environment, thereby bypassing to a great extent the need for overt folk 
reasoning. Therefore, propositional content predicated on truth evaluability at the neuronal 
level need not occur.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced a minimal approach to representation within our cognitive 
processes, specifically when it comes to processes relating to FP, augmenting the PP picture of 
our minds presented in Chapter Three. Its purpose was to be deflationary with regards to mental 
content-acquisition and processing, and streamlining the already frugal interactions that a PP 
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theory of mind provides. A brief run-through of the literature was done, which served to 
highlight the shift toward minimal content when describing cognitive processes. This in turn 
made it possible to ground my affinity for non-representational cognition and the subsequent 
problematisation of the idea that semantic content is the mark of the truly cognitive. Thereafter, 
I introduced the teleosemiotic account of the covariant relationship between body and 
environment to lend theoretical weight to a more visceral blending of mind and environment 
than is typically the case. Thereafter, this discussion incorporated the literature on enculturation 
and scaffolded learning in order to construct a theory that joins FP, PP, and teleosemiotics. In 
conclusion, a view of frugal, least-resistance processing when it comes to our base folk 
psychologising was explicated to tie these differing but closely related fields together. 
From the above it should be clear that I do not accept the reality of actual propositionally-laden 
folk explanations of behaviour, except in their minimal sense, and beyond their overt use in 
our linguistic practices. They are merely a means of what could be called “niche survival”, 
where this niche happens to be the vast socio-cultural milieu which surrounds and envelops us. 
FP as propositional attitudinal thinking speaks to a truncated understanding of our minds, far 
too reliant on armchair reasoning to be helpful when it comes to explaining what occurs at the 
level of the mind/brain. It is easy to say that it is intuitively plausible that propositional attitudes 
are what lie behind our reason-giving capacities, but it can also quite easily be said that we 
usually do not utilise an overt reasoning process when we understand others’ behaviour. In 
other words, it is highly plausible that the majority of our daily cognition does not take 
propositional form, due to our embodied and embedded existence within the environment. This 
is why I endorse a deflationary account of our FP. PP, and more importantly the FEP, points to 
a mind which takes shortcuts, prior to our ability to cognate reasons at all levels of interaction. 
This leads to a view of mind whereby a minimum of resources are utilised, and propositional 
reason-giving only occurs on a post hoc basis. Cultural norms, therefore, provide a vast 
cognitive resource which enables us to go “offline”182 and achieve much more in our everyday 
reasoning than would be possible if we were to process the majority of our interpersonal 
experiences. We can view the norms of culture as providing an emancipation from unnecessary 
cognition in our ever-deepening social environment. 
  
                                                 
182 By “offline” I mean in the sense of non-overt and subconscious reasoning. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
“Keep in mind that what seems like rationality is often just rationalization, 
playing catch-up with subterranean forces that we never suspect.” 
- Robert M Sapolsky (2017: 423)  
 
1. Introduction 
So much for this review of the current landscape of the philosophical and scientific fields of 
FP, PP, teleosemiotics, and the rest. But one may still feel as if there is a core element absent 
from this account of the mind and how it is said to process, represent, and instantiate folk 
psychological ascriptions. Even if all that has been covered is accepted, one may feel cheated, 
as if a sleight of hand has been performed. Not only have our folk psychological ascriptions 
been problematised, but a central cognitivist depiction of the mind has been challenged, as well 
as representational theories of the mind in general. Not only have we been jolted from our 
familiar folk thinking, but the very frameworks from which we tend to understand them have 
been subverted, and even supplanted. Where does this leave us regarding our self-conception? 
Are we poorer for this new view of ourselves? Well, perhaps, but perhaps not. This chapter 
will review the central themes of this thesis by summarising the take-home points from the 
analysis of folk psychological ascriptions in Chapter Two, before doing the same for the 
implications of PP for our FP theories. Thereafter, the teleosemiotic account of our basic 
cognition and what it says about representation and content in our cognition, and therefore our 
FP, will also be reviewed. To end this chapter, some issues that these theories hold for future 
research and conceptions of cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophical depictions of 
our FP will be unpacked. 
 
2. Folk Psychology Problematised 
As seen in Chapter Two, traditionally-construed FP is far too constrained a theoretical 
imposition to be sustained as a workable theory of the mind. Putting aside the issues that arise 
for FP once the more plausible theories of PP and teleosemiotics come into play, the view of 
propositional attitudes as individuated components of our mentality is vastly untenable once 
their truncated natures are revealed. As was elucidated in that chapter, the reasoning behind 
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supposing the existence of full-blown propositional attitudes in behavioural reason explanation 
are not convincing enough to easily sway us any longer. It was shown that we arguably 
construct narratives entailing such attitudes in order to aid us in the navigation of our social 
environment, but this need not reflect reality to do its work. But Fodor’s (1994) disjunction 
problem, as introduced in Chapter Two, is a reminder of the analytic worries that plague 
naturalised theories of cognition, wherein it is alleged that truth conditionality must hold 
everywhere and always for mental content to be useful or accurate. Propositional content is 
tied to accurate correspondence with the environment, leading to the issues surrounding the 
disjunction problem. 
Nevertheless, I have argued against the assumption that propositional content is the mark of 
the cognitive, and have argued that this assumption needs to be done away with. As I have 
argued for covariant relationships which relate the mind to world, leading to a more holistic 
understanding of mental states, the disjunction problem falls away. It is a strange imposition to 
posit these abstract (yet allegedly rigid) propositional structures in the brain in order to account 
for our cognitive abilities. Not only this, but the insistence that it is predominantly these 
propositional attitudes that enable our truly human cognition, is a view that should be 
questioned. We are in need of a more comprehensive, empirically-informed theory of cognition 
before being able to say unequivocally that this is indeed the case. Often, as with many 
cognitive phenomena such as talk of “representation” and the like, propositional attitudes are 
assumed to be the end-goal of our theories of cognition. Instead of elucidating why we should 
incorporate propositional attitudes into our deliberations, they are smuggled in from the start 
(as argued by Ratcliffe 2007b). One can see why this presupposition could alter conceptual 
work on the target phenomena of scientific as well as philosophical theories of the mind. 
Moreover, such propositional thinking is seemingly introduced from an early age in the form 
of narratives (Hutto 2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b), rendering a shift in perspective 
exceedingly difficult. As we have seen, these narratives serve as the exemplars from which co-
cognition is effected and maintained across cultures, and they provide the means for reason 
explanation in our everyday FP. Therefore, our FP narratives provide the core abilities upon 
which our social understanding is based. As was seen in Chapter Two, Churchland (1981) has 
been a dominant theorist in the drive to eliminate propositional attitudes from our ontology, 
and he has done a commendable job. However, it is certainly time to move on from the all-or-
nothing approach of true eliminativism, as propositional attitudes clearly occur in our conscious 
reasoning, regardless of their reality at a neuronal level. They may not be instantiated at this 
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level in any recognisable form, but they do seem to play some kind of role in cognition and, as 
argued above, they derive their efficacy from the social domain. They are cultural impositions 
upon the neuronal substrate. 
 
3. Folk Psychology and Predictive Processing 
Looking at folk psychological ascriptions through a plausible theory of our basic cognitive 
processes, namely predictive processing, also seems to suggest that propositional attitudes 
should be done away with, at least when it comes to most cognitive processes. There seems to 
be a basic incongruence between psychology of the propositional kind and the PP paradigm. 
On this view, the separation of beliefs and desires into their canonical distinctions are broken 
down and woven together on an active inference construal of cognitive processing. If 
predictions are action-oriented in the PP sense, we simply do not have beliefs and desires 
instantiated within the brain (Dewhurst 2017). What we do have in their place is a probabilistic 
model of the environment which is attuned to appropriate cues. Moreover, these proto-beliefs 
and -desires, as explained in Chapters Two and Three, are far too fine-grained to be picked out 
in publicly-accessible language (at least on most planes of the predictive hierarchy)183. These 
“beliefs” and “desires” are inter-woven and not clearly delineated and transparent enough for 
our ability to categorise them. A move we can perform to counteract the radical nature of this 
picture of FP would be to shift our understanding of what the folk have always meant when 
they have ascribed behaviour on the basis of propositional attitudes. It may be that canonical 
beliefs or desires were always meant to pick out the phenomena postulated by PP in some sense 
(Dewhurst 2017: 10). But this does not seem to track very well with what the folk have actually 
been doing. As Dewhurst (ibid.) points out, it is more plausible to say that beliefs and desires, 
as attributed by the folk, were always meant to pick out macro-reasons for behaviour. The way 
that I see it, these macro-reasons are evident on the broader scale of co-communicative 
understanding, yet they do not directly depict any corresponding cognitive processes, which 
can be disconcerting to our lived experience. Therefore, beliefs and desires are emergent 
properties once culture has had its effect on the brain. As described earlier in this thesis, FP is 
a fuzzy endeavour that nevertheless picks out framed “just so” narratives describing 
generalities about human behaviour for public consumption. There is simply no determinate 
                                                 
183 Not to mention that on REC’s teleosemiotic construal not much would be represented in any contentful sense 
in any case. 
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way of delineating an “actual”, corresponding belief and desire as publicly understood at a 
cognitive level, but this, at the end of the day, is a “problem” more for our conceptions of who 
we are than any undermining of our ontological reality. We should take a Dennettian (1989) 
stance on our understanding of where propositional attitudes are situated, and instead position 
them (in a non-essential sense) somewhere between brain and environment (metaphorically 
speaking). 
The incompatibility between the PP model and our public folk psychological ascriptions need 
not entail a drastic change in our behaviour, but rather a drastic change in the conceptualisation 
of our FP (Dewhurst 2017: 10). Our folk psychological ascriptions need not necessarily be 
congruent with reality in order to provide a useful elucidation of other peoples’ thoughts. This 
means that, while FP as propositional attitude ascription is predominantly incompatible with 
PP, it is only the literalists such as Fodor and the like who will run into real problems as a 
result. If our FP and any theories which hang on it are set within boundaries demarcated by 
propositional attitudes, the PP framework undermines its efficacy as a coherent ToM. But this 
is also the case for Churchland’s form of eliminativism which advocates that either FP be 
understood as an accurate portrayal of our internal cognitive processes, or it should be 
eliminated from our epistemological framework. It hardly needs saying anymore that this is 
not a necessary move in order to reach coherency in our scientific theorising. We could simply 
modify our understanding of what it is that we are picking out in the world when we folk 
psychologise, without entirely eliminating the terminology from public discourse. PP could 
seep into the mainstream and alter our understanding of what it is that we are actually 
describing when we speak of the behaviour of those around us as well as of ourselves. This 
would not be easy to guide in any controlled manner184, and the need to do so is up for debate. 
But perhaps we can see this as more of an opportunity for a revising of our FP into a more 
scientifically cogent one. As Dewhurst puts it: 
 
We should aim to develop a novel conceptual taxonomy that more accurately reflects the 
structure of cognition and allows us to move beyond the limitations of folk psychological 
discourse. Understood in this way folk psychology could be used to identify interesting 
target phenomena and inspire scientific research […] but should not be used as a source 
of technical cognitive scientific concepts. (Dewhurst 2017: 11).  
 
                                                 
184 Think of the notions of the Freudian unconscious and how it populated public discourse at the turn of the last 
century. 
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There have been a number of efforts to explicate a way of doing this, such as Anderson (2015), 
Klein (2012), Poldrack (2006; 2010) Price and Friston (2005), and others (in Dewhurst 2017: 
11). These efforts have sought to revise the understanding of our cognition by amalgamating 
large sets of studies, all in order to segregate which processes are of functional relevance to our 
cognitive processes. From here, we can reconceptualise our cognitive processes (and by 
extension our FP) by incorporating terminology which is more appropriate185. By way of 
example, in order to incorporate our understanding of PP into FP, we would need to be aware 
of the way in which beliefs and desires are amalgamated into a singular predictive state. In 
addition, the differences in the interactive processes of such predictive states and those alleged 
to arise from propositional attitudes could be elucidated186. I am inclined to support this, 
although we must be careful if folk psychological terminology and concepts are used to 
“identify interesting target phenomena” (Dewhurst 2017: 11). This is because occasionally the 
long-standing usage of specific terminology may push us down conceptual avenues without 
recourse for revision. We would be philosophically stuck in our ways. The way to come out 
from under the yoke of decades of conceptual baggage is not always clear. It would not be as 
easy as changing the words we use (“belief” and “desire” etc.) to others (much like “surprise” 
and “surprisal” have been). I suppose, in any case, that FP as traditionally understood would 
still hang around, as the folk can still knowingly treat our coarse-grained interpretations in an 
“as if” sense. The entire edifice of FP, recognised as more than simply the attribution of 
snapshot mental states, could be subsumed into the PP framework in this way. Theoretical 
propositional attitude FP, however, would more than likely not survive the transition. The shift 
in our self-conception that PP would more than likely bring about would irrevocably alter how 
we conceptualise and understand FP.  
 
4. Folk Psychology and Teleosemiotics 
As for what the teleosemiotic account of cognitive processing gives us with regards to 
understanding our FP, we are in need of demarcating the functional processes of the brain as 
clearly as possible. I have given good reason to doubt the immediate assumption that the brain 
                                                 
185 For example, Poldrack (2010) attempts to explicate the failings of attempting to map particular brain regions 
in terms of their particular functions. He instead advocates redefining the ontology of the brain (ibid.: 760). 
186 Predictive states, for example, could be vastly different to the alleged interactions between the neuronal states 
of propositional attitudes if predictive states cannot be clearly defined. We are in need of a different view of the 
imperative (“desire”) and indicative (“belief”) aspects of our neuronal states if they are indeed predictive states. 
Naturally, they would not be “belief” and “desire” traditionally conceived. 
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trades in representational “content” or “information” and the like. “Information” is a quite 
general term, but it is usually used to denote data of some variant that is “acquired” in some 
fashion, and then utilised within the brain. I introduced REC at this point to upset this 
commonly held view, as REC is a formulation of neurodynamic interaction within the brain 
that sees it as more “informationally sensitive” (Hutto & Myin 2017: 237) than informationally 
accurate. This view depicts neuronal pathways as influencing behaviour, but importantly not 
representing states of affairs in the world. Therefore, organismic behavioural responses are 
sustained through direct acquaintance with the environment, through the indexical ability of 
covariant relationships which calls into question the assumption that cognition is, at base, 
representational (ibid.: 29-31). The top-down models that are understood to operate within PP 
can be understood to afford a grip upon the world (via active inference) to make these covariant 
relationships do real cognitive work. It is this which fundamentally entwines the literature on 
REC and PP and explicates our basic cognitive functionality. As a result, we can effectively 
ignore the disjunction problem as a serious epistemic and metaphysical hindrance when we 
adopt this covariance model of basic organismic functionality. This is because it does not hold 
any great philosophical weight if we are dealing with information in a covariant sense as 
opposed to notions of accuracy. This is positive in that it frees us from philosophical baggage 
which does not align with evolutionary theory. 
To move away from a contentful mind, and therefore the more traditional cognitivist thinking 
around propositional attitudes, we need to change some of our fundamental assumptions, as 
they place us at a considerable conceptual handicap. The repercussions of not adopting this 
approach is shown by Bechtel (2016), who assessed whether researchers have undergone 
studies187 in such a way so as to assume the target phenomena of the study, in this case the 
representational abilities of the brain (ibid.: 3-7). Bechtel arrives at the conclusion that 
neuroscientists appear to be set on the idea that they are attempting to elucidate the form of 
representation within the brain, as well as the content itself (ibid.: 29-31). In the experiments, 
researchers attached electrodes to rats’ brains to attempt to explain their spatial navigation in 
terms of “map-like” representations, which represent the environment in a contentful manner 
(ibid.: 29). In other words, the notion of contentful representation was foundational to the 
experiments. Bechtel does, however, believe that viewing content in this way is what enables 
such a rich body of work in the first place. This may be true, but of course there is more at 
                                                 
187 In this case, studies on the neuronal representation that the place cells in the brain allegedly afford were 
analysed. 
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stake here than motivation. Accuracy of a fecund research paradigm relies on the lucidity of its 
conceptual premises, leading me to argue that the commitment to conceptual accuracy is of 
paramount importance. How can we say that our cognition is being elucidated if we are 
understanding the very nature of our research programs in a subtly flawed way? If we believe 
that robust representation is a necessary component of cognition, we are often going to be going 
up dead ends in future research on this score. REC appears to offer just the right frugal approach 
to research on cognition by avoiding adding redundant cognitive processes to the mix, and thus 
side-stepping the issue of content (and thus the HPC). Furthermore, any lingering worries about 
disjunction issues are similarly swept away. 
If there is minimal content in the brain, then conventionally understood FP in terms of 
propositional attitude ascriptions becomes an increasingly untenable framework for 
understanding behaviour. If accuracy is not needed to be contextually-bound to the 
environment, the teleosemiotic account of intentionality provides a fairly novel tool to 
conceptualise the real-world sensitivity of our neuronal systems to said environment. The 
neuronal systems which instantiate navigation through our environment via their dynamic 
firings are all that are needed for appropriate (notice: not necessarily purely accurate) behaviour 
to be elicited. But these neuronal systems only exhibit their attuned environmental sensitivity 
once a particular context is experienced, thereby alluding to a correspondence between the 
neurons and the environment188. Notice, again, that this need not be representational, especially 
in the sense that propositional attitudes are thought to function. Therefore, what we are left 
with is a distinctly minimally contentful picture of our minds, and by extension our FP. But 
our cognition is fully realised, not only in its underlying processes being directly attuned to the 
environment, but also in its capacity to “loop” (Hutto & Myin 2017: 253) through culture, 
enriching the mind in such a way so as to provide the content that conceiving of propositional 
attitudes requires. In other words, through interaction with cultural artefacts of consumption, 
our sociocultural milieu provides some of our mental content, rather than the basic processing 
of our minds. The extensive, patterned practices of enculturation are the true harbingers of the 
truth conditional content needed by propositional attitudes, and it is only through our 
engagement with these practices that our content-enriched intentionality arises through a field 
of “cultural affordances” (Ramstead et al. 2016). Therefore, we have enculturation to thank for 
our seemingly “content-rich” cognitive representations. But this is a gloss on what our basic 
                                                 
188 For example, place cells within the brain are believed to hardwire affordances within the environment to make 
the individual sensitive to future interactions when in a similar environment in the future (Ólafsdóttir et al. 2015: 
1). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 137 
minds actually do, which is a direct coupling between environment and mind that trades on a 
form of cognitive “inertia” toward specific environmental stimuli. This “inertia” takes the place 
of truth conditional content, and serves exactly the same function in tuning the mind in such a 
way so as to be able to act upon the world. In other words, our minds are directed toward a 
field of affordances (Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014; Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014; Ramstead et 
al. 2016) not a field of content. 
Lending weight to this idea, Hutchins (2005: 1558) has described how some experiments 
indicate that many concepts which “lack cultural coherence” simply cannot be grasped 
sufficiently within memory. For example, D’Andrade (1989) has shown that some inferential 
reasoning cannot easily be made unless tied to concrete concepts. In this case reasoning toward 
particular conclusions using simple premises with “x” and “y” as placeholders have a 
significant impact upon success rate. Substitute these placeholders with concrete concepts, and 
the rate of success increases exponentially. While a simple example, it is a window into the 
effect that shared models of the environment have as they reinforce the thinking and behaviour 
of individuals, over and above their base rudimentary cognition. Furthermore, as these cultural 
artefacts are embedded themselves within a vast mutually supportive network of other cultural 
artefacts, they have the effect of constraining themselves to a particular logical space. Hutchins 
(2013: 12-13) has also linked this concept with PP by alluding to the fact that cultural practices 
reduce entropy and increase the predictability of an individual’s experience. Much more effort 
is needed to flesh out this aspect of social cognition. 
What we are left with, once the layers of theory have been peeled away from talk surrounding 
FP, is something seemingly more anaemic than full-blown propositional attitude FP. But this 
anaemia only extends so far, as we must keep in mind the entire edifice of folk psychological 
discourse as a whole. The capacity for the utilisation of learnt narratives, predictions of 
behaviour, and the normative streamlining that enables these abilities, speak to a larger picture 
than a restricted FP model predicated on propositional attitudes (Dewhurst 2017: 10). Having 
said this, there is no need for accuracy in explicating the underlying components of our reason-
explanation for behaviour when the general narrative frameworks successfully elucidate 
macro-reasons for behaviour at the coarse-grained level. Again, propositional thinking only 
shows itself at this level, but not necessarily further down into the underlying covariant 
relationships that hold between neurons and the environment. Therefore, there is an acquired 
capability that we utilise in our social “understanding”, operating at the “basic” (but 
fundamental) level. This capability orientates us toward distal (in this case social) cues so as to 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 138 
interpret them on a visceral level, all without full-blown reason explanations in the 
propositional sense. This latter reason explanation only arrives through overt cognition and co-
communication, utilising public cultural symbols. Without this, our more generalised FP is 
dispositional in nature, leading to my formulation of DFP, as introduced toward the end of 
Chapter Four. This simply denotes the dispositional nature of how we react to social cues 
without overt reason explanation, which is significant insofar as it does not invoke 
propositional content in the traditional sense. Our social understanding is subsumed into our 
cognitive architecture, which enables a more streamlined and frugal use of cognitive resources. 
As stated earlier in this thesis, once propositional attitudes are off the table, this is what we are 
left with in our FP. To me, once the bigger picture is taken into account, there is no big loss 
here. 
 
5. Future Endeavours 
It would be remiss of me not to give a brief overview of the prevalent issues of this depiction 
of our minds as minimally-contentful prediction machines. We cannot supplant a decades-long 
view of the mind and expect no resistance and no repercussions. The conceptual leap alone is 
a shift in perspective many may not find easy to take, but luckily this is not something we need 
overly concern ourselves with. For example, if the PP framework is accurate, this reality may 
simply slowly seep into public discourse, or be co-opted when it is useful. This is a radical 
reconceptualisation of our underlying cognitive processing, but it is seemingly business as 
usual once out of the conceptual armchair and into the world. If anything, it is not clear what 
to make of this depiction of the mind as of yet. The science has not been settled significantly 
enough to say, so the ramifications could change by the time this is even read. But there is still 
a sense that if this is at least half the picture, our conception of our minds will never be the 
same. 
The predominant ramifications perhaps lie in the effect that this would have on our theoretical 
propositional attitude FP, as both Clark (2016: 285-288) and Hohwy (2013: 2) have attested. 
A new FP taxonomy would need to encompass this conception of how our social understanding 
works in some form. The issues would perhaps sort themselves in time, but even using the 
word “prediction” usually denotes some form of agency on the part of the individual, so it 
would be a tough habit to break to make that cognitive shift. For now, we could focus on our 
folk psychological language use, or more accurately how precise it is in the elucidation of our 
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PP processes. This, of course, would only be necessary if the entire framework of PP is actually 
scientifically viable in the first place, but that is a purely empirical question. Some examples 
of neuronal dynamical studies that are seeking to eke out the details concerning motivation and 
desire at a fine-grained level are Friston et al. (2012), Gershman and Daw (2012), Bach and 
Dolan (2012), and Schwartenbeck et al. (2014). But what of the “higher” cognitive abilities 
displayed during social cognition and instrumental reasoning? These have only begun to be 
explored, and much interesting work can be found in Clark (2016)189, Hohwy (2013) 
(especially in Chapters Nine to Twelve), Harrison et al. (2011), Hobson and Friston (2014), 
Moutoussis et al. (2014), and Seth (2014a). For example, Moutoussis et al. (2014: 10-11) cast 
“representations” within the mind during interpersonal interaction as a form of “belief” in a 
Pavlovian sense where social learning may skew us toward “beliefs irrespective of their 
consequences” (ibid.: 10) within certain contexts. Essentially, specific brain states are “taught” 
to be attuned to behaviour much in the same way that Pavlov’s animals were behaviourally 
trained. Again, this is a social attunement not built upon sentential propositional attitudes, but 
upon generative models within the neuronal substrate. Studies such as these are the first steps 
to a more coherent picture of our neuronal as well as social functioning in terms of our 
belief/desire psychology. 
The research looks bright, but a multitude of conceptual hurdles are still in the way. For 
instance: the extended battle over conceptual clarity concerning representation within the mind 
is far from over, with the promising but abrasive REC programme still waiting in the wings. 
Content may not be a problem if it is done away with but, as has been demonstrated, content is 
often introduced as the very mark of the cognitive. The REC approach is to ignore the problem 
and focus elsewhere, but it is clear that that is not viable if content is put on the proverbial 
pedestal and assumed to be pertinent to subsequent theorising. The problem of truth conditional 
content for propositional thinking may be swept aside if our minds are recognised as embodied 
and embedded within their environment in such a way so as to harbour covariant relationships 
to distal stimuli. The socio-cultural environment then provides the necessary accuracy-
conditions as a narrative gloss over and above the actual neuronal reality. It is only in this sense 
that propositional thinking is “instantiated” within the brain. Again, there is still a further need 
to elaborate on how enculturation affects the brain at a concrete level, but this is a promising 
                                                 
189 Especially in his discussions surrounding the possibility of generative models and how they potentially form a 
variant of simulation, enabling long-term planning in conjunction with social cognition. Moreover, there is 
discussion over how precision-weightings can be “self-manipulated” through “linguistically inflected reasoning” 
(Clark 2016: 300). 
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avenue of research. In short, the hurdles become wrinkles in the road if we simply shift our 
perspective toward these more radical theories, but this will require overcoming decades-worth 
of conceptual baggage. Academics themselves should at the very least apprise themselves of 
the latest science (and philosophy thereof) before theorising from their armchairs. Further 
research is needed in order to elucidate the bodily responsitivity toward environmental cues, 
while remaining neutral to what processes are being instantiated. Cao (2012), for example, 
conducted a study to figure out what is being said when specific parts of the brain are said to 
be in “contentful” communication with one another. Is there more explanatory weight that is 
borne by positing intermediary content? After analysing a diverse cast of functionally different 
processes and components within the brain, from neurotransmitters to networks of neurons, she 
arrives at the simple answer: not much. It is only once the organism as a whole is taken into 
account that semantics comes into the picture (ibid.: 70). I propose it is only in this light that 
philosophers can be useful in their contribution toward the endeavours of the cognitive 
sciences. If they are not “in the lab”, they can certainly help clarify matters, building on what 
the science has revealed. The downside to this is a jockeying for position with regards to whose 
theory holds the best explanation. While I agree with Hutto and Myin in their belief that 
philosophers “are not mere onlookers” (Hutto & Myin 2017: 244), I am reticent to speculate 
just how much the majority of philosophical theorising in this field has been helpful. I am, 
however, confident that the avoidance of the HPC manages to sidestep otherwise “intractable 
theoretical mysteries” (ibid.). 
A lesser issue in this regard (due to its waning popularity), is of the question of the role of 
theoretical propositional FP in its canonical guise. It is a research paradigm which is petering 
out, and perhaps this study can contribute to the slow death of the paradigm. Again, we shall 
continue to use folk terminology, but it is best if its technical usage falls away in time. It is 
much more plausible to view FP as trading in a priori modelling of the environment, which is 
altered on an ad hoc basis.  Reason explanation is shown to be a retrospective instrumental 
thinking that affords us a grip on an otherwise cognitively fuzzy environment, providing 
platitudes that guide us along pathways that work in the macro-perspective of general social 
interaction. We will be left with talk of folk psychological propositional attitudes in our 
everyday speech, but hopefully within academic circles these will eventually turn out to be 
relics from a hard-to-shake-off jargon. A developing science needs to look to a future 
emancipated from our present conceptual shackles, and I hope that this thesis goes some way 
to showing the why and the how of achieving this. 
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